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Abstract
This dissertation examines the impact of contemporaneous American participation in war on
military labor and conflict duration. Chapter one uses variation in occupation-specific retention
bonuses and mortality risks observed in the U.S. Army during the war on terror to estimate the
rate at which volunteers for active military service are willing to trade wealth and risk of death
when making reenlistment decisions. Our estimate of the Value of Statistical Life among first-term
soldiers is between $0.1M and $0.5M. Bonus policy is an effective tool for meeting near-term military
manpower shortages. Increasing the bonus offer by $1,000 leads to an increase in the probability of
reenlistment of 1.5 percentage points.
Chapter two documents a substantial increase in the post-service one-year mortality rate of recent
veterans using estimates constructed by matching Army administrative data to the Social Security
Administration's Death Master File. The total mortality of service in the Army between 2001 and
2010 is likely understated by approximately 10% or over 350 deaths. Approximately 91% of the
change in post-service mortality is due to the effect of exposure to high rates of mortality while
in-service. The relationship between in-service and post-service mortality has likely always existed,
but the higher rates of in-service mortality during the war mean that post-service mortality rates are
higher.
The third chapter provides empirical evidence linking third-party interventions to increases in the
duration of intra-state wars. It also reviews several theoretical constructs underlying this correlation,
and it adapts the model of the Swing Voter's Curse to provide a novel explanation. Namely, when
third-parties intervene in civil wars, local nationals are more likely to abstain from making a com-
mitment to either the government or rebel side as the intervening party serves to cloud perceptions
of the latent balance of power between the primary intra-state contenders. The chapter concludes
with an analysis of implications for interventionist policies with regard to the war in Afghanistan.
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Abstract
Estimates of the Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) are important for use in the cost-benefit
analysis of policy-related issues involving trade-offs between wealth and risk of death. We exploit
substantial variation in both occupation-specific retention bonuses and occupation-specific mortality
risk to estimate a discrete choice model of a soldier's decision whether to re-enlist for an additional
term of obligated service in the U.S. Army. This framework allows us to estimate the VSL across
heterogeneous risk types in a setting with a wide range of mortality hazards and where people
have good information about the risks they potentially confront. Our estimates of the VSL for the
population of young men and women who volunteer for active military service range between $0.1
and $0.5M. Our estimates provide strong evidence on the efficacy of bonus policy in meeting near-
term manning shortages. Increasing the bonus offer by $1,000 leads to an increase in the probability
of reenlistment by about 1.5 percentage points. Finally, our approach allows us to estimate the VSL
as well as the elasticity of military labor supply with respect to bonus policy while controlling for the
risk of non-fatal injury.
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1.1 Introduction
"Still there was never a shortage of able volunteers. Discomforts, dangers, the likelihood of
miserable death on the wrong side of the world.. only exalted the energy of those who were
filled with a sincere love for the great task undertaken."
- David McCullough, The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal 1870-1914
By May of 1884, nearly 19,000 people were at work on the first (failed) attempt to construct the Panama
Canal. Typical wages averaged $2.11 per day or nearly $526 per year. A conservative estimate of the
mortality hazard was a staggering 2,200 deaths per 100,000 workers. Back-of-the-envelope calculations
suggest a hedonic wage estimate of the value of a statistical life (VSL) among canal workers was about
$16,000 in nominal terms, or about $380,000 in constant year 2010 dollars.1 Placed in the context
of contemporaneous estimates of the median VSL for workers, which is $7-$8 million (Viscusi, 2009),
one might conclude the canal workers to have been exceptionally risk-seeking or perhaps even irrational.
However, the above quote from McCullough suggests the existence of substantial non-pecuniary value
associated with working on a task considered to be of vast national or strategic importance.
The purpose of this study is to estimate the value of a statistical life (VSL) using variation in occupation-
specific military retention bonuses and occupation-specific mortality hazards in the context of observed
reenlistment decisions made by soldiers in the U.S. military during a time of war. Although our estimates
are specific to the population of young people who volunteer for enlisted service on active duty, our
framework allows estimation of the VSL across person types with varying degrees of risk aversion and in
a setting with widely varying exposure to risk. Further, our methodology improves upon existing tech-
niques for estimating the elasticity of military labor supply with respect to cash bonuses by incorporating
occupation-specific mortality and morbidity hazards.
The setting for our study is the U.S. Army's reenlistment system from 2002 through 2010. This is
a near-ideal setting for estimating the trade-off between wealth and risk. First, there is a substantial
degree of variation in both occupation-specific mortality hazards as well as wealth across both military
occupational specialties and time. Second, soldiers have very good information about the risks associated
with their inside occupational choices as well as the wealth associated with their occupational choices.
Third, soldiers who are eligible for reenlistment confront a choice among many different alternatives that
'McCullough reports there were 420 recorded deaths among canal workers in 1883, but the actual death count was
probably closer to 1,300. Assuming alternative annual earnings opportunities of roughly $250 per year and an alternative
mortality rate of roughly 500 per 100,000, a very rough, conservative estimate of the VSL among canal workers is calculated
as ($526- $250) 42 -500). 100,000 = 16,131. By 1884, the death toll in Panama was no longer a secret. In fact,
faculty members at the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussees began advising graduates not to go to Panama because it would
be suicidal. Nonetheless, there was never a shortage of workers. Lieutenant William Kimball, an American naval officer
who prepared a special intelligence report in May 1885 (the report was subsequently labeled The Rousseau Report), wrote,
"[L]oss of human life would never be a deterrent in itself. Money was what counted. Human life was always cheap ...and[t]o abandon the canal now would be unthinkable... it would spell disaster not merely for thousands of shareholders, but for
French prestige." The logic articulated in the latter half of Kimball's statement seems eerily similar to much of the rhetoric
used in debates related to the American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
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involve choice-specific levels of wealth via different bonus offers and choice-specific mortality hazards.
Finally, the reenlistment decision is generally binding in the sense that once a soldier signs a contract to
re-enlist, he is obligated to serve for the full period of the contract in the specified occupation.
We offer several potential contributions to the literature. First, we estimate the VSL using a novel
margin of adjustment. That is, the military reenlistment decision is not only an occupational choice but
a lifestyle choice. Second, the degree of variation in both bonuses and mortality hazards, both within and
across military occupations and over time, allows us to provide internally valid estimates of the VSL for
this important population of young people. This allows us to learn something about the heterogeneity
in VSL by studying what most consider to be an extreme tail of the distribution of risk types. It also
allows us to develop modern wartime estimates for VSL, which may be useful to the military, particularly
in cost-benefit analysis of contemporaneous policy choices related to investments in safety equipment,
capital, or modified operational tactics.
Our estimation method makes use of the the discrete choice framework. We parametrically estimate
the probability of reenlistment among first-term Army soldiers as a function of reenlistment bonus offers
and military occupation-specific fatality rates while controlling for observables such as the prevailing
military-civilian earnings differential, the (age-gender-race-specific) civilian mortality rate, and the civilian
unemployment rate. We interpret the ratio of the observed marginal change in wealth required to
induce soldiers to accept a marginal increase in exposure to risk as the implied VSL. We make a further
contribution to the literature through the ability to estimate the VSL while controlling for the risk of
non-fatal injury.
Similar to estimates of the VSL among canal workers during the period of France's "great task," we
estimate VSLs for American military workers in the range of $0.1-$0.5 million. Again, these estimates
are substantially lower than generally accepted contemporaneous estimates among American civilian
workers. This result may not be surprising given the young age and relatively low opportunity costs
of serving among volunteers for active military service. Yet, our estimates are so small, and in some
cases $0 for particularly risk-seeking infantry types, that one might wonder whether the rational utility-
maximizing actor model is adequate, particularly without usable measures of the non-pecuniary benefits
associated with service in support of a "great task" of national importance. Though point estimates
measuring the responsiveness of reenlistment behavior with respect to changes in mortality hazard are
small, negative, and generally statistically significant, a consistent and strong finding across virtually all
of our specifications indicates soldiers are highly responsive to changes in bonus policy. We estimate
the probability of reenlistment increases by about 1.5 percentage points when the Army increases bonus
offers by $1,000.
We proceed as follows. Section two provides a very short review of the empirical challenges of estimating
the VSL as documented in the literature. Section three details the setting for our empirical analysis.
Section four describes our estimating framework. Section five provides details about the data along with
summary statistics of our sample. Section six presents and discusses our results. Section seven concludes.
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1.2 Overview
There is no upper bound on the value of a life. Most people would likely choose to give up all material
wealth to avoid certain death. However, most people encounter risks, often deliberately, as part of the
normal processes of life. Risks can be avoided or mitigated by spending time or money, and many people
are willing to accept increased wealth in exchange for increased risk exposure. The VSL measures the
willingness to accept increased wealth in exchange for increased exposure to risk (Thaler and Rosen,
1976). One can estimate the VSL (V*) by recovering preferences related to the willingness to trade-off
changes in wealth (W) with changes in the probability of death (p):
AWV* -- - (1)AP
The literature documents three general frameworks for attempting to recover preferences related to the
wealth-risk trade-off: hedonic wages, consumer demand for safety, and quasi-experimentation rooted in
policy change.
The canonical hedonic wage approach predicts compensating differentials for variations in job risk from
a regression of wages on occupation-specific, industry-specific, or occu pation-i nd ustry-specific risk (con-
ditional on observables). This approach has produced lower-bound estimates of the VSL that range
between $1.OM (Thaler & Rosen) and about $11M (Viscusi). However, the net relationship between
wealth and risk is confounded. Unobserved factors that affect wealth are likely correlated with risk pro-
ducing omitted variable bias. Workers demand higher wages for higher risks leading to the potential for
reverse causality. Skill and working conditions are correlated with risks across job types. There is likely to
be a high degree of non-classical measurement error in the risk variable as measured by aggregate labor
market statistics. VSL estimates produced by the hedonic wage approach can be misleading. Hersch
(1998) as well as Black & Kniesner (2003) find a negative relationship between wages and job hazards
for many regression specifications.
The hedonic wage approach suffers from other estimation challenges. First, the VSL likely varies by
income, risk levels, risk preferences, and over the life cycle. Further, observed risk premiums depend on
the distribution of occupational risks, safety technology, and sorting of workers. Most data are insufficient,
either in terms of sample size or heterogeneity across the potential joint distribution of earnings, risk,
and age, to recover a distribution of VSL estimates. Second, expectations of occupational fatality risks
may be difficult to measure. Ex post observations of occupational mortality as recorded in administrative
data might not be consistent with the information used by agents when making wealth-risk trade-off
decisions. One could still estimate the VSL if one knows what information agents are using to make
their decisions. However, it's not clear that such assessments are consistent across individuals or that the
typical data used in hedonic regressions involve agents that are well-informed about actual occupational
risks. Finally, given the fact that occupational deaths are small probability events, even in the most
dangerous of occupations, the lack of a continuous supply of job risks makes it difficult to back-out
individual preferences.
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The consumer demand for safety approach compares variation in the values of things that people buy
with associated avoidance of mortality risks. One example is a study that compares variation in housing
values with avoidance of cancer risk. Gayer, Hamilton, and Viscusi (2000) produce an upper bound
estimate of the VSL that ranges between $5.6M to $6.6M from analysis of Superfund cleanup sites in
the Grand Rapids, Michigan area. Though a potential improvement over the hedonic wage approach, the
consumer demand for safety approach generally suffers from lack of precision, small-sample sizes, and
lack of continuous distributions of hazards across heterogeneous risk and wealth types.
The quasi-experimental approach is based on policy changes that have safety-related impacts. Ashenfelter
and Greenstone (2004) estimated the VSL using a 1987 institutional change in federal speed limit law that
allowed states to raise the speed limit on rural interstate highways from 55 miles per hour to 65 miles per
hour. The authors estimate that states which adopted the higher speed limit were willing to accept risks
that resulted in savings of $1.54 million (1997 dollars) per fatality (about $2.1 million in 2010 dollars).
The authors interpret this estimate as an upper bound on the VSL in states adopting higher speed limits.
The analysis relies on two major assumptions. First, the 1987 law is a plausibly exogenous change that
avoids the difficulties of making causal inferences with observational data that reflect the past optimizing
decisions of individuals. Second, the 1987 federal law and subsequent state-level policy decisions made
by elected representatives reflect the preferences of the median voter. Thus, the estimated VSL could be
a reflection of the policy maker's preferences rather than of individual preferences.
Our approach draws on the basic concept of the hedonic wage framework by attempting to recover
preferences relative to the trade-off between wealth and risk as observed in an occupational setting.
However, our approach provides an improvement over the canonical hedonic estimates by being able
to estimate the VSL in a setting with a relatively continuous supply of job risks as well as substantial
variation in both job risks and wealth levels. Additionally, our approach makes use of a large sample
of individuals with well-measured data in a setting where the agents are well-informed about both the
variation in wealth and in mortality hazard. Also novel within the VSL literature, our method does not
strictly rely on estimation along the margin of occupational choice but rather the margin of a lifestyle
choice because the military reenlistment decision not only determines a soldier's occupation but his
housing location, transportation patterns, access to medical care, and many other things that affect his
quality of life.
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1.3 The Setting
The setting for our analysis is the U.S. Army. Between 2002 and 2010, the number of people serving on
active duty in the U.S. Army at any point in time has averaged between 475,000 and 550,000 soldiers.
Each year, approximately 65,000 non-prior service young people volunteer to serve in the Army for a
period of between two and six years. The organization of work is generally structured to encompass
hierarchical job ladders in which soldiers serving at higher levels of responsibility and skill must come
from lower levels of the internal labor market. There is no lateral entry. Thus, the Army relies on a
substantial proportion of each new cohort to re-enlist for additional periods of obligated service in order
to meet its requirements for higher-ranked, experienced workers. The Army has relatively fixed demand
for soldiers, in the short run, and such demand is defined by requirements at the level of occupation and
rank. With no lateral entry and the need for higher-ranked individuals, the Army must balance enlistment
and reenlistment rates with attrition. The main, short-term policy instruments available to the Army to
address near-term imbalances in demand and supply are enlistment and retention bonuses.
In the short term, military demand for labor is relatively inelastic. Personnel requirements are set by rank
and occupation authorizations in accordance with established Tables of Organization and Equipment as
well as statutorily authorized funding levels. The Army does have the ability to imperfectly substitute
one type of labor for another type to meet short term requirements. The Army can hire contractors to
drive trucks when there aren't enough military-trained truck drivers, use infantry privates to perform the
duties of infantry sergeants when there aren't enough sergeants, or use artillery trained-canon operators
to perform the duties of infantry riflemen when there aren't enough infantrymen. In the long run, the
military demand for labor can be more elastic as the Army has the ability to modify tables of organization
and equipment in such a way as to substitute equipment for people. For example, the Army can increase
its use of passive surveillance equipment rather than using infantrymen as sentries, or the Army can use
unmanned aerial vehicles which require fewer mechanics, operators, and crew members than helicopters.
The military can also change its strategy or its doctrine, essentially changing the way that it conducts
operations, so as to require different amounts of labor. The Army might decide to emphasize the use
of small-scale special forces units in indigenous force training operations rather than employ large-scale
conventional units in seize-and-hold operations. However, the cycle by which these types of changes take
place extend over the course of several months and in many cases years, whereas changes in reenlistment
bonus policy can be implemented over the course of a few days.
On the supply side, when an individual enlists in the U.S. Army, the individual is able to choose his term
of service and to pick an occupation. Once enlisted (and subsequently trained), the Army chooses a
soldier's unit of assignment based on the needs of the Army (Lleras-Muney, 2010). Once assigned to a
2
Choice of military occupation at the time of enlistment is constrained by an individual's physical and mental qualifications as
well as by contemporaneous conditions of supply and demand. For example, individuals with low Armed Forces Qualification
Test (AFQT) scores may not qualify for service in some technical occupations. Also, if an occupation is over-strength at
the time a person wishes to enlist, the occupation will generally not be available to the applicant.
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unit, the Army chooses the soldier's ex-post mortality hazard, conditional on occupation (Lyle, 2006).3
The individual's ex-ante expected hazard is a function of the soldier's occupation and deployment timing.
Near the end of a soldier's term of service, he enters the reenlistment eligibility window. Soldiers in their
reenlistment window confront the choice of re-enlisting in the active force or finishing their term of active
service and exiting active duty. See Figure 1.
When a soldier nears the end of his contractually obligated term of service, he participates in a mandatory
career counseling program during which he is exposed to options for re-enlisting for a follow-on term in
the active military as well as to information relative to outside options including civilian employment
and educational opportunities. Those considering reenlistment in the active force have a substantial set
of reenlistment options ranging from regular Army reenlistment, re-training to a different occupational
specialty (if their current occupational specialty is over-strength), stabilization at their current post of
assignment, choice of being re-assigned to another location within the continental U.S. (CONUS), or
choice of re-assignment to an overseas post (OCONUS). Further, potential re-enlistees can choose the
amount of time by which they extend their active service from between two and six years.
The Army offers lump-sum reenlistment bonuses for certain soldiers who agree to serve an additional
term of obligated service on active duty in selected occupations. Whether or not a soldier receives a
bonus offer and the size of the bonus offer depend on several factors to include military occupational
skill, rank, how much time the soldier has served on active duty, and how many years the soldier is willing
to extend his service on active duty. Bonuses are subject to federal income tax except when the soldier
reenlists in a combat zone. Bonuses may be subject to state income tax, depending on the laws of the
state of the soldier's home of record.
The most common type of reenlistment bonus is the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB). SRBs may
be occupation, location, or skill and location specific. Eligible occupations and locations are determined
by Army headquarters to meet rank, skill, and mission requirements. Bonus policies change frequently
at irregular intervals. If a soldier's current occupation or desired location is not eligible for an SRB, then
the soldier might still be eligible for an SRB if he is currently serving in a full-strength or over-strength
occupation and is willing to retrain for service in a shortage occupation. Additionally, during the period
2004 through 2010, soldiers in all occupations were generally eligible to reenlist and receive a bonus if
reenlisting during a deployment.
Observed bonus levels are an equilibrium outcome of the interaction between military demand for labor
and individual supply of military labor. On the demand side, the Army sets bonus offers for specific
occupational specialties as a function of requirements4 for the occupation, observed historical personnel
3
Though some first term enlisted soldiers may have some scope over their choice of duty location conditional on occupation,
they arguably have no scope over the choice of unit of assignment or of deployment timing. Once a soldier completes the
initial entry training associated with his occupation of choice, the needs of the Army dictate which unit the soldier serves
with and when the soldier deploys. As such, variation of within-occupation risk exposure is generally orthogonal to the
soldier's preferences for deployment or risk, conditional on the soldier's choice of occupation.
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shortages within the occupation, projected shortages based on historical enlistment and reenlistment
trends, the criticality of the particular occupation relative to the Army's mission set, the arduousness of the
occupation, and the degree of transferability of the skills associated with the military occupation relative to
the civilian labor market. Bonus offers for specific occupational specialties are increasing in the persistence
of observed and expected shortages, the criticality of the occupation to mission accomplishment, the cost
of training new recruits, the degree of arduousness associated with the occupation, and the transferability
and value of the military occupational skills relative to commensurate civilian occupations.
For example, the Army occupation with the highest demand is occupational specialty 11B, combat
infantryman. This occupation has experienced persistent shortages since the late 1990s (i.e., there
are fewer 11B's on hand than required), is considered an extremely high priority occupation given the
Army's current operational missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and is considered one of the most arduous
occupations in the military. As a result, the Army has consistently offered a reenlistment bonus to soldiers
willing to sign up for an additional term of service in the infantry. However, the size of these 11B bonus
offers has varied over time (see Figure 2) and have been mitigated by both the low cost of training new
infantry recruits and the lack of correlation between the military-specific nature of the infantryman's
skill-set and outside employment options for infantry veterans in the civilian labor market.
In contrast, the Army has also consistently offered reenlistment bonuses to soldiers willing to sign up for an
additional term of service as electronic equipment repairers. Though these occupations are not considered
arduous, high priority (due to the ability to out-source electronic equipment repair to contractors), or
difficult to fill with new recruits, it is relatively costly for the Army to train soldiers to perform duties
in these types of occupations and there are attractive outside options in the civilian sector for veterans
trained in these skill sets.
The probability of death associated with a particular occupation can be influenced by several factors to
include the specific timing and location of deployment, enemy activity, and the local unit commander's
aggressiveness. The Army can influence the probability of death via its choice of strategy and equipment
investment. For example, increased use of counterinsurgency tactics relative to seek-and-destroy missions
may not affect the overall level of risk but may decrease the risk faced by infantry soldiers while increasing
the risk faced by soldiers serving in other occupations such as those related to language translation, civil
affairs, or field medical services. Also, the military can reduce the risk of death confronted by all soldiers
by increasing its spending on protective equipment such as vehicle and body armor. As in the case of
military labor, such changes related to the use of safety or operational technology take several months
Requirements are determined by the Army's assessment of its contemporaneous mission set, its selected strategy for
accomplishing its assigned missions, and its adopted organizational structure. Though marginal changes to strategy and
organizational structure may take place annually (and sometimes more frequently), such changes are usually constrained
by budget levels and lengthy bureaucratic review processes. As such, major changes in demand for military labor occur
relatively infrequently. The most significant changes since the end of the post-Cold War draw-down include the strategic
shift in emphasis from offensive-minded combat operations to counterinsurgency operations and the organizational shift
from a division-centric Army to an Army organized by brigade combat teams. These shifts have resulted in increased
requirements for some occupations such as infantry, special forces, language translation, intelligence analysis, and military
police, and decreased requirements in other occupations to include, but not limited to, air defense, field artillery, and
combat engineering.
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or even years to implement. Given that assignment to units and assignment to deployments is driven by
the needs of the Army, we believe the contemporaneous exposure of individual soldiers to risk is largely
random, conditional on occupational choice. Further, we assume that there are no individual "supermen"
capable of single-handily changing the nature of risk exposure conditional on their choice of reenlistment.
The Army's reenlistment system includes formal, mandatory career counseling for each soldier. This
counseling takes place quarterly starting two years prior to the end of the soldier's initial contract. The
following regulatory guidance for the conduct of these counseling sessions provides the primary motivation
for our choice of key explanatory variables to include in our model of discrete choice:
"This counseling is conducted with the purpose of obtaining a reenlistment commitment from
the Soldier. A review of the Soldier's qualifications...will be conducted. Reenlistment options avail-
able to the Soldier at this time will be discussed in detail. Counselors should also advise Soldiers to
investigate civilian opportunities.. .to compare available alternatives. A review of the Regular Mili-
tary Compensation (RMC) Chart.. .and... of Army benefits is also appropriate at this time. Soldiers
will be apprised of current retirement programs, health care plans for family members, education
opportunities, and other monetary and personal benefits that an Army career provides."
- From Guidelines for Career Counseling Sessions, Table C-1, The Army Retention Program, Army
Regulation 601-280, 15 December 2010
Given this regulatory guidance on the frequency and content of career counseling, we believe soldiers
considering a reenlistment decision are well-informed about the inside wage, potential outside opportuni-
ties, and the specific cash bonuses associated with the various reenlistment menu choices. Further, given
the widespread publication of military deaths by way of both internal military information dissemination
networks and external public news media, we believe soldiers considering a reenlistment decision are
well-informed about the relative mortality hazards among the menu of available reenlistment choices.
Our primary data source consists of administrative records from the U.S. Army encompassing the years
2002 to 2010. See Figure 3. Prior to 2001, the military mortality rate was lower than that of com-
mensurately aged civilians. Further, military compensation largely increased at about the same rate as
civilian compensation. After 2001, the military mortality hazard increased substantially as did the average
level of retention bonus offers and the growth rate of military compensation. Our sample includes the
population of all non-prior service, first-term soldiers who were eligible for reenlistment between 2002
and 2010. We observe a full set of demographic and service characteristics for each individual in the
sample, and we observe the ex post reenlistment decisions made by soldiers who become eligible for
reenlistment. We make use of publicly available policy announcements to construct a complete history
of the ex ante bonus and reenlistment options available to each soldier at the time he becomes eligible
for reenlistment. We estimate hazard rates from an administrative database of war-related casualties
and separations from active duty, including those separations that result from death (all causes). To our
knowledge, this is the first attempt to link the complete menu of choices available to an Army soldier at
14
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his reenlistment decision with his demographic characteristics, his choice-specific mortality hazards, and
his actual reenlistment choice.
There are several features of the Army's personnel system that are particularly advantageous to the
estimation of the VSL. The first is the fact that there are frequent changes in bonus policy as well as in
mortality hazards, both across and within military occupations, and such changes are plausibly exogenous
to any given soldier's reenlistment decision. Variation over time of within-occupation hazard rates are
essentially random, or at the very least are orthogonal to an individual's decision whether to reenlist. In
other words, there are no supermen who can single-handily change the outcomes or conduct of military
operations at the operational or strategic levels. Further, changes in reenlistment bonus policies are
essentially orthogonal to an individual's decision whether to reenlist because changes in bonus policy
are made at the macro level in response to manning shortages, which are driven by the needs of the
Army as defined by relatively fixed manning requirements. As such, the Army's demand for personnel
is fixed by processes that determine operational requirements, and such processes are generally executed
with little regard to micro level variations in labor supply within specific occupational classes. Thus, the
Army cannot adjust its demand for personnel in the short run nor can it affect supply through changes
in general compensation levels. Rather, the Army must rely on relatively frequent changes in retention
bonus policy to respond to contemporaneous manning shortages. Further, given the large size of the
Army (over 500,000 soldiers on active duty during most of the decade of the 2000s), one individual's
reenlistment decision is likely to have little to no effect in the near term on bonus policy.
A second relatively unique feature of the occupational choice decision inherent in the reenlistment process
is that soldiers have relatively perfect information about the inside wage as well as very good information
about the inside hazard rate. We believe it is highly likely that soldiers have accurate knowledge of the
information recorded in the administrative data. As such, the scope for measurement error is relatively
small in the military setting, unlike hedonic wage approaches which rely on self-reported survey results
as well as aggregated occupation and industry classification data from civilian labor markets.
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1.4 Estimating Framework: Discrete Choice
We use a random utility model of discrete choice to model a soldier's decision whether to select among
a range of reenlistment options or to exit active military service. Decision maker i (a soldier in the
reenlistment window) chooses reenlistment option j with j C J for discrete, finite J where rij takes on
the value 1 if alternative j is chosen and 0 otherwise. The alternatives are mutually exclusive. One of
the alternatives must be selected. The probability of selecting any alternative j E J is positive.
rij 1 if alternative j is chosen
0 if j not chosen-
Erij = 1
Pr(rij=1) > 0 Vj
The utility for soldier i who selects choice j has an observable component Vij and unobservable componentEij:
Uij = Vij + Eij V (2)
We assume eij is independent and identically distributed extreme value which implies that E,= Ei- ei
has the logistic distribution (for j 7 j) so that:
exp E,F (E,*jj,) = (ii
1+ exp (e,)
McFadden (1974) showed that the conditional logit model can be derived from optimizing behavior where
the probability of individual i selecting choice j from among J alternatives is given by:
Pr (rij = 1) = Pr (Vij+ Eij > Vi + Eij Vj j')
= Pr (eij <Vij+Eij -Vij Vij fj')
f ( vi exp (-exp (Vj + ij -Vi)) f (Eij )dEij
exp (Vij)
E exp (Vij)
The relative odds of choosing one option vice an alternative are given by:
Pr(ri-=1) exp(Vij)
Pr (riji = 1) - exp (Vij) =-exp (V 1 - Vi) (3)
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Our approach applies the discrete choice, conditional logit model to the case of military retention in a
spirit similar to that of Rand (2011). Our approach modifies that of Rand by incorporating death risk
and allowing heterogeneity in death risk across time and military occupational specialties. Additionally,
our approach uses actual bonus offers as compiled from Military Personnel Messages rather than bonus
offers estimated from cohort averages.
Consider the case where J= 3 so that the choice set includes j= 0 (exit Army), j = 1 (reenlist same MOS),
and j = 2 (reenlist new MOS). We use the discrete choice approach to estimate the elasticity of the
reenlistment response to retention bonus offers (Bktj) associated with occupation k at time t for choice
j and relative mortality hazards where Pktj is the expected hazard in occupation k at time t for choice j
and pi" is the expected civilian hazard for individual i at time t associated with the outside option of not
reenlisting. We control for the expected discounted military-civilian earnings difference (mit - wi), local
area unemployment rates (ut), and time fixed effects ('rt). We also estimate models with occupation and
year-by-occupation fixed effects (Xk and 2 kt).
We normalize location by setting the utility of the outside option (j = 0), which is leaving active duty
to enter the civilian labor market, equal to 0. The utility (for choice j 7 0) is a function of the time
and occupation-specific bonus offer Bktj, the excess mortality (Pktj - p'il) which is the relative difference
between the time and occupation-specific mortality hazard and the expected civilian mortality hazard,
the relative difference between military pay and expected civilian pay, the unemployment rate, and in
some specifications time effects, occupation effects, and time-by-occupation fixed effects.
Uikto = 0
Ujktj = a+ yBktj + p (pktpj - Pi) + 0 (mit -wit)+ 3uit -+- T +Xk +kt + eiktJ for j # 0
Total differentiation of representative utility for choice j yields the following result:
dUikt dUiktj -dUiktj = dB dBktj + k V d (p itj -piV)Ukt j d (Pkt j - Piti )
dUitk, d( ±Uikid+ d~kj d (mit - wit ) + duit
d (mit -- wit ) d uit
By setting dUiktj = 0 and assuming no change in m, w, or u, we estimate the VSL as:
dUik~j
dBktj (Pkt-Pit p
d (Pkt~j - P~iv) duik~j 7
For example, the estimated relative log-odds of reenlistment (j= 1) to exiting the service (j= 0) are
given by:
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(Pr (rikt1 1) B)ivlog = a+ +Bkt1 + P (Pkt1 - Pit i
Pr (riktO = 1 /
+0 (mit ~ wit) -- it
and the implied VSL is estimated as:
dlog Pr(rikI-1)
d(pkt1-p") _ dBkt1 P
1 og Pr(rikI=1) d (pkt I - Pciv) (Pr(ritO=1)
dBktl
We interpret -0*1 as the increase in reenlistment bonus at time t necessary for soldier i serving in MOS
k to accept a marginal increase in the relative risk of death associated with choice 1 (re-enlisting in the
same MOS) vice choice 0 (leaving active duty and entering the civilian labor market). In more common
terms, we measure the VSL as A = and in the discrete choice framework we estimate the VSL as a
ratio of partial derivatives with = - = In our data, we measure wealth, or the bonus offerdU/dB -dP -
B, in units of thousands of dollars and risk in units of deaths per 1,000 soldiers per year. Thus, our
estimates of the VSL are measured in units of millions of dollars. For example, if __ = 0.23 and = -1
then = - dU/P _ 0.23x1,000 -023 x 106 -$230 000.tU/dB -1/1000
This approach has some potential shortcomings. First, it assumes independence of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA). This assumption is less problematic if the observed portion of utility is specified correctly, but may
be more of a concern if choice alternatives are correlated. To address this issue, we estimated several
models using different configurations of the choice space in an effort to group together alternatives that
are likely to be most correlated. Second, this approach assumes constant variance and does not allow for
individual variation in unobserved tastes for risk or military service. To address this issue, we estimated
mixed logit models as well as conditional logit models with fully flexible polynomial functional forms
for the hazard and bonus variables. We did not find substantial empirical evidence for the existence of
unobserved heterogeneity. 5
A third shortcoming of the discrete choice approach is that we assume exogeneity of the explanatory
variables. As per our discussion in Section 3 above, we argue that macro-level reenlistment bonus offers
and expected military mortality hazards are orthogonal to individual-level reenlistment decisions. Finally,
our approach assumes a static framework during the period of time in which a soldier is eligible for reen-
listment. In other words, we assume the set of reenlistment choices available to a soldier remain constant
5When we executed b-spline estimates in specifications allowing flexible polynomial functional forms for the hazard and
the bonus variables, our results were not substantially different than the straight-forward linear specifications thus implying
a constant effect. In other words, the results of our flexible functional form estimates did not suggest the need to divert
from our use of the more parsimonious linear specification. This indicates the trade-off between wealth and risk occurs at
a constant rate at the margin that soldiers face when in their reenlistment decision window. Results of our mixed logit and
flexible functional form estimates are available upon request.
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throughout the period of time during which he is eligible for reenlistment. It is possible that bonus offers
as well as hazard rates can change during a soldier's eligibility window. However, given that soldiers have
little scope of control over the timing of their deployments or the operational methods selected by their
commanders, that soldiers do not have access to in-the-moment information about specific occupational
shortages, and given that bonus policy announcements are made at what are essentially irregular and
random intervals, it is very difficult for soldiers to strategically game the reenlistment process by holding
out for a higher bonus offer or a lower mortality hazard. Since bonus offers can change within the span
of a few days and since soldiers lack sufficient information to accurately predict the direction of bonus
offer changes, we argue that the initial offer in the soldier's primary reenlistment decision window is a
sufficient statistic for the actual bonus offer in place when the soldier makes the reenlistment or exit the
Army decision. With regard to the exogeneity of the mortality hazard, we executed time series regression
models to predict future values of occupation-specific death risks. Our results indicate a mean-reverting
time series prediction fits the data better than any other time series model suggesting that soldiers have
some sense of the value of the long-run war-time mortality hazard and expect contemporaneous devia-
tions in either the up or down direction to be mitigated in future periods. See Appendix A for additional
discussion related to predicting future hazard rates.
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The data consist of a panel of non-prior service, first-term Army soldiers who entered their window
for reenlistment eligibility between 2002 and 2010. Demographic information on each soldier and the
soldier's military service characteristics come from the Total Army Personnel Database (TAPDB) as
sourced by the Army's Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis (OEMA). Each soldier's deployment
history is derived from military pay records. We use separations data from the TAPDB as well as a
listing of all war-related casualties provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) to estimate
time-varying occupation-specific military mortality hazards.6 We use publicly available Military Personnel
Messages, which provide policy announcements on the Army's reenlistment program several times each
year, to construct a complete history of actual bonus offers. Our sample includes a wide mix of military
occupations with large populations and wide-ranging values of both mortality hazards and bonus offers.
We use the Army's RETAIN database to construct a matrix of actual reenlistment decisions to include
actual bonus received, option selected, and term of additional service. We use Current Population
Survey (CPS) data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (Ruggles, 2010) to estimate expected
opportunity cost civilian earnings for soldiers considering reenlistment. We use National Center for Health
Statistics micro-level mortality files and Census Bureau inter-censal population estimates to construct
comparison civilian mortality rates. Finally, we use Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data on Local
Area Unemployment Statistics to measure the unemployment rate in the soldier's home-of-record county
during the month of his reenlistment decision.
1.5.1 Bonus Offers
Using publicly-available policy announcements called Military Personnel Messages, we construct a database
of time, location, rank, and occupation-specific reenlistment bonus offers. During the period 1997-2010,
the Army released at least 139 Military Personnel Messages which announced changes to reenlistment
and bonus policy. See Figure 4 for a short extract from one of these policy announcements.
Each military personnel message specifies the occupation, rank, and level of bonus authorized. For
example, Figure 4 shows that a Truck Driver (88M) in the reenlistment eligibility window in July 2007
with rank of specialist (SPC) in zone A (i.e., has between 17 months and 6 years of active service) is
eligible for a Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) with multiplier 2. The bonus offer is the multiplier
times the soldier's basic monthly pay times the number of years of the reenlistment term that he selects.
Since there is a cap on the bonus of $10,000, the formula for calculating the bonus offer is given by:
Bk=88M,t=Ju1y2007 = max { Multiplier -BasePayE4,4ys -ReupTerm, $10,000}
6TAPDB data from OEMA as well as all personnel data from DMDC were provided to Michael Yankovich as part of a
restricted use agreement that specifies the data can only be stored, accessed, and analyzed using government information
systems within government facilities. Though the data provided to the authors was de-identified, the risk of backward
induction of personal identities precludes additional distribution of the data. For access to the raw personnel data, one
must make direct application to OEMA and/or DMDC. Data preparation and analysis programs are available from the
authors upon request.
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For a truck driver with four years of service (monthly basic pay in 2007 of $1,978.50), the menu of
reenlistment options available to the soldier is depicted in Figure 5.
After constructing an exhaustive database of potential bonus offers for each occupation in each month,
we matched the individuals in our sample to the bonus offer database based on an occupation-rank-years
of service crosswalk. We were able to validate this method by using data from the Army's RETAIN
database, which contains a full set of administrative characteristics about each reenlistment. As a result,
we were able to compare our constructed bonus offers from military personnel messages to the actual
terms of reenlistment, including option and term choice, as well as the value of the bonus actually received
among those who re-enlisted.
1.5.2 Military Fatality Rates
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) measures the fatality rate for group g during time frame t (typically
a year) as
fatalitiesgt 2001000,000
hoursworkedgt
where 200,000,000 is a scaling factor for 100,000 full-time equivalent workers, assuming 50 weeks of
work with a 40 hour work week. We use military administrative data7 to measure the mortality rate per
1,000 soldiers for military occupation k in month t as:
) 1,000
Pkt = fatalitieskn - (5)
(n=t- II1 strengthkt
where strength is the number of soldiers assigned to military occupation k at the end of time period t.
Our measure is different than that used by BLS because we do not attempt to represent the number
of hours worked by soldiers. Our measured rate may overstate the fatality hazard relative to how BLS
would measure it since the typical soldier puts in more than a 40-hour work week on average, particularly
when deployed. Further, our count of fatalities includes all fatalities whereas the BLS count would only
include deaths that are specifically linked in a causal way to the occupation. We argue that a soldier is
exposed to the threat of occupational hazards 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
Using Pkt as the measure of the military mortality hazard rate assumes that the soldier expects next
period's mortality to be the same as that of the current period in which the reenlistment decision is
7
There are two sources of data on military deaths. The first comes from the Defense Manpower Data Center. It is a database
of all combat-related deaths which have occurred since September 2001. The second comes from the Office of Economic
Manpower Analysis and is derived from the Army's loss files. Each time a soldier departs active service, an entry is created
in the loss file which records a full set of administrative characteristics about the type of discharge, including whether the
soldier died or left active duty due to disability. We are able to compare data from the combat-deaths file with the data
from the loss file to validate the accuracy of the military death counts we use to construct military occupation-specific
mortality hazards over time.
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made. We consider several alternative specifications. Our preferred approach uses a measure of the
expected military mortality hazard at time t + 1 in occupation k using the results from mean-reverting
time series regression prediction where:
Pk,t+1 = k,t+1 = k + (+1k)Pkt (6)
and where &, and P, are estimated from the mean-regression model:
Pkt - Pk,t-1 = ak + OkPk,t _1 + Vkt
The mean-reverting measure of mortality risk is appropriate if soldiers have accurate, timely information
about the mortality hazards in occupation k but expect such hazards to follow a long-run average trend.
Thus, if considering reenlistment in exceptionally high periods of mortality, soldiers might expect next
period's morality to be lower. We also consider specifications involving measures of mortality aggregated
at the career management field level as well as more complicated time-series predictive ARIMA models.
See Appendix A for a complete discussion of our choice of measure for the inside mortality rate.
1.5.3 Civilian Mortality Hazards
We estimate civilian mortality hazards, normalized to rates per 1,000 population, using the following
equation:
Pit Pagr - Dsctagr - 1,000 (7)
sctagr
where psvagr is the civilian mortality hazard in state s and county c corresponding to individual i's home
of record, and in year t for age group a, gender g, and race r. Psctagr is the population in state s, county
c, and year t for age group a, gender g, and race r as tabulated from the Census Bureau's Vintage 2009
intercensal estimates8 . bsctagr is the number of deaths resulting from non-health related reasons in state
s, county c, and year t for age group a, gender g, and race r as estimated using Poisson regression from
micro-level Vital Statistics mortality data (i.e., Mortality Files with All County Geographic Information)
provided under a restricted-use data agreement with the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). 9
After estimating Pcjvagr for each county and age-gender-race group in the US for 1997 through 2009,
we match the estimated civilian mortality rate to individuals in our sample via a crosswalk from the
8
See http://www.census.gov/popest/data/intercensa/index.html or http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/bridged _race.htm.
9
We use three year running totals to estimate the mortality hazards in counties with small populations (<100,000) and for
county age-gender-race cells with small populations (<10,000).
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individual's home-of-record zip code to state-county FIPS code. Thus, our basic assumption is that, at
the time of a soldier's reenlistment decision, his expectation of the civilian mortality hazard he would
confront by not re-enlisting is based on the contemporaneous mortality hazard for his demographic group
in the county of his home of record (i.e., the soldier's home address at the time of original enlistment).
We focus on estimating civilian mortality hazards for age groups encompassing ages 20-34, which con-
stitutes the possible age range during which most first term enlistees could face a reenlistment decision.
We use bridged-race categories white, black, and other (where other substitutes for American Indian or
Alaskan Native and Asian or Pacific Islander).10 We focus on death counts resulting from non-health
related causes including all accident types, suicides, homicides, and other external causes. We catego-
rize causes of death from the Vital Statistics variable "cause34" (which is based on the International
Classification of Disease (ICD) 9) in the 1997 and 1998 data, and from "cause39" (which is based on
ICD10) for the 1999-2009 data. We exclude health-related causes of death (including causes related to
cancers of all types, heart-diseases of all types, diabetes, pneumonia, flu, diseases of the lungs, liver,
kidneys, and so on) because of the high degree of selection based on sound physical health at entrance
into the military and at the point of reenlistment. In other words, individuals with most pre-existing
health conditions, especially those with relatively high probability of mortality, are not allowed to enter
the military. Further, soldiers who suffer adverse health-related issues while on active duty are generally
not eligible for reenlistment, though waivers are obtainable under rare circumstances. Rather, soldiers
who contract diseases while in service are generally treated, stabilized, and processed for separation under
disability proceedings and potentially transferred to the Veterans Administration for continuing health
care coverage.
The NCHS Mortality Micro-Data with all county geographical information provides mortality counts that
include the deaths of military personnel occurring within the United States. Some of these deaths could
be the result of late effects of combat injuries, some could be the result of non-combat, non-deployed
military-specific job hazards, and some could be the result of natural causes. Whichever the case, we
attempt to separate mortality that occurs while on active duty in the Army from mortality that occurs
in the civilian population so as not to over-estimate civilian mortality rates, especially in geographic
locations with relatively high-density military populations. We adjust NCHS death counts from a year-
county-age-gender-race cell by subtracting the commensurate number of military deaths recorded in the
military administrative data at military bases concomitant with the respective county from the NCHS
data. More simply, we subtract military deaths from the death counts in counties with Army bases or
Army hospital facilities. We are able to do this because the military's administrative data allows us to
observe the soldier's duty location at the time of death. This procedure makes two assumptions. One,
most deaths of active duty soldiers while in the United States that are the result of late effects of combat
10
Bridged-race categories were constructed by mapping the 31 census race groups used in Census 2000 in accordance with
the 1997 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) standards for the collection of data on race and ethnicity to the four
race categories specified under the 1977 OMB standards. See Federal Register 62FR58781-58790 of October 30, 1997 and
OMB Statistical Policy Directive 15 of May 12, 1977.
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injuries occur in a relatively small number of locations (i.e., hospitals on military bases including places
like Walter Reed in Washington, D.C. and Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio, TX). Two,
mortality which occurs subsequent to military service after a soldier has been discharged and re-enters
civilian life is not the direct result of active military service. The first assumption could be problematic
if a significant number of combat-injured soldiers are sent to places other than military hospitals for
treatment and recovery. The second assumption could be problematic if the military regularly discharges
duty-related-injured soldiers who have a high likelihood of near term death. We do not have reason to
believe that either of these issues are prevalent.
Our estimates of civilian mortality rates are not adjusted for marital status or education level as annualized
population estimates by age-gender-race-education-marital status are not readily available at the county
level. Since there are likely to be significant differences by marital status and education level between the
military population in our sample and the civilian population upon which the mortality rates are based,
we might expect the use of our estimates for civilian mortality rates to introduce measurement error. On
one hand, soldiers are more likely to be married and have higher educational status than commensurately
aged people in the civilian population, which implies that our estimates of civilian mortality rates might
be biased upward since we generally expect to observe lower rates of mortality among married persons
and persons with higher levels of education. However, we might also expect, conditional on observables,
for those who are less risk averse to select into the military. Thus, the potential direction of bias is
ambiguous. We contend that it is best to use relatively simple-to-calculate risk of death estimates, such
as the one we use as described above, as these are the ones that are most likely to be publicly reported
and thus part of the decision maker's information set when making a reenlistment decision.11
To get a general sense for the excess mortality associated with choosing one of the reenlistment alter-
natives, see Figures 6a and 6b. Figure 6a provides an overview of the mortality rate in 2006 for selected
occupations in the military and civilian sectors. The overall Army-wide fatality rate in the Army in 2006
was 166 (deaths per 100,000 soldiers). The overall civilian occupational fatality rate was 3.9. The high-
est risk Army occupations were combat occupations including those in the cavalry, infantry, and combat
engineers. The highest risk civilian occupations were fishing, aviation, and logging. Since choosing to
reenlist in the military is not just an occupational choice but also a lifestyle choice, the more appropriate
comparison for the calculation of excess mortality is the general civilian health rate. Since soldiers are
screened for service on the basis of good health, and since soldiers who are eligible for reenlistment
must also be in good health, we exclude deaths due to health related causes in the calculation of excess
11
Though using a more sophisticated estimate of civilian mortality may potentially reduce measurement error in the estimation
of the risk associated with the outside option, this is not a primary concern. Rather we might be more concerned about
the potential for systematic measurement error in which the decision maker has inside information about the risk that he
is likely to confront in choosing whether to stay in the military or return to the civilian sector. In other words, we might
be concerned that the decision maker knows how much combat he will face in his next assignment in the military should
he choose to re-enlist and thus he knows ex ante whether he will confront a relatively high military mortality hazard by
reenlisting. Further, we might be concerned that the soldier has inside information about the risk of death he would confront
by choosing to re-enter civilian life, for example by choosing a relatively dangerous civilian occupation or re-locating to a
more dangerous county than that of his home-of-record.
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mortality. We focus on estimating civilian mortality rates by age (focusing on 20-34 year olds), race, and
gender at the county level. Figure 6b provides an overview of the military-occupation specific mortality
rates in comparison to civilian mortality rates for selected counties. The overall civilian fatality rate (for
non-health related causes) for white men aged 20-34 was 102 in 2006, for black men it was 172, for
white women it was 31, and for black women it was 30. In general, the mortality rate for black men aged
20-34 in primarily urban counties like Philadelphia or Cook County in Illinois are substantially higher than
the overall Army-wide mortality rate as well as most of the military occupation-specific mortality rates.
Only cavalry scouts, infantrymen, and combat engineers have higher mortality than black men in urban
areas.
1.5.4 Expected Military-to-Civilian Earnings Differential
We measure expected earnings for the inside options using Regular Military Compensation (RMC) where
RMC consists of the soldier's base salary, housing allowance, subsistence allowance, and the value of the
federal tax advantage associated with the statutory exemption of housing and subsistence allowances
from federal income taxation.12 We measure expected earnings for the outside option using the results
of a Mincer-style earnings regression on CPS data matched to the individuals in our sample by potential
work experience, education level, gender, race, marital status, home-of-record state, and decision year.
-We calculate the expected earnings differential as RMC minus expected civilian earnings and covert to
constant year 2010 dollars using the September Consumer Price Index (CPI) for all urban consumers
(U.S. city average, seasonally adjusted, all items) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
To the extent that unobservables (from the standpoint of the econometrician) such as individual pro-
ductivity potential, access to private job networks, or individual effort affect civilian earnings potential,
our measure of the expected military-to-civilian pay differential could be biased. Our measure of the
pay differential could also be biased if military occupation-specific training and experience affects ex-
pected civilian earnings. As a result of these two potential sources of bias, we develop estimates based
on matching those in our sample to the results of a Mincer-style earnings regression on CPS data of
military veterans. Because of the relatively small sample size of military veterans, we are only able to
match by potential work experience, education level, gender, race, marital status, home-of-record census
region, and decision year. The second alternative is a measure of expected civilian earnings based on
matching those in our sample to the results of a Mincer-style earnings regression on CPS data where the
match is made by occupation, potential work experience, education level, gender, race, marital status,
home-of-record state, and decision year. However, empirically we find that using alternative measures
of expected civilian earnings does not impact our estimates of the VSL. Additional details about our
Mincer-style civilian earnings regressions are available in Appendix B.
12Several sources of historical military pay tables are available on-line. The most comprehensive source is likely DOD's
Military Compensation website available at http://militarypay.defense.gov/pay/. We accessed this website on several
occasions in the fall of 2011.
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1.5.5 Summary Statistics
Table 1 provides a summary of the key explanatory variables and observable characteristics of the soldiers
in our sample. Columns (1) through (4) display summary statistics for the whole sample (n=561,319).
The average bonus offer for those who reenlisted (reup=1) was $8,630 while it was $4,840 for those who
did not reenlist. The excess mortality rate (the difference between a soldier's military occupation-specific
mortality rate and the civilian mortality rate prevailing in the soldier's home-of-record count) was slightly
higher for those who did not reenlist (1.68 per 1,000 verses 1.64). On average, those who reenlisted
came from counties with higher unemployment rates, had more deployment experience, were more likely
to be black, older, and married, had lower Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores, and were
more likely to have been promoted early to E-5 sergeant. Those who reenlisted also had, on average,
more individual combat exposure. 13
We also examine sub-samples by grouping individuals from the sample into one of four gender-by-
occupation classifications: men in non-combat occupations, men in combat occupations (not including
infantry or special forces occupations), men in the infantry and special forces, and women in all oc-
cupations. Non-combat occupations include military occupational specialties related to administrative,
intelligence, logistical, medical, and communication functions. Combat occupations (not infantry or spe-
cial forces) include air defense artillery, armor, aviation, engineer, and field artillery specialties. Women
are precluded by law from serving in direct combat occupations such as infantry, armor, combat engi-
neer, field artillery, and special forces. See Appendix D for a selected list of the most common military
occupational specialties and their groupings by career management groups and function types.
Examining sub-samples based on aggregated occupational groups allows us to estimate models within
sub-populations of soldiers who potentially have similar risk preferences. Summary statistics for men in
non-combat occupations are provided in columns (5)-(8), for men in combat occupations in columns (9)-
(12), for men in infantry and special forces occupations in columns (13)-(16), and for women in columns
(17)-(20). On average, women reenlist at lower rates than men, and men in combat occupations and
the infantry reenlist at lower rates than men in non-combat occupations. There is little difference in
observable measures of civilian educational attainment among those who reenlist and those who do not.
Interestingly, the gap in individual combat exposure between those who reenlist and those who do not
for men in infantry and special forces occupations is substantially higher than the gap in other gender-
by-occupation-type groupings suggesting circumstantial support for the notion that those who reenlist
for the infantry or special forces are particularly risk-seeking.
13We measure individual combat exposure for soldier i as:
cbtexpi = castoths -. 12-10 (8)deployedmonthsi
where castoti is the total count of casualties experienced by company sized units to which soldier i was assigned during
his first term of service. Company sized units (sometimes called squadrons or detachments) usually consist of about 100
soldiers. The variable deployedmonthsi is a count of the total number of months that soldier i was deployed during his first
term of service. We multiply by 12 to normalize the casualty count to a rate with an annual basis. We multiply by 10 to
normalize the rate to a per 1,000 soldiers basis. The units of cbtexpi are casualties per 1,000 soldiers per deployed year.
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Tables 2 through 6 provide a summary of observed reenlistment choices for the whole sample and each
of the four sub-samples. Overall, just under 43% of eligible soldiers choose to reenlist. The most popular
option among reenlisters is to reenlist in the same occupation with guaranteed stabilization at the current
duty location for at least 12 months. Over 13% of eligible soldiers select this alternative, which is about
31% of those who reenlist.14 The most popular reenlistment term length among those who reenlist is four
years as 14% of eligible soldiers select this term length, which is about 33% of those who reenlist. Option
2 stabilization and four-year term length are also the most popular reenlistment alternatives among those
who reenlist for each of the sub-samples. The most popular specific alternative among reenlisting men is
option 2 stabilization with a six-year term. The most popular specific alternative for reenlisting women
is option 5 (reenlist for the same occupation with choice of assignment location at a home base in the
continental United States) for a three year term.
Table 7a provides a summary of reenlistment trends for the entire Army, not just among first-term
soldiers, between 2000 and 2009. There was a sharp rise in the number of reenlistments, the proportion
of re-enlistees receiving a bonus, and the average value of bonuses received in the aftermath of the
invasion of Iraq in 2003. This simple pattern is broadly reflective of the Army's overall growth during this
period, its increased focus on retention to satisfy manning requirements, and its increased use of short-
term iocentives to elicit labor supply responses. Increases in retention (and increases in both the number
and average size of bonuses) at the aggregate level were concomitant with increases in military mortality
trends. Table 7b provides a summary of bonus trends among the non-prior service, first-term soldiers
who are the subjects in our sample. Again, the table reflects the trend of an increase in the proportion of
bonus recipients as well as an increase in bonus levels concomitant with increases in Army-wide mortality
rates as displayed in Figure 3 and also reflected by trends at the occupation level as displayed in Figure
7.
Figure 7 illustrates occupation-specific mortality hazards and occupation-specific reenlistment bonus
offers for several selected occupations. The bonus offer is based on the Regular Army Option for a
four-year term for a soldier with rank of specialist (E4) and four years of service. The mortality hazard
for infantrymen peaked in the 2007 time frame at over 6 deaths per 1,000 soldiers serving in the infantry.
The pattern of average bonus offers for infantrymen generally follows the pattern of mortality rates after
2003 with a peak average bonus offer of nearly $15,000 (in constant 2010 dollars) in late 2006. However,
the pattern of bonus offers for the infantry is seemingly independent of mortality rates in the earlier
periods. In fact, bonus offers for infantrymen went to 0 for a short period of time after September 2001,
perhaps reflecting a surge of patriotism.
Trends in occupation-specific morbidity rates are generally similar to occupation-specific mortality rates
though some variations exist particularly for aircraft mechanics, military policemen, combat engineers,
and artillerymen (fire support). See Figure 8. Since mortality and morbidity is generally not co-linear for
most military occupations, we are able to control for non-fatal injury rates in many of our specifications.
14 Note that guaranteed stabilization refers to the home-station base for the soldier's unit of assignment. This option
does not preclude soldiers from being assigned to operational deployments. In fact, none of the reenlistment options restrict
a soldier's potential for selection to deployment.
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We measure the non-fatal injury rate using casualty statistics where a soldier is classified as a casualty
when he becomes unavailable to the unit as a result of accident, capture, or injury, whether by way of
hostile or non-hostile events. For a formal definition of what constitutes a casualty, see Appendix C.
Well over 80% of casualties in the time period 2001-2010 resulted from hostile action. See Figure C1 in
Appendix C.
1.5.6 Discounting
If the annualized mortality risk is 2.6 deaths per 1,000 soldiers, the probability of death in any given year
is 0.0026. However, the reenlistment decision encompasses a choice over potential term lengths ranging
between two and six years. If the soldier expects to face an annualized mortality risk of 2.6 in the decision
year, does he expect this risk to remain constant over a three-year reenlistment term or does the soldier
discount the risk in future years? If so, what is the appropriate discount rate to use? The literature
has little to say on this topic, and sufficient treatment of this topic is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, there is some evidence on the discount rate used by soldiers with respect to multi-period streams
of money. The canonical estimate comes from Warner and Pleeter (2001), which suggests a discount
rate among active duty military members in the all-volunteer force of approximately 17%. Evidence from
field studies involving soldiers in Israel also suggests that active duty military members have exceptionally
high discount rates (Lahav et al, 2011). As such, our regressions use discounted streams of earnings
differentials according to the following formula:
Tj-1 M,-wt
(mit - wit) = 1( 7, (9)
s=0
where (mi, - wit) is the single-year earnings difference between military pay and expected civilian pay
for soldier i in month of reenlistment decision t and where s indexes each discrete year in the term
length (Tj) associated with choice alternative j. With little guidance from the literature and for the
sake of consistency, we choose to measure the accumulated excess mortality risk in the same fashion by
discounting future risk at the rate of 17% per year so that:
( J i Tj-1 (Pktj - Ptiv)(Pkt(j -I,, i t su 1.17s 0)
s=0
where (Pktj - Pil) is the single-year measure of excess mortality associated with choice alternative j as
estimated from equations 6 and 7.
1.5.7 Army Bonus Offer Function
We conclude Section 5 by displaying the results of a linear regression of the Army's bonus offer function.
See Table 8a. We estimate the following model:
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Bkt =a+PPkt+ XkP-Ek (11)
where the data is a monthly panel of observations defined at the occupation rather than individual level.
The dependent variable Bkt is the bonus offer in MOS k in month t for an E-4 with four years of service for
a Regular Army four-year reenlistment term, Pkt is the current month mortality rate for MOS k in month
t (see equation 5), and Xkt is a vector of control variables including the average expected civilian mortality
hazard, average regular military compensation, average expected civilian earnings, and the average local
area unemployment rate for soldiers in occupation k eligible for reenlistment in month t. Estimates of
the regression model of equation 11 are provided in column (1).
Identification of the causal effect of mortality risk on the Army's bonus offer may be threatened by the
presence of endogeneity arising from time-invariant omitted variables that may be common to occupation
groups or time periods. As such, we add occupation (Zk) and year fixed effects (,r,) to the model:
Bk= a-+ ppk+ -kt+ -k +,-t+ (12)
The results from estimation of the regression model of equation 12 are summarized in column (3) where
the model is estimated in levels with dummies for all years and occupations. Column (4) includes the
results of a specification with occupation-by-year fixed effects, which is estimated as a saturated model
including dummies for all years, all occupational specialties, and all interactions of year and occupational
dummies:
Bkt = a+ ppkt + t@ - k - rt - Xk - rt+Ekt
Column (5) summarizes the results of fixed-effects panel estimation where the estimating equation is
given by:
(Bkt -,&k) = P (Pkt -Pk) + X -$ K + (Ekt - tk)
As an excursion, we estimate a variation of equation 12 that controls for common trends which may be
producing a spurious relationship between the explanatory and dependent variables that might vanish if
the common trend were taken out. Column (6) summarizes the results of the following model, which
includes a linear time trend and occupation fixed effects:
Bkt = a - ppkr + Xkt -+k +yt ++ekt
To account for potential non-linearities in the common time trend, we include a trend break to coincide
with the post-2003 period when the insurgency in Iraq began to pick up momentum. Column (7)
summarizes the results of a model with a time trend as well as a trend break for the post 2003 period:
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Bkt a ±pPPkt + X +k +)i + 72t -1 {t > 2002} +ekt
In general, average bonus offers are rising with the average military mortality hazard as well as the civilian
mortality rate. Also, average bonus offers are increasing in expected civilian earnings and decreasing in
the unemployment rate. Point estimates on the military occupation-specific mortality rate indicate that
an increase in the inside mortality rate of 1 death per 1,000 soldiers assigned per year is associated with
an increase in the bonus offer by an amount between $139 and $347. Thus, the implied policy VSL,
from the perspective of the Army's bonus-setter, is between about $140,000 and $350,000 (in constant
year 2010 dollars). A scatter plot with fitted values from the specification of column (1) is displayed in
Figure 9. We interpret this figure as depicting the average slope of the Army's offer function. In other
words, the slope of the regression line reflects the market locus of the supply and demand for risk across
Army occupations rather than an estimate of the VSL.
Assuming demand is fixed and that the supply curve is shifting, then we might expect the coefficient
on the inside risk to be equal to the coefficient on the outside risk. What we find instead is that the
response to the outside (civilian) hazard is larger than the response to the inside (military) hazard, and
this difference is statistically significant across specifications as assessed by a Wald test of the equality
of coefficients (see Table 8b). Perhaps this is the result of a type of patriotism effect in which soldiers
might be more willing to confront risks on behalf of their nation for a perceived "great task" vice the
types of risks they might confront as civilians back home such as those resulting from gang violence or
transportation related accidents.
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1.6.1 Binary Choice Framework, Whole Sample
Our analysis of individual level data begins with estimates of binary choice regression models where the
dependent variable is an indicator for whether the soldier chose to reenlist or not. As such, rik, = 1 if the
soldier reenlisted for any reenlistment alternative including options 1 through 5 for any reenlistment term
length; and rik, = 0 if the soldier chose not to reenlist. The underlying assumption within this framework
is that the inside reenlistment alternatives are highly correlated so as to be practically indistinguishable
in terms of the relationships between risk, wealth, and reenlistment preferences. This assumption may be
reasonable given that during this time period the risk of deployment is relatively independent of home-
base location. As such, it is very difficult for a soldier considering reenlistment to have a reasonable
expectation of avoiding deployment by picking one option over another except for possibly the choice
of reenlisting to train for a new occupation. However, eligibility for selecting the reenlistment Training
option is strictly limited to soldiers serving in non-shortage occupations who are willing to transfer into a
shortage occupation. Often such a transfer involves increased exposure to the probability of deployment.
We conduct specification checks by estimating discrete choice models involving alternatives grouped
according to the five reenlistment options (see the J=5 framework results presented in Sections 6.5 and
6.6), with alternatives grouped according to whether reenlistees stay in the same occupation or train for a
new occupation (see the J=10 framework in Section 6.8), and under the assumption of fully uncorrelated
alternatives across the full set of reenlistment choices (see the J=23 framework of Section 6.7).
According to the discrete choice framework described in section 4, our model of utility in the binary
choice setting is the following:
Uij = 0 if j = 0 (don't reenlist )
Vj + Eij if ] = 1 (reenlist)
where the observed portion of utility Vi is modeled as a linear function of the bonus offer, the excess mor-
tality hazard, the expected earnings difference, the military occupation-specific non-fatal injury hazard,
and the local area unemployment rate. See equation 13 with
Vij = Vikj = a+yBktj ±p (pktj - -t-) +6 (mit - wit) + VZktj + 8 uit (13)
where Bktj is the bonus offer for MOS k at time t and choice j (with j = 0 for the outside option and
j= 1 for any of the inside reenlistment alternatives), (pktj -pi'v) is the discounted, accumulated excess
mortality hazard, (mit - wit) is the discounted, accumulated pay difference between expected military
and civilian earnings, Zktj is the discounted, accumulated occupation-specific morbidity hazard, and uit is
the local area unemployment rate for soldier i's home-of-record county in the month of his reenlistment
decision.
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We estimate the model using maximum likelihood with the logit link function. Results are summarized in
Table 9. Estimates of the discrete choice model with equation 13 as the observable portion of utility are
reported in column (1). We augment the model with occupation fixed effects to account for potential
endogeneity associated with time-invariant omitted variables at the occupation level. Estimates with
occupation dummies included as controls are reported in column (2). We add decision year fixed effects
to the model and report results in column (3). We include both decision year and occupation dummies
for the model and report results in column (4). We estimate the model with fully interacted decision year
and occupation dummies included in the model of the observable portion of utility (see equation 14), and
report results in column (5). We estimate robust standard errors clustered at the occupation level for all
specifications. Clustering at the occupation level coincides with the level of grouping at which most of
the variation in the bonus offer and inside mortality hazard takes place.
Vikjt a + Bkt + P (Pktj -Pciv) +±&0(Mit - Wit)-F+ fZktj± 3 Ut +Xk±++Xk -T (14)
Panel A of Table 9 reports marginal effects, evaluated at the mean values of the included explanatory
variables, for regressions on the whole sample using the mean-reverting time series estimate of the military
occupation-specific inside mortality rate (see equation 19 of Appendix A). The coefficient on the excess
mortality hazard has the expected negative sign across all five specifications. According to our preferred
specification with interacted decision-year-by-occupation dummies reported in column (5), increasing the
excess mortality hazard by 1 death per 1,000 soldiers decreases the probability of reenlistment by about
0.8 percentage points. The coefficient on the bonus offer also has the expected sign and is statistically
significant with p-values very close to 0 across all five specifications. Our preferred specification in column
(5) indicates that increasing the bonus offer by $1,000 increases the probability of reenlistment by about
1.6 percentage points. The local unemployment rate has a significant but small positive effect on the
probability of reenlistment.
We find non-intuitive results for the effects of morbidity and earnings differences. The point estimates
for the coefficients of both variables have the "wrong" sign: increasing the occupation-specific morbidity
hazard increases the probability of reenlistment, while increasing the expected pay difference between
military and civilian earnings decreases the probability of reenlistment. Ex ante, we would have expected
morbidity to have a negative impact on probability and higher relative earnings for the inside options to
have a positive impact on reenlistment. There could be spurious positive correlation between morbidity
and reenlistment if the morbidity measure captures true variation explained by deployment frequency
where deployment frequency is a positive predictor of reenlistment (Hosek et al, 2006). Deployment
frequency can be a positive predictor of reenlistment when soldiers gain more utility from serving in the
military and being able to perform the duties for which they trained in real-world operational missions.
Regardless, the size of the coefficients on both of these variables are extremely small and have little
empirical economic meaning.
Panel B of Table 9 reports the implied VSL as the ratio of the coefficient on the excess mortality hazard
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divided by the coefficient on the bonus offer as per the derivation of a marginal change in utility reported
by equation 4. The panel also reports a 95% confidence interval for the estimated VSL based on standard
errors calculated using the delta method. Point estimates of the VSL when using the mean-reverting time
series measure of the inside occupation-specific mortality hazard range between $308,000 and $537,000.
Our preferred specification in column (5) indicates the VSL for the population of young people who
volunteer for active service in the US Army ranges between $324,000 and $750,000. This estimate of
the VSL is generally far lower than that typically reported in the related literature. Most estimates of
the VSL, particularly those estimated in the context of occupational choices, range between $4M-$11M.
This result is not surprising given that the subjects of our study are young people who typically have just
a high school degree with little real work experience and as such face low opportunity costs of service.
Additionally, this result is not surprising if volunteers for active military service are relatively risk-seeking
and come from the tail of the distribution of risk types.
As a specification check, we estimate the binary logit models on the whole sample using alternative mea-
sures of the inside hazard rate. Panel C reports results when using a differenced first-order autoregressive
model, ARIMA(1,1,0), to predict the expected inside occupation-specific mortality hazard (see equation
18 in Appendix A). Panel D reports results when using the current month measure of the occupation-
specific mortality hazard (see equation 5). Panel E reports results when using the current month measure
of the mortality hazard aggregated at the career management group level (where career management
groups consist of several similar occupation types as illustrated in Appendix D). Panel F reports results
when using the current month measure of mortality aggregated Army-wide.
The VSLs estimated from each of the various hazard measures are largely similar and over-lapping.
Results from our preferred specification in column (5) indicate the VSL and associated confidence interval
estimated from the current month occupation-specific hazard measure (Panel D) is nearly exactly the
same as that from the mean-reverting time series measure (Panel B). VSLs estimated using measures
of the mortality hazard as predicted by ARIMA time series modeling (Panel C) are slightly higher than
those of the mean-reverting time series measure (Panel B). However, our preferred method is to use the
mean-reverting time series measure because the empirical model upon which it is based provides better
empirical explanatory power for making one-step ahead forecasts of the mortality hazard relative to the
ARIMA time series prediction model (see Appendix A). Further, we prefer the mean-reverting time series
measure to the current month measure on theoretical grounds because we believe soldiers are implicitly
making a forecast about the hazard they will confront when selecting among the reenlistment alternatives
rather than assuming that the current month measure of mortality will remain constant indefinitely.
VSLs estimated using measures of the mortality hazard aggregated at the occupation-grouped level and
the Army-wide level are slightly higher ($815,000 per Panel E and $1.05M per Panel F) than those
estimated by the mean-reverting time series measure of the hazard, but are also less precisely estimated.
A typical problem in the VSL literature is whether subjects know and understand the risks they face,
or, stated slightly differently, whether econometricians know what subjective values of risk subjects use
when making occupational decisions. It could very well be the case that soldiers have more information
about measures of risk aggregated at the career grouping or Army-wide levels since such measures might
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be more easily accessible via popular media. If this is the case, the measurement error associated with
using occupation-specific measures of the risk may attenuate estimates of the VSL. This potential issue
is worth further exploration in future research as it stands in contrast to our a prior beliefs that soldiers
would be much more responsive to a measure of the mortality hazard that is calculated at a level much
closer to their personal identification. Given the high degree of variation in occupation-specific mortality
hazards and occupation-specific bonus offers across occupations and across time, and given the fact that
soldiers typically work on a day-to-day basis with others in their same occupations in units composed of
people who work in the same or similar occupations, it seems reasonable to believe that soldiers have
good information about the occupation-specific risks they confront and that they would be responsive
to such measures. As such, our estimates in the remainder of the paper focus on results using the
mean-reverting time series measure of the expected military occupation-specific mortality hazard.
1.6.2 Binary Choice Framework, Sub-Samples
Under the assumption that similar risk types choose similar occupations, we attempt to explore observable
heterogeneity in VSL estimates by estimating binary logit models of the probability of reenlistment using
sub-samples based on broad occupation-by-gender groupings. We explore four sub-samples: men in
non-combat occupations, men in combat occupations (not including infantry and special forces), men
in infantry and special forces occupations, and women in all occupations. Appendix D provides a table
that cross-walks many of the specific military occupations existing at the end of the federal fiscal year
2006 to both career occupation groups and the more broad occupation-by-gender groups that constitute
our sub-sample selections. Results of our estimates of equation 13 on these four sub-samples, along
with additional specifications including occupation dummies, decision year dummies, and occupation-by-
decision year dummies, are summarized in Table 10. The top half of each panel in Table 10 displays
the marginal effects estimated from binary logit coefficients of the key explanatory and control variables
in our model (i.e., the excess mortality hazard, the bonus offer, and the occupation-specific morbidity
hazard). Again, the estimated standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the
occupation level. The bottom half of each panel provides point estimates of the VSL based on the ratio
of coefficients for each specification along with the VSL's 95% confidence interval estimated using the
delta method.
Across all specifications and all sub-samples, we find a robust reenlistment response to the bonus level.
Increasing the bonus offer by $1,000 increase the probability of reenlistment between 1.4% and 1.8% for
men and between 1.2% and 1.3% for women. Point estimates for the coefficient on the excess mortality
hazard are mixed across specifications and sub-samples. In our preferred specification of column (5),
the point estimates for the coefficient on the excess mortality rate have the expected sign in Panels A,
B, and D, but are not statistically significantly different from 0 in Panels B and D. Further, the point
estimate for the excess mortality for men in the infantry and special forces (Panel C) has a statistically
significant positive sign, though its value has little economic meaning since it is very close to 0.
The results of Table 10 suggest a small degree of observable heterogeneity across broad aggregates of
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occupation-types. The VSL for men in non-combat occupations (Panel A) ranges between $38,000 and
$242,000, for men in combat occupations (Panel B) it ranges between $0 and $153,000, for men in
infantry and special forces occupations (Panel C) it ranges below $0, and for women in all occupations
(Panel D) it ranges between $0 and $479,000. As expected, the VSL is lower among men who choose
to serve in combat and infantry occupations. We would expect these sets of sub-samples to be relatively
more risk-seeking and perhaps relatively more motivated by non-pecuniary benefits like prestige or the
satisfaction of challenging oneself by performing work in higher-risk occupations.
1.6.3 Binary Choice Framework, Specification Checks
Table 11 reports the results of several specification checks on the binary logit estimates of the discrete
choice model of utility where the observed portion of utility is modeled as per equation 14 with occupation-
by-decision year fixed effects. Our purpose with these specifications is to check the robustness of our VSL
estimates from Table 9 and Table 10 to the inclusion of other explanatory variables that could be related
to the probability of reenlistment. Columns (1) and (2) report results when including variables that
measure individual combat exposure. One measure is based on an individual's exposure to casualties in
his company-level unit of assignment during deployments (see equation 8, which is described in a footnote
in Section 5.5), and the other is based on an individual's exposure to deaths in his company-level unit
(replace castoti with diedtoti in equation 8). Columns (3) and (4) report results when controlling for
measures of morbidity and mortality, respectively, aggregated at the Army-wide level. Column (5) reports
the results of a specification when controlling for early promotion to E-5 sergeant, which is an indicator
of successful job performance. Column (6) reports the results of a specification controlling for a soldier's
deployment experience.
Panel A reports marginal effects calculated from the regression coefficients for the estimates on the
whole sample. Again, across all specifications we find the consistently robust result that the probability
of reenlistment is positively and significantly related to the bonus offers: increasing the bonus offer
by $1,000 increases the probability of reenlistment between 1.3 percentage points and 1.6 percentage
points. This result is similar to and consistent with our estimates reported in Tables 9 and 10. We
also find that the response to the excess mortality hazard is negative and statistically significant across
all specification except for the specification that controls for the Army-wide mortality hazard. Results
when including the other specification check variables, save for the Army-wide mortality hazard, indicate
that an increase in the occupation-specific excess mortality hazard of 1 death per 1,000 decreases the
probability of reenlistment between 0.6 and 0.9 percentage points. This result is similar to and consistent
with our results reported in Table 9. The coefficient on the excess mortality hazard is not significantly
different from 0 when including the Army-wide mortality hazard as a control. The coefficient on the
Army-wide mortality hazard is large, statistically significant, and would result in a VSL estimate similar
to that reported in Column (5) in Panel F of Table 9. Again, this result indicates that soldiers may
be more responsive to the broader measure of the Army-wide mortality rate since information on this
measure may be more readily available through popular forms of media.
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Panels B through F of Table 11 summarize VSL's and their respective 95% confidence intervals, as
estimated from the ratios of the excess mortality hazard coefficients to the bonus offer coefficients,
for the whole sample and each of the four occupation-by-gender sub-samples described in the previous
section. Our main estimates from column (5) of Table 9 for the whole sample indicated the VSL ranged
between $324,000 and $750,000. The results reported in Panel B of Table 11 indicate that this result is
robust to the inclusion of controls for individual measures of combat exposure, Army-wide measures of
the morbidity rate, an indicator for early promotion to the rank of sergeant, and deployment experience.
However, this result is not robust to the inclusion of the Army-wide measure of the mortality rate.
Our main estimates from Panel A of Table 10 indicate the VSL for men in non-combat occupations ranges
between $38,000 and $242,000. Panel C of Table 11 indicates this result is robust to the inclusion of
the aforementioned specification-check variables. Our main estimates from Panel B of Table 10 indicate
the VSL for men in combat occupations ranges between $0 and $153,000. Again, this result is robust to
the inclusion of the aforementioned specification-check variables (see Panel D of Table 11). Our main
estimates from Panel C of Table 10 indicate the VSL for men in infantry and special forces occupations is
at most $0. This result is also robust to our specification checks (see Panel E of Table 11). Finally, our
main estimates from Panel D of Table 10 indicate the VSL for women ranges between $0 and $479,000.
Once again, this result appears to be robust to the inclusion of our specification check variables.
1.6.4 Binary Choice Framework, Heterogeneity by Observable Demographic Characteristics
To examine heterogeneity in the implied VSL across observable demographic characteristics, we estimate
binary conditional logit regressions of our discrete choice model using bonus offers and military mortality
hazards interacted one-at-a-time with various observable characteristics including AFQT score categories
as well as indicators for age older than 24 at the time of decision, whether the soldier's company level
unit ever had a casualty, whether the soldier every deployed, being a high school dropout, being married,
gender female, and race black. The model for the observable portion of utility is given by equation 15
where xi represents the interacted observable demographic characteristic of soldier i:
Vikjt = a+yBktj + p (pktj - pi v) -±6 (mit -wit)+ uit - Xk +ti
+xi + ylBktjxi + P1 (Pktj - pi iv) xi (15)
We estimate VSL for the portion of the sample for whom the interacted variable is turned off (i.e., xi =0)
as:
Vio =
and we estimate VSL for the portion of the sample for whom the interacted variable is turned on (i.e.,
xi= 1) as:
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Table 12 summarizes our VSL estimates from this exercise in exploring heterogeneity for the whole sample
(n=561,386). We focus on the results listed in columns (5) and (6) which are based on conditional
logit regressions that include the following explanatory variables: the bonus offer, the accumulated and
discounted excess mortality hazard (based on the occupation-specific mean-reverting time series prediction
model), the accumulated and discounted expected earnings difference, the local area unemployment rate,
decision year dummies, and occupation dummies. The table reports estimated VSLs along with 95%
confidence intervals calculated using the delta method. (As in previous regressions, we estimated robust
standard errors clustered at the occupation level for the parameters of the utility model.)
Though point estimates for the VSLs differ when interacting AFQT score categories, the 95% confidence
intervals largely overlap suggesting little true heterogeneity by AFQT score. For example, when interacting
AFQT Category 1 (i.e., xi= I[afqtscorei > 92]), we find that the VSL for those with AFQT scores less
than or equal to 92 is $246,000 while for those with scores greater than 92 it is $138,000. However,
the 95% confidence interval for the VSL of those with scores less than or 92 ranges between $21,000
and $471,000, while the 95% confidence interval for the VSL of those with scores greater than 92
ranges between 0 and $400,000. As such, the confidence intervals for this grouping of soldiers by AFQT
Category 1 are largely over-lapping. We also observe overlapping confidence intervals when interacting
AFQT Category 2, Category 3a, and Category 3b-5 as well as when interacting the age and marital status
indicator.
We do find some interesting heterogeneity when interacting indicators for gender and race. The VSL
point estimate for female soldiers is $542,000 while it is not significantly different from $0 for male
soldiers. The VSL point estimate for black soldiers is $394,000 with a confidence interval ranging from
$192,000 to $596,000. For non-black soldiers the VSL point estimate is only $115,000 with a confidence
interval ranging from less than $0 to $290,000. The men in our sample seem to be more risk-seeking
than young women, and non-blacks appear to be more risk-seeking than blacks. Taken together, this
suggests that non-black men are likely to be the least risk-averse among the population of volunteer
service members.
We also discover significant heterogeneity based on work experience during the first term of service.
The VSL point estimate for those who have not deployed is $684,000, which is significantly higher than
the VSL point estimate for those who have deployed ($112,000). Additionally, the lower bound of the
confidence interval for non-deployers is larger than the upper bound of the confidence interval for those
who have deployed. We find a similar result when comparing those who have had individual exposure
to casualties with those who have not (VSL point estimate of $577,000 for those with combat exposure
versus $82,000 for those who have not had combat exposure).
Table 13 reports interacted results for each of the four sub-samples using conditional logit regression
on a the binary outcome with the excess mortality rate, bonus offer, morbidity rate, expected earnings
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difference, local unemployment rate, and year and occupation fixed effects as included explanatory vari-
ables. For men in non-combat occupations as well men in infantry and special forces occupations, we
do not observe significant heterogeneity in VSL estimates across observable demographic characteristics.
For men in combat occupations, we observe significant heterogeneity in VSL estimates that is similar to
that which we observed for the whole sample with regard to individual casualty exposure and individual
deployment experience. In both cases, men in combat occupations without having had the experience of
individual casualty exposure or deployment have higher VSLs than those who have had such experiences.
We also observe heterogeneity by educational attainment among men in combat occupations. Those
who are high school graduates or above have higher VSLs than those who were college dropouts.
For women, we observe significant heterogeneity in the point estimates of VSLs across several dimensions
of observable demographic characteristics. For example, the point estimate of the VSL for black women
is higher than that of non-black women and the point estimate of the VSL for women who are high
school graduates or above is higher than that of dropouts. However, in most of the interacted estimates
for the sub-sample of women, the VSLs are estimated relatively imprecisely so that there is substantial
overlap in confidence intervals between the estimates when the interaction term is turned on versus when
it is turned off. Again, we highlight the observation that women who have not had the experience of
deployment and individual casualty exposure have substantially higher estimated VSLs on average than
women who have had such experiences.
1.6.5 Multinomial Choice Framework (J=5)
Estimates from the binary choice framework are potentially confounded by over-aggregating the full slate
of reenlistment alternatives and representing the discrete choice model as a stay or go decision. In order
to estimate the model in the binary choice framework, we had to assume that the choice of reenlisting
in the same MOS for a four-year term was a sufficient representation of all the reenlistment alternatives.
There are more dimensions to the decision to reenlist for an additional term of service including the
possibility of selecting a new MOS or picking the home-base location of one's duty assignment. If we
extend our model to the a multinomial choice framework where the decision space includes the outside
option (exiting the Army) and five inside options (reenlist for the same MOS to be stationed at a location
of the Army's choice, reenlist for the same MOS to stay at one's current duty location, reenlist to train
for a new MOS, reenlist for the same MOS and to be stationed at an overseas location of choice, or
to reenlist for the same MOS to be stationed at a location of choice within the continental U.S.), we
can examine whether soldiers are willing to trade-off wealth and risk at different rates across alternatives
with varying degrees of non-pecuniary benefits. In the case of the standard multinomial logit model, with
multiple unordered outcome variables, we can write the probabilities as:
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S Pr(rikt = 0| Bkt, pkt, Pii, Mit, Wit, = (16)
1 I exp (VikJt)
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where Vikjt is the linear model of utility for choice j from equation 13 which includes explanatory vari-
ables for the excess mortality rate, bonus offer, expected earnings difference, military occupation-specific
morbidity hazard, and the local area unemployment rate. Further, the standard multinomial logit model
requires 
_O Pj = 1. Designating the outside option j = 0 as the base case, we estimate the relative
log-odds of reenlisting for option f to exiting the service where f can equal 1 (reenlist same occupation),
2 (reenlist same occupation with stabilization at current duty location), 3 (reenlist for a new occupation),
4 (reenlist same occupation with choice of overseas location), or 5 (reenlist same occupation with choice
of location in the continental U.S.) as:
in ( = Vij't
and the implied VSL associated with choice of alternative f relative to the outside option is:
SPoj'
The standard multinomial logit model also allows us to test the equality of VSL estimates across alterna-
tive choices. That is, we can compare I/*, with ^ *,, for f - j" with f 4 0 and j" = 0. In Table 14, we
report results of Wald tests on all possible combinations of ] and j" for the hypothesis HO : V'*, = *,
Rejection of the equality of VSL estimates across alternative choices would indicate differences in reserva-
tion prices between those who reenlist for inside alternative / and those who reenlist for inside alternative
j" given a commensurate change in excess mortality. In other words, rejection of these tests would indi-
cate the existence of differences in non-pecuniary values associated with the various inside alternatives.
This seems reasonable that soldiers would derive utility from being able to pick a new occupation or
choose a home-base location assignment that potentially compensates for a lower bonus offer despite
confronting the same relative risk as the choice of staying in the same occupation and being assigned
39
1.6 Empirical Results and Discussion 1 MILITARY VSL
according to the needs of the Army.
Results from multinomial logit estimation are reported in Table 14. Panel A uses the base model for
the observed portion of utility without including year or occupation fixed effects. Panel B uses the base
model for the observed portion of utility including year fixed effects. Panel C uses the base model for
the observed portion of utility including decision year and occupation fixed effects. The top portion of
each panel reports parameter estimates on the excess mortality hazard and bonus offer that are specific
to each inside choice alternative. The bottom portion of each panel reports chi-square test statistics
for each test of HO : #1, = We focus on the results for our preferred specification for the observed
portion of utility as reported in Panel C. As in the case of the binary choice framework, we find a
consistently large and significant effect of the bonus on the probability of reenlistment. We also find that
the excess mortality hazard has a small but negative and statistically significant effect on the probability
of reenlistment. VSLs estimated for each inside choice relative to the outside option range between
$5,000 and $13,000. All of the reported chi-square test statistics indicate rejection of the null hypothesis
of equality of VSL estimates across specifications. Counter-intuitively, the VSL estimates for the inside
options involving a choice of either a new occupation or duty location are all significantly lower than
the VSL estimate for the regular Army reenlistment option which involves neither a choice of changing
occupation or picking a duty location. This suggests that those who reenlist for the regular Army option
(j= 1) have a higher reservation price than those who reenlist for a reenlistment option involving some
choice over either occupation change or duty location. However, the estimated VSLs are so small for
all the alternatives that even though differences across alternatives are significant, these difference are
economically meaningless.
1.6.6 Alternative Specific Conditional Logit Estimates (J=5)
The disadvantage of the standard multinomial choice model is that it ignores choice-specific variation
of the explanatory variables across choice alternatives within cases (where a case is an individual). The
format of the data in the standard multinomial choice model is that there is one observation per individual
that includes only the information about the explanatory variables that is associated with the choice
alternative actually selected by the individual. We extend our analysis to estimate alternative specific
conditional logit models which explicitly incorporates variation in the values of explanatory variables across
choice alternatives for each individual. The format of the data in the alternative specific conditional logit
framework is similar to that of panel data in that there are J observations for each individual, one for
each of the choice alternatives. In our case, the excess mortality rate, the bonus offer, and the morbidity
rate may be different for different choice alternatives for each individual, whereas the other explanatory
variables including the expected earnings difference, the local area unemployment rate, decision year
dummies, and occupation dummies are constant across choice alternatives for each individual. For the
alternative specific conditional logit framework, our model of utility is given by:
Uij = XiJf+Zy+ Eij
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with utility normalized to 0 for the outside civilian option, Xij as a vector containing the option-specific
bonus offers and excess mortality hazards, and Zi as a vector of individual-specific control variables that are
constant across choice alternatives. Results of maximum-likelihood estimation of the alternative specific
conditional logit model with J = 5 are reported in Table 15. Panel A reports key parameter estimates
from regressions on the whole sample. Again we find that the bonus offer has a strong, positive, and
statistically significant effect on the probability of reenlistment. Panels B through F summarize estimated
VSLs from regressions on the whole sample as well as each of the four occupation-by-gender sub-samples.
Our preferred specification is that of column (4) for which Zi contains both decision year and occupation
fixed effects.
For the whole sample, we estimate a VSL of about $164,000, which is substantially lower than that
estimated in the binary choice framework ($537,000). For men in non-combat occupations, the VSL
estimate is about $136,000, which is nearly the same as the $140,000 estimated in the binary choice
framework. For men in combat occupations, the VSL estimate is $56,000, which is also nearly the
same as the $55,000 estimate from the binary choice framework. For men in infantry and special forces
occupations, the VSL is about $49,000, which is not significantly different than $0 but is higher than
the negative valued point estimate from the binary choice framework. For women, the VSL is about
$316,000, which is nearly twice as high as the $176,000 value estimated by the binary choice logit.
1.6.7 Alternative Specific Conditional Logit Estimates (J=23)
Variation in the content of the inside alternatives is not just a function of occupation and location choice.
Rather, each of the inside alternatives include a choice of the length of the reenlistment term. We estimate
alternative specific conditional logit regressions for the case with J = 23. See Table 16 for a complete
list of choice alternatives along with summary statistics on the observed and predicted probabilities of
selecting each option j as well as mean bonus offers and excess mortality hazards associated with each
option j. Estimated parameters from alternative specific conditional logit regressions on the whole sample
are reported in Panel A of Table 17. VSL estimates for the whole sample and each of the sub-samples
are summarized in Panels B through F. Results indicate a precisely estimated VSL of about $254,000
for the whole sample, which falls between the point estimate from the binary choice framework and the
multinomial choice framework with J = 5. VSL estimates for the sub-samples are mostly similar to those
estimated in the J= 5 framework, particularly for men in combat and infantry occupations. The VSL
estimate for women in the J = 25 framework is about $154,000, which is closer to the estimate for women
from the binary choice framework but much smaller than the estimate from the J = 5 framework.
1.6.8 Alternative Specific Conditional Logit Estimates (J=10)
Though the J = 23 framework takes into account the full set of reenlistment alternatives available to
soldiers who are eligible for reenlistment, the multinomial choice framework assumes independence of
irrelevant alternatives. In other words, it assumes there is no correlation between different alternatives.
41
1.6 Empirical Results and Discussion 1 MILITARY VSL
This assumption does not seem particularly reasonable given that reenlistment options 1, 2, 4, and 5
involve staying in the same occupation whereas reenlistment option 3 involves the choice of training for
a new occupation. As such, we might expect alternatives related to staying in the same MOS to be
highly correlated with one another, particularly if choice of home-base duty location is orthogonal to the
probability of deployment. As such, we estimate alternative specific conditional logit regressions in a
J= 10 framework where the inside options involve a set of choices with varying term lengths but involve
staying in the same occupation and a second set of options involving a set of choices with varying term
lengths but involve selecting a new occupation. For a complete list of the 10 choice options, along with
selected summary statistics for each choice, see Table 18.
Results of alternative specific conditional logit estimation in the J= 10 framework are reported in Table
19. Panel A lists parameter estimates from regressions on the whole sample. Once again we find a strong,
positive, and statistically significant effect of the bonus offer on the probability of reenlistment. VSL
estimates are summarized in Panels B through F for the whole sample and each of the four sub-samples.
We focus on results from our preferred specification in column (3) for the whole sample and in column
(2) for each of the four sub-samples. We find a precisely estimated VSL for the whole sample of about
$315,000, which is nearly halfway between the VSL estimate from the binary choice framework and the
J = 5 framework. Interestingly, this estimate is also the same as the Army "policy" estimate as reported
in our preferred specification listed in column (4) of Table 8a. The VSL estimate in the J = 10 framework
for men in non-combat occupations is $244,000, which is larger than that estimated in the binary choice
as well as the J = 5 and J = 23 frameworks. The VSL estimate for men in combat occupations is
$117,000, which is also larger than estimates from the J= 2, J = 5, and J = 23 frameworks. The VSL
estimate for men in infantry and special forces occupations is $103,000 and is the only positive estimate
for the VSL of men in the infantry that is significantly different than 0. Finally, the VSL estimate for
women is about $252,000, which falls between the estimate from the J = 2 and the J = 5 framework,
but is larger than the estimate from the J= 25 framework.
1.6.9 Discussion
The ease of estimation by maximum likelihood of the conditional logit model in the binary choice frame-
work enables us to quickly explore a wide variety of specifications. Taken together, the results of binary
logit estimation indicate a VSL for young people who volunteer for active military service to range
between $0 and about $500,000. These estimates are exceptionally low in relation to those typically
reported from hedonic wage estimates involving American workers. However, our estimates for the VSL
for this particular population are not surprising given the young age of most soldiers, their general lack
of work experience, and the implied belief that volunteers for active military service are likely to come
from the tail of the distribution of risk types. However, there are several potential confounds associated
with the binary logit estimating framework. Foremost is our concern associated with over-aggregation of
inside choice alternatives into a single option thus restricting the discrete choice model to a simple stay
or go decision. To address this concern, we estimated several varieties of multinomial choice models.
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The challenge of estimation in the multinornial choice framework, particularly given our large sample
size, is the curse of dimensionality which limits our ability to explore a wide variety of specifications. Our
preferred framework for multinomial choice estimates is the J= 10 choice alternatives framework, which
we believe best captures the degree of choice variability across inside reenlistment alternatives while at
the same time minimizing inter-alternative correlations. In the J = 10 framework, we estimate VSLs for
young people who volunteer for military service in the Army to range between $100,000 and $315,000.
Considering the binary and multinomial choice results, we conclude a reasonable estimate of the VSL for
this population ranges between $100,000 and $500,000 with observed heterogeneity across gender and
general occupation types.
Perhaps one of the most interesting findings from our analysis is the heterogeneity in VSL by cumulative
deployment and individual casualty exposure experience as measured at the time of the reenlistment
decision. It seems somewhat counter-intuitive that those with more deployment experience and more
exposure to casualties, even when controlling for occupation and time fixed effects, have smaller estimated
VSLs than those without deployment experience or individual exposure to casualties. The regression
coefficients indicate those who have been in a unit with casualties and those who have been deployed are
both less responsive to the occupation-specific mortality hazard and more responsive to the bonus offer.
Perhaps the experience of safely making it through a deployment without becoming a casualty oneself
develops a sense of immunity among soldiers or impacts them in such a way that they discount the
possibility of ever becoming a casualty in the future. The regression coefficients also indicate that those
who have not deployed or experienced casualties before their reenlistment decision are relatively more
responsive to the occupation-specific mortality rate. Perhaps those who have not had actual experience
with deployment or individual exposure to casualties are more likely to not reenlist because they want to
avoid even the possibility of future exposure.
Absent evidence on whether deployment experience makes one more or less likely to become a casualty
in the future and conditional on service in the same occupation, the risk of mortality in a future term
of service should be the same for those confronting a reenlistment decision having had deployment
experience and combat exposure as it is for those confronting a reenlistment decision not having had
such experiences. Our results suggest that deployment and combat experience for the former group may
be causing them to underestimate the risk of future mortality for continuing on active duty while the
lack of experience (or fear of the unknown) for the latter group may be causing them to overestimate
their future risk of mortality from a decision to continue on active duty.
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The discrete choice estimation framework along with the substantial degree of variation in both retention
incentives and mortality hazards in the military setting offers the opportunity to reliably estimate the
VSL among the population of young people who voluntarily serve on active duty in the US Army. Given
a relatively continuous range of time-varying occupational fatality rates as well as precise measures of
occupation-specific death risk and bonus offers, our results imply a VSL range of between $0.1 and
$0.5 million for the population of Army volunteers. We observe heterogeneity in VSL estimates across
occupation types and within occupation types by observable characteristics. We also find robust estimates
of the reenlistment response to changes in bonus offers. Across various models, specifications, and
samples, we find a consistent and statistically significant coefficient on the bonus offer. Increasing the
bonus offer by $1,000 increases the probability of reenlistment by approximately 1.5 percentage points.
This evidence on the risk-wealth trades that young volunteers for military service are willing to make
indicate exceptionally low VSLs for this particular population. Are young people who volunteer for military
service irrational or myopic? Are these young people driven to accept relatively low compensation for
confronting military risk as a result of unattractive civilian labor market opportunities or high civilian
mortality in their home-of-record locales? Do non-pecuniary benefits such as occupational prestige,
willingness to sacrifice to participate in a "great task," or the desire to engage in meaningful work with
challenging tasks provide sufficient margins of utility to compensate for increased exposure to risk? In
future work, we hope to address some of these questions to better understand the underlying causal
mechanisms that might explain the low value of life assessed by this population of young people.
Regardless, our estimates of the VSL are useful for several contemporaneous policy applications. They
serve as a reference point for the assessment of cost-benefit margins in the acquisition of military capital
equipment, the trade-off between compensating differentials and purchases of safety equipment, and
the efficacy of targeted bonuses versus general pay raises. Our estimates reinforce existing evidence on
the efficacy of bonus policy in helping the military respond to near-term manning shortages, particularly
during a time of war. Contrary to ex ante expectations about having to fight a sustained conflict with
an All-Volunteer Force, the active Army managed not only to sustain its desired end-strength but also
grow by nearly 80,000 soldiers while engaged in two simultaneous overseas conflicts.15 Further, given the
Army's role as the single largest employer of young people in the U.S., our estimates provide interesting
insights into an important sub-population that not only occupies a tail in the distribution of risk types
but which is also likely to compose a non-trivial proportion of the future civilian labor force.
'
5 See the New York Times Oped of March 19, 2013 by John Nagl, "What America Learned in Iraq":
"In the wake of Vietnam, the United States began its grand experiment of an all-volunteer military. And it
was most certainly an experiment: there was no expectation that the system would hold together in a major
war, and for two generations young men have been required to register with the Selective Service in case
general conflict erupted. But there have been two such wars over the past decade, and the all-volunteer
force has come through these crucibles of blood and fire with enormous distinction."
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Figure 1. Enlistment to Reenlistment Process Diagram.
Assigned to Unit: Work, Train, Deploy Transition
I
Enlistment
Select:
1. MOS
2. Term (yrs)
;I qt
Reenlistment Window End of Initial
Select: Contract
1. Nothing (exit Army at ETS)
2. Reenlist: Option x Term
Incentives:
1. Enlistnent Bc1nus
2. College Fund "Kicker"
Incentives:
1. Selective Reenlistment Bonus
2. Option Choices
Reenlistment Alternatives
Option Name Occupation Home Base Location Term Length
1 Regular Army No change Army chooses 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 years
2 Stabilization No change Stay at current location 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 years
3 Training New occupation Army chooses 3,4, 5, or 6 years
4 OCONUS Choice No change Pick overseas base* 3, 4, 5, or 6 years
5 CONUS Choice No change Pick base inside U.S.* 3, 4, 5, or 6 years
45
Train
1.8 Figures and Tables 1 MILITA RY VSL
1.8 
Figures and Tables 
1 
M
ILITARY VSL
Figure 2. History of bonus offer policy for infantry MOS 111B, 1997-2010.-0
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Figure 3. Compensation and Mortality Hazard Trends, U.S. Army, 1997-2010.
- Regular Military Compensation
--- Average Reenlistment Bonus
- - Predicted Civilian Mortality Hazard
-at- Predicted Civilian Earnings
- - - Army Mortality Hazard
- -------- - - - - - - --- -
- - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -1 - - - -
.... .. .. .. ... .....   .......... .. -----. ...........  1 .
- - - - .
$15,000 -- - - -........ . ------- ---- ---
$,000 - - - ----
$ 5 ,0 0 .....-.............. .... 0... .  ....................... ...... ..... ... .. ....... .. .. ..... ..
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Data Sources: DMDC for military compensation and Army mortality hazard; RETAIN for average reenlistment
bonus; CPS for civilian earnings; and NCHS for civilian mortality.
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Figure 4. Example of a Military Personnel Message announcing reenlistment Policy Updates.
Milper Message Number 07-141
SELECTIVE REENLISTMENT BONUS (SRB) PROGRAM
Issued 04 JUNE 2007. This MILPER message will expire NLT 31 DECEMBER 2007.
This message announces changes to the Regular Army Active Component SRB Program. The effective
date for additions to SRB multipliers or maximum payments is 05 JUNE 2007. The effective date of
decreases and terminations to the SRB Program is 05 JULY 2007.
Zone A includes soldiers who have between 17 months and 6 years of service at time of reenlistment.
MOSITITLE SPC SGT SSG CAP
11B Infantryman 1A 1.A5A $15,000
13B Cannon Crew Member w."P" 0 1A 0 S10,000
13F Fire Support Specialist I 5A 2A 2A $10000
25U Signal Support Systems Spec. 1 5A 1.A 0 $10.000
31B Military Police 1A 1.5A IA $10,000
68W Health Care Specialist 1A 1 A IA $15,000
88M Motor Transport Operator 2A 1.5A 1A S10,000
92Y Unit Supply Specialist 0 5A 0 0 $10000
97E Interrogator 4A 4A 4A $30,000
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Figure 5. Menu of reenlistment options for truck driver, eligible for reenlistment in July 2007.
Reup Option \ Reup Term Length 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs 5 yrs J6 yrs
Regular Army $3,957 $5,936 $7,914 $9,893 $10,000
Current Station Stabilization $3,957 $5,936 $7,914 $9,893 $10,000
Training (new MOS) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Overseas Station of Choice n/a $5,936* $7,914* $9,893* $10,000*
CONUS Station of Choice n/a $5,936* $7,914* $9,893* $10,000*
* Depends on needs of the Army (Soldiers cannot pick a station where there is no demand for their occupation).
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Figure 7. Military fatality rates and reenlistment bonus offers (SRB Offer) for selected
military occupations, 2003-2010.
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Data Sources: DMDC for mortality rates and MILPER Messages for SRB Offers. Note: The SRB offer scale is
on the right axis and is measured in thousands of constant year 2010 dollars.
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Figure 8. Military fatality and casualty rates for selected military occupations, 2003-2010.
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Graphs by Military Occupation
Data Sources: DMDC for mortality and casualty rates. Note: Casualty rate scale is on the right axis and is
measured as number of casualties per 1,000 soldiers assigned to the MOS.
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Figure 9. Bonus offer vs. military occupation-specific fatality rate for infantry MOS 11B,
2003-2010.
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Mortality Rate per 1,000 (Infantry)
* SRB Offer (E4, 4yos, RA x 4yrs) Fitted values
Data Sources: DMDC for mortality rate and MILPER Messages for SRB offers. Mortality rate is accumulated over
a four-year term, discounted at 17% per year. This graph along with the results reported in Table 8 (descriptive
regression of the Army's bonus offer function) reflect the market locus of the supply and demand for risk. The
slope of the regression line can be interpreted as the Army's version of what it thinks it will take to get just
enough soldiers to reenlist to satisfy its fixed near term demand. The slope of this regression line has the same
interpretation as what gets reported in most VSL papers using the hedonic wage framework.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)Whole Sample Men Non Combat Men Combat [Not Inf) Men Infantry & SF Women All Occupations
reup=0 reup=1 reup=1 reu=0 reuo=1 reu=O reug1 reup=0 IeU=1
mn sd mn sd mn sd inn sd mn sd mn sd mn sd mn sd mn sd mn sdBonus offer l$k, 2010) 4.84 (6.24) 863 (772] 4.7g. (6.50) 8.61 (7.84] 4.28 (5.67) 840 (7.45) 7.16 (6.11) 1060 (7.43) 3.51 (5.91) 6.88 (7.57)Relative Hazard (p1 000) 1.68 (4.34) 1.64 (4.99) -0.85 (2.70) -0.80 (2.88) 2.59 (4.87) 3.01 (5.61) 5.77 (4.82) 6.86 (5.96) 1.39 (1.89) 1.37 (1.89)Pay Diff, 4-yr ($k, 2010) 48.48 (28.5) 4729 (29.7) 41.72 (313) 42.33 (31.1) 46.48 (26.1) 47.47 (27.7) 47.44 (26.6) 48.43 (28.5) 62.25 (22.1) 60.87 (24)Local Area Unemp Rate 6.34 (2.59) 6.43 (2 72) 6.33 (2.62) 648 (2.77) 6.31 (2.56) 6.41 (2.71) 6.43 (2.61) 6.39 (2.66) 6.28 (2.55) 6 37 (2-65)
'individual Combat Exp 12.17 (37.1) 18.12 (42.1) 8.36 (28.2) 12.62 (33.1) 13.44 (36.5) 19.49 (41.8) 29.55 (58.8) 43.45 (64.2) 2.21 (13.4) 5.28 (18.2)Months Deployed 5.17 (7.23) 9.23 (7 61) 5.53 (7.39) 9.01 (7.63) 6.26 (7.62) 10.21 (7.66) 6.71 (7.67) 10.95 (7.17) 2.22 (5.02) 6.58 (7-17)Race: Black 0.15 (0.36) 0.21 (0.41) 0.17 (0.37) 0.24 (0.43) 0.10 (0.30) 013 (0.34) 0.05 (0.22) 0.07 (0.25) 0.25 (0.44) 0.39 (0.49)Dropout 0.15 (0.36) 0.14 (0.35) 0.14 (0.35) 0.13 (0.33) 0.19 (0.39) 0.18 (0-39) 0.20 (0.40) 0.19 (0.39) 0.10 (0.31) 0.06 (0.24)High School Grad 0.73 (0.44) 074 (044) 0.73 (0.44) 075 (043) 0.73 (0.45( 0.74 (044) 0.71 (0.45) 0.72 (0.45) 0.76 (0.43) 078 (0.42)AFQT Score 60.21 (18.9) 57.47 (19.0) 62.23 (19.3) 58.49 (19.4) 59.70 (18.6) 56.86 (18.3) 60.34 (19.2) 58.60 (19.4) 57.32 (17.8) 54.04 (17.9)Age 24.98 (3.56) 25.07 (3.64) 25.27 (3.65) 25.34 (3.73) 24.84 (3.47) 24.87 (3.48)1 24.39 (3.15) 24.43 (3.11) 25.17 (3.77) 25.22 (400)
Married 0.30 (0.46) 0.41 (0.49) 0.30 (0.46) 0.44 (0.50) 0.28 (0.45) 0.41 (0.49) 0.21 (0.41) 0.33 (0.47) 0.37 (0.48) 0.43 (0.50)Early Promotion to E5 0.14 (0.35) 0.20 (0.40) 0.15 (0.36) 0.19 (0.39) 0.16 (0.37) 0.19 (0.39) 0.17 (0.38) 0,22 (0.41) 0.08 (0.27) 0.19 (0.39)
n 320,235 241,084 116,774 111,249 69,448 53,424 61,865 39,823 72,148 36,588Notes: Samples include first-term, non-prior service enlisted soldiers with reenlistment decisions between 2002 and 2010. Bonus offer and 4-year cumulative expected pay difference (Regular MilitaryCompensation less civilian earnings for veterans with similar demographic characteristics, discounted at 17%) are measured in thoLsands of constant year 2010 dollars. Relative hazard is thedifference between the military occupation specific mortality rate (per 1,000 soldiers assigned to the occupation) less the civilian mortality rate from the soldier's home-of-record county amongpeople aged 20-34 with the soldier's same race and gender. Local area unemployment rate is from the soldier's home-of-record county in the year and month of his reenlistment decision. individualcombat exposure is the morbidity rate (or casualty rate) for the soldier's unit of assignment (at the company, squadron, or detachment level which typically includes about 100 soldiers). Monthsdeployed is cumulative number of months deployed up to and including the soldier's reenlistment decision date.
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Table 2. Observed reenlistment counts by option and term, 2002-2010.
Sample: All
Term (Years)
Option 0 2 3 4 5 6 Total
0 (Exit)
1 (Regular Army)
2 (Stabilization)
3 (Training)
4 (OCONUS)
5 (CONUS)
Total
320,235
0.571
0
0.000
0
0.000
0
0.000
0
0.000
0
0.000
320,235
0.571
0
0.000
18,247
0.033
3,9068
0.007
0
0.000
0
0.000
0
0.000
22,055
0.039
0
0.000
9,481
0.017
17,621
0.031
2,811
0.005
2,272
O004
22,384
0.040
54,569
0.097
0
0.000
11,607
0.021
19,523
0.035
10,940
0.019
19,177
0.034
19,G64
0.034
80,311
0.143
0
0.000
6,756
0.012
11,301
0.020
3,092
0.006
4,081
0.007
7,184
0.013
32,414
0.058
Notes: Table displays counts of observed choices with proportion of total sample. Populatio
0 320,235
0.000 0.571
12,633 58,724
0.023 0.105
21,878 74,131
0.039 0.132
3,685 20,528
0.007 0.037
4,527 30,057
0.008 0.054
9,012 57,644
0.016 0.103
51,735 561,319
0.092 1.000
n is non-prior service,
first-term enlisted soldiers in the active component of the U.S. Army and who faced a reenlistment decision
between 2002 and 2010.
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Table 3. Observed reenlistment counts by option and term, 2002-2010, men in non-combat
occupations.
Sample: Men in Non-Combat Occupations
Term (Years)
Option 0 2
0 (Exit) 116,774 0
0.512 0.000
1 (Regular Army) 0 7,253
0.000 0.032
2 (Stabilization) 0 1,423
0.000 0.006
3 (Training) 0 0
0.000 0.000
4 (OCONUS) 0 0
0.000 0.000
5 (CONUS) 0 0
0-000 0.000
Total 116,774 8,676
0.512 0.038
Notes: Table displays counts of observed choices with
first-term enlisted soldiers in the active component
between 2002 and 2010
3 4 5 6 Total
0 0 0 0 116774
0.000
4,262
0.019
7,783
0.034
1,343
0.006
1,167
0.005
11,515
0-050
26,070
0-114
0.000
5,485
0.024
8,444
0.037
5,148
0.023
9,912
0.043
9,367
0.041
38,356
0.168
0.000
3,059
0.013
4,665
0.020
1,443
0.006
2,044
0.009
3,411
0.015
14,622
0.064
0.000
5,682
0.025
9,431
0.041
1,812
0.008
2,254
0.010
4,346
0.019
23,525
0.103
,
0-512
25,741
0-113
31,746
0139
9,746
0.043
15,377
0.067
28,639
0.126
228,023
1.000
proportion of total sample. Population is non-prior service,
of the U.S. Army and who faced a reenlistment decision
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Table 4. Observed reenlistment counts by option and term, 2002-2010, men in combat
occupations.
Sample: Men in Combat Occupations (Not Including Infantry or Special Forces)
Term (Years)
Option 0 2 3 4 5 6 Total
0 (Exit)
1 (Regular Army)
2 (Stabilization)
3 (Training)
4 (OCONUS)
5 (CONUS)
Total
69,448
0.565
0
0.000
0
0.000
0
0.000
0
0.000
0
0.000
69,448
0.565
0
0.000
4,585
0.037
955
0.008
0
0-000
0
0.000
0
0.000
5,540
0.045
0
0.000
1,880
0.015
3,602
0.029
730
0.006
413
0.003
3,530
0.029
10,155
0.083
0
0.000
2,446
0.020
4,252
0.035
2,634
0.021
3,449
0.028
3,369
0.027
16,150
0-131
0
0.000
1,698
0.014
2,775
0.023
852
0.007
815
0.007
1,407
0.011
7,547
0.051
0
0.000
3,786
0.031
6,191
0.050
1,016
0.008
1,024
0.008
2,015
0.016
14,032
0.114
69,448
0.565
14,395
0-117
17,775
0.145
5,232
0.043
5,701
0.046
10,321
0.084
122,872
1.000
Notes: Table displays counts of observed choices with proportion of total sample. Population is non-prior service,
first-term enlisted soldiers in the active component of the US. Army and who faced a reenlistment decision
between 2002 and 2010
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Table 5. Observed reenlistment counts by option and term, 2002-2010, men in infantry
occupations.
Sample: Men in the Infantry & Special Forces
Term (Years)
Option 0 2 3 4 5 6 Total
0 (Exit) 61,865 0 0 0 0 0 61865
1 (Regular Army)
2 (Stabilization)
3 (Training)
4(OCONUS)
5 (CONUS)
Total
0.608
0
0.000
0
0.000
0
0-000
0
0.000
0
0.000
61,865
0.608
0.000
3,277
0.032
800
0.008
0
0.000
0
0-000
0
0.000
4,077
0.040
0.000
1,660
0.016
2,808
0.028
454
0.004
147
0.001
2,363
0.023
7,432
0.073
0.000
1,876
0.018
3,922
0.039
1,695
0.017
2,440
0.024
3,185
0.031
13,118
0.129
0.000
1,233
0.012
2,567
0.025
524
0.005
701
0.007
1,476
0.015
6,501
0.064
0.000
1,770
0.017
4,046
0.040
550
0.005
691
0.007
1,638
0.016
8,695
0.086
,
0.608
9,816
0.097
14,143
0.139
3,223
0.032
3,979
0.039
8,662
0.085
101,588
1.000
Notes: Table displays counts of observed choices with proportion of total sample. Population is non-prior service,
first-term enlisted soldiers in the active component of the U.S. Army and who faced a reenlistment decision
between 2002 and 2010.
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Table 6. Observed reenlistment counts by option and term, 2002-2010, women.
Sample: Women
Term fYears)
Option 0 2 3 4 S 6 Total
0 (Exit) 72,148 0 0 0 0 0 72,148
0.664 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.564
1(Regular Army) 0 3,132 1,679 1,800 766 1,395 8,772
0.000 0.029 0.015 0.017 0.007 0.013 0.081
2 (Stabilization) 0 630 3,428 2,905 1,294 2,210 10,467
0.000 0.006 0.032 0.027 0.012 0.020 0-096
3 (Training) 0 0 284 1,463 273 307 2,327
0-000 0.000 0.003 0.013 0.003 0.003 0.021
4(OCONUS) 0 0 545 3,376 521 558 5,000
0000 0.000 0.005 0.031 0.005 0.005 0.046
5 (CONUS) 0 0 4,976 3,143 890 1,013 10,022
0.000 0.000 0.046 0.029 0.008 0.009 0.092
Total 72,148 3,762 10,912 12,687 3,744 5,483 108,736
0.664 0.035 0.100 0.117 0.034 0.050 1.000
Notes: Table displays counts of obsenved choices with proportion of total sample. Population is non-prior service,
first-term enlisted soldiers in the active component of the U.S. Army and who faced a reenlistment decision
between 2002 and 2010.
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Table 7a. Reenlistment and Bonus trends among all reenlistees between 2000-2009.
Descriptive Statistics, All Re-Enlistments, U.S. Army, 2000-2009
Number of
Reenlistments Number Proportion Average Standard
Year (All Zones) Receiving SRB Receiving SRB Nominal Value Deviation
2000 58,503 14,804 0.25 $4,119 $2,980
2001 54,685 15,705 0.29 $4,507 $2,970
2002 57,116 16,137 0.28 $5,101 $3,166
2003 47,359 6,364 0.13 $4,835 $2,880
2004 58,750 28,590 0.49 $8,983 $3,602
2005 72,274 44,246 0.61 $10,667 $5,160
2006 68,707 44,147 0.64 $14,005 $6,338
2007 78,294 52,678 0.67 $13,575 $6,549
2008 83,607 56,757 0.68 $11,581 $5,715
2009 63,550 34,929 0.55 $7,646 $5,040
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Table 7b. Bonus (SRB) trends among first-term, non-prior service soldiers eligible for
reenlistment between 2000-2010.
(1)
Number
with SRB
reupyr (Proportion)
2000 5,027
(0.353)
2001 5,012
(0.384)
2002 5,488
(0.386)
2003 2,678
(0.172)
2004 14,165
(0.611)
2005 20,109
(0.693)
2006 22,261
(0.711)
2007 25,416
(0.707)
2008 27,625
(0.705)
2009 13,300
(0.545)
2010 4,690
(0.410)
(2)
Mean
Nominal
SRB (stdev)
3,862
(2,859)
4,389
(2,971)
4,984
(3,049)
4,550
(2814)
8,347
(3,089)
10,555
(4,587)
13,925
(5,718)
(3)
Max
Nominal
SRB
65,772
78,800
76,374
(4)
Mean SRB
$2010
(stdev)
3,598
(292)
5,383
(3,644)
6,022
(3,683)
95,000 5,370
(3,321)
99,291 9,607
(3,555)
99,999 11,598
(5,040)
37,500 14,999
(6,159)
13,233 85,000 13,866
(5,691) (5,963)
10,930 95,000 10,910
(4,915) (4,906)
7,240
(4,238)
6,006
(5,016)
75,000
50,000
7,323
(4,287)
6,006
(5,016)
Note: Column (1) proportion is omong those who re-enlisted. Column
(4) meon R is in constont 2010 dollors bosed on seosonolly
odjusted CPffor oll urbon consumers (L5, US city overoge).
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Table 8a. Descriptive regression of the Army's bonus offer function.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Model ols ols yr fe ols yr+mos fe ols yrXmos fe panel ols w/trend ols trend brk
Occupation-Specific Hazard* 0.347 0.189 0.139 0.315 0.331 0.164 0.176
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.062) (0.002) (0.002)
Expected Civilian Mortality Hazard** 2 725 3.005 2.377 1.930 1.453 2.758 3.084
(0 049) (0 045) (0 059) (0 047) (0-254) (0.064) (0 064)
Regular Military Compensation*** 0.643 0.384 0.336 0.299 0.283 0.110 0.317
(0.007) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.060) (0.008) (0.008)
Expected Civilian Earnings**** 0.227 0 152 0.062 -0.009 -0.006 0.112 0.047
(0 003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.020) (0-004) (0.004)
Average Local Area Unempl. Rate -1.581 -0.654 -0.399 -0.392 -0.145 -2-117 -2.439
(0.005) (0.015) (0.013) (0.010) (0.093) (0.006) (0.007)
Time Trend 0.927 -2_430
(0.004) (0.021)
TimeTrend x TrendBreak2003 3.668
(0 022)
Decision Year Dummies x x
Occupation Dummies x x x
Occupation x Decision Year Dummies x
Constant -15.593 -11.051 -4 952 24 364 -5.570 6.267 18.087
(0.214) (0 329) (0-940) (19,270-361) (2 194) (1 042) (1 029)
Market Locus "Policy VSL" (SM) 0.347 0.189 0.139 0.315 0.331 0.164 0.176
SE (0 001) (0 002) (0 002) (0 003) (0 062) (0.002) (0.002)
95% Cl Range of "Policy VSL" 0.345-0.350 0.186-0.192 0.135-0.143 0.309-0.322 0.209-0.452 0.160-0.168 0.172-0.179
Observations 561,319 561,319 561,319 561,319 561,776 561,319 561,319
R-squared 0.323 0.473 0.591 0.780 0.032 0.523 0.548
Number of Occupation x Year Cells 1,248
Notes: Dependent variable is bonus offer (in thousands of year 2010 dollars) for first-term soldiers in the rank of E-4 with four years of
service. Robust standard errors in parantheses, *Occupation-specific mortality hazard is measured as the number of deaths per
1,000 soldiers assigned to a specific military occupation in the reenlistment decision month. *Expected civilian mortality is
measured as the three-year moving average mortality rate specific to a soldier's home of record county for his or her age group,
gender, and race. '"*Regular military compensation is measured as basic pay. housing allowance, subsistance allowance, and the
value of the federal tax advantage (in thousands of year 2010 dollars) for an E-4 with four years of service. ""Expected civilian
earnings are measured as the predicted earnings for each soldier based on the average earnings of somebody of the same age.,
gender, race, and education level in the soldier's home of record state. These four primary explanatory variables are then
accumulated over a four-year period using a discount rate of 17%.
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Table 8b. Test of equality of coefficients, military vs. civilian hazard, from Table 8a.
Column Model n F-Stat(1,n) DOF P-Value
(1) ols 561,319 2,298.48 561,313 0.000
(2) ols yr fe 561,319 3,734.58 561,305 0.000
(3) ols yr+mos fe 561,319 1,433.10 561,159 0.000
(4) ols yrXmos fe 561,319 1,171.57 560,065 0.000
(5) panel 1,248 18.17 1,247 0.000
(6) ols w/trend 561,319 1,638.86 561,166 0.000
(7) ols trend brk 561,319 2,029.65 561,165 0.000
Note: Results of Wald tests of equality of coefficients (He: p=p:, i.e. coefficient on military
occupation-specific risk - coefficient on civilian mortality hazard = 0).
1.8 Figures and Tables 1 MILITARY VSL
Table 9. Main estimates, binary choice framework (binary logit model).
Main Estimates for Binary Choice Framework, Whole Sample (n=561,319)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Marginal Effects (Hazard = Mean-Reverting Time Series Model)
Excess Mortality Hazard (per 1,000) -0.0043 -0.0042 -0.0076 -0.0077 -0.0085
(0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0014) (0 0016) (0 0017)
Bonus Offer (1,000s of $2010) 0.0136 0.0138 0.0150 0.0155 0.0159
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Occupation Morbidity Hazard (p1,000) 0.0001 0.0007 0.0005 0.0013 0.0017
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Pay Difference (1,000s of $2010) -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0007 -00007 -0.0008
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Local Area Unemployment Rate 0.0135 0.0140 0-0048 0 0045 0.0044
(0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0-0003) (0.0004)
Panel B: Hazard Measure: Mean-Reverting Time Series Model
VSL (SM) 0.3137 0.3078 0.5081 0.4940 0.5368
Cl -0002-0.629 -0.040-0.655 0.310-0706 0-290-0-698 0.324-0-750
LL -370433 -368354 -367131 -364930 -362735
Panel C: Hazard Measure: ARIMA(1,1,0) Time Series Model
VSL (SM) 0.3947 0.3377 0.7069 0.6380 0,6411
Cl 0.073 - 0.716 -0.060 - 0.735 0.501 - 0.913 0.395 - 0.881 0.400 - 0.883
LL -370340 -368330 -366705 -364672 -362557
Panel D: Hazard Measure: Current Month Mortality, Occupation-Specific
VSL ($M) 0.3271 0.3248 0-4894 0.4786 0.5174
Cl 0.051 - 0.603 0.026 - 0.623 0.307 - 0.672 0.297 - 0 660 0.324 - 0.711
LL -370413 -368330 -367150 -364944 -362757
Panel E: Hazard Measure: Current Month Mortality, Career-Management Field
VSL (SM) 0.6028 0.5588 0.7804 0.7171 0.8154
Cl 0266- 0.939 0.166 - 0.952 0.576 - 0.985 0.462 - 0.972 0.488 - 1.143
LL -370098 -368106 -366648 -364617 -362363
Panel F: Hazard Measure: Current Month Mortality. Army-Wide
VSL ($M) 0.7461 0.9305 1.0315 1.0752 1.0494
Cl 0.372 - 1.121 0-688 - 1.173 0.673 - 1.390 0.753 - 1.397 0.737 - 1.361
LL -369917 -367489 -366484 -364094 -361977
Decision Year Fixed Effects x x
Occupation Fixed Effects x x
Decision Year x Occupation Fixed Effects x
Notes: Marginal effects (with robust standard errors clustered by occupation in parentheses) reported for binary logit estimates
with outcome as binary indicator for whether soldier reenlisted. VSL estimated as ratio of coefficient on relative hazard to
coefficient on bonus offer. The excess mortality hazard is measured as the difference between the inside and outside hazard, where
the inside hazard is the occupation-specific mortality rate for the soldier's occupation at the time of his reenlistment decision and
the outside hazard is the civilian mortality rate of the soldier's home of record county for his age group, gender, and race in the
year of his reenlistment decision. The hazards are accumulated over a four-year term and discounted at 17%. The bonus offer
estimate is based on the assumption of a reenlistment for a Regular Army option, four-year term. The military occupation-specific
morbidity hazard is measured as the number of casualties per 1,000 soldiers assigned to the occupation per year, accumulated
over a four-year term and discounted at 17%. The expected pay difference is measured as the difference between the soldier's
expected military compensation and the average civilian earnings of veterans in the soldier's age group, race, gender, and
education level in the soldier's home of record state. The expected earnings are accumulated over a four-year term and discounted
at 17%. The local area unemployment rate (source: BLS) is specific to the soldier's home of record county during the month of his
reenlistment decision.
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Table 10. Binary logit estimates on sub-samples.
Binary choice framework mean-reverting hazard (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Sample: Men in Non-Combat Occupations fn=228,023)
Excess Mortality Hazard (per 1.000) 0.0015
Bonus Offer (1 000s of $2010)
Occupation Morbidity Hazard (p1,000)
(0.0012)
0.0142
(0.0011)
-0.0011
(0.0006)
0.0006
(0.0011)
0.0155
(0 .0009)
-0.0029
(0 .0006)
-0.0015
(0. 0010)
0 0161
(0 0016)
-0 0006
(0-0006)
-0.0021
(0.0009)
0.0172
(0. 0013)
-0.0020
(0.0006)
-0.0024
(0 0009)
00 174
(00013)
-0 0016
(0. 0006)
VSL ($M) -0.1055 -0.0365 0.0948 0.1195 0.1400
Cl -0.276 - 0.066 -0.175- 0.102 -0.026- 0-216 0.012 - 0.227 0.038 - 0.242
LL B -151500 -150157 -149890 -148734 -147880
Panel B: Sample: Men in Combat Occupations. Not Infantry 1n=122,872)
Excess Mortality Hazard (per 1.000)
Bonus Offer (1 .000s of $2010)
Occupation Morbidity Hazard (p1.000)
-0.0008
(0.0019)
0. 0151
(0 0008)
00001
(0 0003)
0 0002
(0.0020)
0 0152
(0. 0008)
0 0002
(0 0003)
-0.0023
(0.0013)
0.0173
(0.0008)
0.0003
(0.0003)
-0.0013
(0.0011)
0.0175
(0. 0009)
0.0003
(0 0003)
-0.0010
(0.0009)
0.0180
(0.0009)
0.0005
(0 0003)
VSL (SM) 0.0499 -0.0152 0.1334 0.0729 0.0546
CI -0.201 - 0.301 -0.279 - 0.248 -0 018 - 0.285 -0.057 - 0 203 -0 043 -0 163
LL -80458 -80353 -79371 -79284 -78918
Panel C: Sample: Men in Infantry Occupations (n=101.688 )
Excess Mortality Hazard (per 1 000) 0 0100 0 0093 0 0035 0.0029 0.0027
(0 0015) (0.0017) (0 0012) (0.0010) (0.0008)
Bonus Offer (1,000s of $2010) 0.0144 0.0137 0.0180 0.0171 0.0170
(0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0005)
Occupation Morbidity Hazard (p1 ,000) -0,0012 -0.0009 0.0001 0 0006 0.0006
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001)
VSL ($M) -0.6944 -0.6756 -0.1944 -0.1716 -0.1571
Cl -0.968 - -0.420 -0.978 - -0.373 -0.332 - -0,057 -0.292 - -0.052 -0.254 - -0.061
S- . LL -65240 -65138 -64577 -64518 -64424.
... .. ..... ........ ......... ............ . ......... ......... . ......... .....- ... L ... -6.................................. ............................................ _ _............................ ......
Panel D: Sample: Women in All Occupations in=108,736 I
Excess Mortality Hazard (per 1.000) 0.0026 0.0014 -0.0007 -0.0021 -0.0022
(0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0019)
Bonus Offer (1,000s of $2010) 0.0116 0.0128 0.0111 0.0126 0 0126
(0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0023) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Occupation Morbidity Hazard (p1,000) -0.0023 -0.0019 -0.0025 -0.0021 -0 0016
(0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0006)
VSL ($M) -0.2215 -0.1117 0.0647 0.1636 0.1757
C1 -0 647 - 0.204 -0 461 - 0.237 -0.326 - 0.456 -0.167 - 0-494 -0.128 - 0.479
LL -68184 -67239 -67873 -66910 -66461
Controls: Local Area U-rate & PayDiff X x X x X
Decision Year Fixed Effects x x
Occupation Fixed Effects x x
Decision Year x Occupation Fixed Effects x
Notes: Marginal effects (with robust standard errors clustered by occupation in parentheses) reported for binary logit estimates with
outcome as binary indicator for whether soldier reenlisted. VSL estimated as ratio of coefficient on relative hazard to coefficient on bonus
offer. The excess mortality hazard is measured as the difference between the inside and outside hazard, where the inside hazard is the
occupation-specific mortality rate for the soldier's occupation at the time of his reenlistment decision and the outside hazard is the civilian
mortality rate of the soldier's home of record county for his age group, gender and race in the year of his reenlistment decision. The hazards
are accumulated over a four-year term and discounted at 17. The bonus offer estimate is based on the assumption of a reenlistment for a
Regular Army option, four-year term. The military occupation-specific morbidity hazard is measured as the number of casualties per 1,000
soldiers assigned to the occupation per year, accumulated over a four-year term and discounted at 17%. The expected pay difference is
measured as the difference between the soldier's expected military compensation and the average civilian earnings of veterans in the
soldier's age group, race, gender, and education level in the soldier's home of record state. The expected earnings are accumulated over a
four-year term and discounted at 17%. The local area unemployment rate (source. BLS) is specific to the soldier's home of record county
during the month of his reenlistment decision.
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Table 11. Main estimates, binary choice framework (binary logit model), specification checks.
Spec Checks, Binary Choice Framework (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Marginal Effects for Whole Sample
Excess Mortality Hazard (per 1.000) -0.0084 -0-0085 -0 0088 0 0021 -0 0085 -0-0063
(0-0016) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0 0013) (0 0016) (0 0012)
Bonus Offer (1,000s of $2010) 0.0155 0.0157 0.0163 0.0162 0.0154 0.0127
(0 0008) (0 0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0 0007)
Occupation Morbidity Hazard (p1.000) 0 0014 0.0016 0.0019 0.0005 0 0017 0 0009
(0 0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0 0002) (0 0003) (0 0003)
Spec Check Variable 0 0072 0-0285 -0.0034 -0 0190 0 0575 0 0154
(0 0008) (0.0028) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0 0173) (0.0006)
Panel B: Whole Sample VSL 0 5416 0 5427 0.5363 -0 1278 0 5499 0 4947
n=561,319 Cl 0_333 - 0.750 0.332 - 0.753 0 327 - 0-746 -0.289 - 0 034 0-329 - 0.771 0-304 - 0_685
LL -361604 -362266 -362605 -361960 -362209 -348523
Panel C: Men NonCombat Occs VSL 0 1516 01449 0 1483 0.0307 0.1393 0,1370
n=228.023 Cl 0 048 - 0256 0 043 - 0 247 0 045 - 0 252 -0 225 - 0 287 0-032 - 0.247 0.017 - 0.257
LL -147682 -147822 -147826 -147872 -147797 -144552
Panel D: Men Combat Occs VSL 0 0652 0 0647 0 0552 0 0161 0 0575 0 1369
n=122,872 Cl -0-034-0.165 -0,034-0163 -0,043-0.153 -0.127-0.159 -0.043-0.158 0_004-0.269
LL -78775 -78855 -78913 -78916 -78912 -76687
Panel E: Men Infantry Occs VSL -0.1508 -01492 -0 1483 -0-3703 -0 1621 -01016
n= 101,688 Cl -0.257 - -0.045 -0.251 - -0.047 -0.228 - -0.069 -0.656 - -0.084 -0.253 - -0.071 -0.262 - 0.059
LL -64104 -64276 -64418 -64406 -64417 -61828
Panel F: Women All Occs VSL 0.1989 0.1928 0-0219 -0.2203 0.1195 0.3388
n=108,736 Cl -0.116 - 0.514 -0.115 - 0.501 -0.223 - 0.267 -0.637 - 0-196 -0_246 -0.485 -0.128 - 0.805
LL -65932 -66236 -65758 -66387 -65213 -61254
Controls Included:
Expected Pay Difference x x x x x x
Local Area Unemployment Rate x x x x x x
Decision Year X Occupation FE x x x x x x
Specification Check Variables:
Individual Exposure to Casualties x
Individual Exposure to Deaths x
Army-Wide Casualty Rate x
Army-Wide Mortality Rate x
Early Promotion to E-5 x
Total Months Deployed x
Notes: Marginal effects (with robust standard errors clustered by occupation in parentheses) reported for binary logit estimates on whole sample
with outcome as binary indicator for whether soldier reenlisted. VSL estimated as ratio of coefficient on relative hazard to coefficient on bonus
offer. The excess mortality hazard is measured as the difference between the inside and outside hazard, where the inside hazard is the occupation-
specific mortality rate for the soldier's occupation at the time of his reenlistment decision and the outside hazard is the civilian mortality rate of the
soldier's home of record county for his age group, gender, and race in the year of his reenlistment decision. The hazards are accumulated over a
four-year term and discounted at 17%. The bonus offer estimate is based on the assumption of a reenlistment for a Regular Army option, four-
year term. The military occupation-specific morbidity hazard is measured as the number of casualties per 1,000 soldiers assigned to the occupaon
per year, accumulated over a four-year term and discounted at 17%. The expected pay difference is measured as the difference between the
soldier's expected military compensation and the average civilian earnings of veterans in the soldier's age group, race, gender, and education level
in the soldier's home of record state. The expected earnings are accumulated over a four-year term and discounted at 17%. The local area
unemployment rate (source; BLS) is specfic to the soldier's home of record county during the month of his reenlistment decision. Individual
exposure to casualties (deaths) is measured as the casualty rate (mortality rate) experienced by the soldiers 100-person unit of assignment
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Table 12. Main estimates with interaction terms, binary choice framework.
Estimates for Binary Choice Framework with Interaction Terms, Whole Sample (n=561.386)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lo (Var=O) Hi (Var=1) Lo lVar=0) Hi (Var=1) Lo (Var=0) Hi (Var=1)
Interaction Variable:
AFQT Category 1 (Score>92) VSL; 0-2700 0.0463 03711 0.1653 02463 01384
CI 0.117-0.423 -0-263-0,356 0.233 - 0.509 -0O110 -0441 0.021 - 0-471 -0.123 - 0.400
AFQT Category 2 (Score>64 & <93) VSL 0 3062 0.1683 0 4090 0.2791 0-2701 0,1902
Ci 0-139-0-474 0.034- 0302 0-261 -0.557 0-149 - 0409 0-034 - 0.507 -0-025 - 0-405
AFQT Category 3a (Score>49 &<65) VSL 0 2480 0 3011 0-3537 03972 0.2374 0 2753
Ch 0-081 -0,415 0148 - 0-454 0199 - 0.509 0 267 - 0,527 0-011 - 0,463 0.028 - 0-522
AFQT Category 3b-5 (Score<60) VSL 0 2214 0 3507 0.3310 0-4456 0 2132 03013
Ch 0 081 - 0.362 0.182 - 0.519 0-204 - 0-458 0.301 - 0.590 -0 013 - 0.439 0-076 -0.527
Age (Age>24 at Decision Date) VSL 0 2776 0 2417 0.3890 0.3448 0 2457 0.2152
Cl 0.115-0,440 0-082-0-401 0-251 - 0.527 0 187 - 0.503 0 013 - 0.479 0 003 - 0,427
Ind. Cas. Exp. (Unit had >0 cas) VSL. 0-8399 0 2395 0 8341 0-3009 0 5769 0-0816
Ch 0.599-1-080 0.096-0-383 0.562 - 1106 0 179 - 0-423 0.376 - 0.778 -0-072 - 0.235
Deployed (Months Deployed>0) VSL 1.1909 0 3501 1.0900 0.3927 0 6842 0 1123
Cl 0.855-1-527 0185-0.515 0-731 - 1449 0 214 - 0.571 0-361 - 1 008 -0.053 - 0-278
Dropout VSL 0,3387 -0-0043 0-4384 0.0929 0.3211 -0.0152
CH 0.179-0.498 -0-170-0-161 0.287-0.589 -0-047-0233 0086 - 0-556 -0188 - 0,157
Married VSL 0-2318 0,2560 0.3315 0.3480 02576 02828
C1 0-072 - 0-392 0.060 - 0-452 0-187-0476 0.184-0.512 0-039 - 0.476 0-001 - 0.565
Female VSL 0-2915 0.3450 0.3796 0-6540 -0.0144 0.5417
Ch 0151 - 0432 -0.416 - 1.106 0.200 - 0.559 -0-080 - 1-388 -0.102 - 0,073 0.103 - 0.980
Black VSL 0.0820 0.3489 0-2023 0-4340 0.1148 0.3941
Cl -0-068 - 0.232 0-195 - 0.502 056 - 0-348 0.291 - 0.577 -0.060 - 0.290 0.192 - 0.596
Explanatory Variables ncluded:
Bonus Offer & Rel. Hazard X X x x X X
Expected Pay Difference x x  x x x
Local Area U-Rate x x X x X X
Year FE X x X X
Occupation FE x X
Notes: Confidence intervals calculated from robust standard errors clustered by occupation. Binary logit estimates with outcome as binary indicator
for whether soldier reenlisted. VSL estimated as ratio of coefficient on relative hazard plus coefficient on hazard interacted with interaction variable
to coefficient on bonus offer plus bonus offer interacted with interaction variable The excess mortality hazard is measured as the difference between
the inside and outside hazard, where the inside hazard is the occupation-specific mortality rate for the soldier's occupation at the time of his
reenlistment decision and the outside hazard is the civilian mortality rate of the soldier's home of record county for his age group, gender, and race
in the year of his reenlistment decision. The hazards are accumulated over a four-year term and discounted at 17%. The bonus offer estimate is
based on the assumption of a reenlistment for a Regular Army option, four-year term. The expected pay difference is measured as the difference
between the soldier's expected military compensation and the average civilian earnings of veterans in the soldier's age group, race, gender, and
education level in the soldiers home of record state. The expected eamings are accumulated over a four-year term and discounted at 17%. The local
area unemployment rate (source: BLS) is specific to the soldier's home of record county during the month of his reenlistment decision.
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Estimates for Binary Choice Framework (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
with Interaction Terms. Sub-Samples Men Non-Combat Occs Men Combat Occs Men Infantry Oces Women All.Occs
(n=228.023) (n=122,872) (n=101,688) (n=108,736)
lLo (Var=0) Hi (Var=1) Lo (Var=0) Hi (Var=1) Lo (Var=0) Hi (Var=1) Lo (Var=0) Hi (Var=1)
Interaction Variables
AFQT Category 1 (Score>92) VSL 0.1501 -0.1380 0.0709 01026 -0.2027 -0.2615 0.5904 -0.4773
Cl 0.009- 0.292 -0.685 -0.409 -0.051- 0_193 -0.135- 0.340 -0.320- -0.086 -0.627-0.104 -0.097 -1278 -4.023 -3068
AFQT Category 2 (Score>64 & <93) VSL 0.1499 0-0482 0 0890 0.0691 -0.2171 -0.1982 0.7574 0.1120
C1 0-005 - 0.295 -0.122 - 0-219 -0-050 - 0.228 -0.039 - 0,178 -0.314 - -0.120 -0.369 - -0.028 -0.003 -1 518 -0.866 - 1-090
AFQT Category 3a (Score>49 &<65) VSL 0.1144 0 1656 0.0680 0.0862 -0.2172 -0.1953 0.4490 0.9305
CO -0.078 - 0.307 0.049 - 0.283 -0.051 - 0.187 -0.050 - 0-222 -0.353 - -0.082 -0.300 - -0.091 -0.287 - 1.185 0 173 - 1.688
AFOT Category 3b-5 (Score<50) VSL 0.1287 0.1093 0.0929 0 1126 -0.2042 -0.2188 0 4848 0.8897
Cl -0.027 - 0.284 -0.047 - 0.266 -0-014-0.199 -0.043- 0268 -0.349--0.060 -0.294--0.144 -0.336-1.306 0.185-1.595
Age (Age>24 at Decision Date) VSL 0 1847 0.0625 0. 0891 0 0665 -0.2003 -0.2312 0 7024 0.3036
Cl 0 036 - 0.334 -0 146 -0 271 -0-046 - 0.225 -0.058 - 0.191 -0.312 - -0.089 -0.383 - -0.080 0.063 - 1.341 -0.477 - 1.084
Ind. Cas. Exp. (Unit had >0 cas) VSL 0.1802 0.2250 0.3135 0.0670 0.1167 -0.4030 1.0849 -0.0151
Cli 0033 -0.328 -0-061 - 0 511 0.156 -0.470 -0026 - 0,160 -0.105- 0.338 -0.576 - -0.230 0 026-2,143 -0.769-0.739
Deployed (Months Deployed>0) VSL 0,2129 0.1622 0.4130 0.1173 0.1031 -0.3284 2.4106 -0 1607
Cl -0-023 - 0.449 -0 147- 0 472 0 189 - 0.637 0-020 - 0.214 -0.018 - 0.224 -0.563 - -0.093 0 177-4.645 -1126 - 0.805
Dropout VSL 0.1474 0-0204 0.1342 -0-1867 -0.1724 -0.3056 0.6626 -0.0468
CI -0.024 - 0.319 -0.157 -0 198 0-021 - 0.247 -0.420 - 0.046 -0.314 - -0.031 -0.409 - -0.203 -0.137 - 1.462 -0.633 - 0.540
Married VSL 0.1374 0.0542 0.0187 0 0744 -0.2364 -0.1232 0.7432 0.3735
Cli -0.021 - 0.296 -0.134 - 0_242 0110 - 0.147 -0 048 - 0,196 -0.376 - -0.097 -0.219 - -0.027 0.026 - 1.513 -0.365 - 1.112
Black VSL -0.0923 -04195 0.0103 0.0398 -0.2584 -0.1896 0.3774 0.7557
Cl -0.290-0106 -0.565 -- 0274 -0_120- 0.141 -0.129- 0208 -0.406- -0.111 -0.261- -0.118 -0.270 - 1.025 0.173 - 1.338
Explanatory Variables Included
Bonus Offer & Rel. Hazard xx x x x x x x
Expected Pay Difference x x x x x x x x
Local Area U-Rate x x x x x x x
Year FE x x x x x
Notes: Confidence intervals calculated from robust standard errors clustered by occupation. Binary logit estimotes with outcome as binary indicatorfor whether soldier reenlisted. VSL
estimated as ratio of coefficient on relative hazard plus coefficient on hazard interacted with interaction variable to coefficient on bonus offer plus bonus offer interacted with
interaction variable. The excess mortality hazard is measured as the difference between the inside and outside hazard, where the inside hazard is the occupation-specific mortality rate
for the soldier's occupation at the time of his reenlistment decision and the outside hazard is the civilian mortality rate of the soldier's home of record county for his age group, gender,
and race in the year of his reenlistment decision. The hazards are accumulated over a four-year term and discounted at 17%. The bonus offer estimate is based on the assumption of
a reenlistment for a Regular Army option, four-year term. The expected pay difference is measured as the difference between the soldier's expected military compensation and the
average civilian earnings of veterans in the soldier's age group, race, gender, and education level in the soldier's home of record state. The expected eamings are accumulated over a
four-year term and discounted at 179& The local area unemployment rote (source- 81) is specific to the soldier's home of record county during the month of his reeniistment decision.
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Table 14. Multinomial logit estimates (j=5 alternatives).
Multinomial Logit Estimates (J=5) 1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reenlistment Alternatives: 1 2 3 4 5
(Base Case: 0=Exit the Army) Reg Army Stabilization Training OCONUS CONUS
Panel A: Base Model, No FE (LL=-504,680)
Excess Mortality Hazard (per 1,000) -0-1306 -0-0904 -0.4279 -0 1307 -4.0981
(0-0027) (0.0027) (0 0045) (0.0029) (0.0027)
Bonus Offer (1.000s of $2010) 6.2257 61842 6.1717 61416 6.1468
(0.4827) (0-4827) (0 4827) (0_4827) (0 4827)
VSL 0.0210 0.0146 0.0693 0.0213 0.0160
Cl 0.018 - 0.024 0 012 - 0-017 0 059 - 0.080 0.018 - 0,025 0-013 - 0,019
Wald Test: Chi2 Test Statistics (df=1)
H.,: VSLi = VSL&,.DE 145-19 157.59 0.96* 130.82
H,,: VSL,-e.2 = VSLe. . 159.66 124.23 34,78
H. VSLtie = VSL :Le L 159.03 159.95
H VSL:Bas = VSL:wth s 10873
............................ ........................ .. . .... . . ...... . . .... . ... ................ 
............... .......................... ...............................
Panel B: Base Model with Decision Year FE (LL=-495.137)
Excess Mortality Hazard (per 1-000) -0.1076 -0.0654
(0 0028) (0.0028)
Bonus Offer (1,000s of S2010) 6.2278 6.2011
(0 5556) (0.5556)
-0.4303
(0.0047)
6.1801
(0. 5556)
-0 1031
(0.0030)
6-1659
(0.5556)
-0 0777
(0.0028)
6.1611
(0 5556)
0-0173 0.0105 0.0696
0.014 - 0.020 0-008 - 0.013 0.057 - 0.082
0.0167 0_0126
0.014 - 0-020 0.010 - 0.015
Wald Test Chi2 Test Statistics (df=1)
Ho. VSL:t-1:i= VSL :._c7 112.55 120.65 3.32* 98.64
H:: VSL *2 = VSL121-66 97.05 54.15
H:: VSLe e = VSLr121.31 121.79
H,.VL~ 75.36
.................. I..........................................................................................................................................................................................
Panel C: Base Model with Decision Year& Occupation FE (LL=483,101)
Excess Mortality Hazard (per 1,000) -0.0824 -0.0353 -0.5115 -0.0540 -0.0298
(0 0029) (0.0028) (0.0049) (0 0032) (0 0029)
Bonus Offer (1,000s of $2010) 6.2278 6.2061 6.1953 6 1709 6 1660
(0 4973) (0 4973) (0.4973) (0 4973) (0 4973)
VSL
Cl
0.0132 0.0057 0.0826 0.0087 0.0048
0.011 - 0.015 0 004 - 0.007 0.069 - 0 096 0.007 - 0.010 0.004 - 0-006
Wald Test Chi2 Test Statistics (df1)
H: VSL. 0o- = VSLe- .; 129 07 152 32 73.97 130 40
H.,: VSLe, 2 = VSL:; = 153.12 50.34 9.62
H: VSL:,. 3 = VSLn t 152.87 153 24
H: VSL:.z = VS r. 64.40
Notes: Standard multinomial logit estimates for unordered qualitative variables. Outcome choices are 0 (exit Army).
1 (reenlist regular army), 2 (reenlist for current station stabilization). 3 (reenlist for Army training option), 4 (reenlist
for OCONUS station of choice), 5 (reenlist for CONUS station of choice). Base model includes excess mortality
hazard per 1.000 (measures the difference between the military occupation specific hazard and the civilian hazard
among 20-34 year olds of the same race and gender in the soldiers home-of-record county estimated as of the
soldiers reenlistment decision, accumulated over a four-year term. and discounted at a rate of 17% per year),
bonus offer in thousands of constant year 2010 dollars. and the expected pay difference (measured in thousands of
constant year 2010 dollars as the difference between regular military compensation and the average civilian
earnings among veterans with similar demographic characteristics in the soldiers home of record state). The top
portion of each panel reports estimated coefficients (odds between choice j and the base case choice 0) from
multinomial logit estimation. Robust standard errors clustered by military occupation are in parentheses. The
middle portion of each panel reports the choice-specific VSL estimated as a ratio of the alternative-specific
coefficients. Confidence interval calculated from standard errors estimated using delta method. The bottom portion
of each panel reports chi 2 test statistic from Wald test of equality of VSL estimate between choice j and choice j'.
*p-value > 0.05 (implies fail to reject equality of VSL estimates in alternative-by-alternative comparison).
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Table 15. Alternative specific conditional logit estimates, multinomial choice (J=5).
Alt. Specific Conditional Logit (J=5) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Coefficient & SE Estimates for Whole Sample
Excess Mortality Hazard (per 1,000) -0.0328 -0.0387 -0.0237 -0.0256
(0.0049) (0.0055) (0.0087) (0.0072)
Bonus Offer (1 .000s of $2010) 01210 0.1495 01243 0.1561
(0 0044) (0.0076) (0.0031) (0 0054)
Panel B: Whole Sample VSL 0.2713 0.2591 0.1904 0.1641
n=561,319 Cl 0 196 - 0.346 0.190 - 0.328 0.057 - 0.323 0.074 - 0.255
LL -689599 -675460 -682546 -667242.................................................................................... I ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................eam ama s
Panel C: Men NonCombat Occs VSL 0.1147 0.1063 0.1674 0.1359
n=228,023 Cl -0.026 - 0.256 0.003 - 0.209 0.055 - 0.280 0.052 - 0.220
LL -303429 -295880 -301009 -293395
Panel D: Men Combat Qecs VSL 0.1151 0.0790 0.0945 0.0559
n=122,872 Cl 0.052 - 0.179 0.031 - 0.127 0.015 - 0.174 0.014 - 0.098
LL -151124 -146497 -150426 -145679
............................................................................................................................................ 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............................................................ms... ........m...............................................en . ..-. ....Panel E: Men Infantry Occs VSL 0.0016 0.0582 -0.0152 0.0490
n= 101.688 Cl -0-027 - 0-030 -0.043 -0160 -0-033 - 0.002 -0.053 - 0.151
LL -115156 -110552 -114578 -110136
............................................................ I ....................................................................................- ................................................................................................
Panel F: Women All Occs VSL 0.3427 0.3489 0.3113 0.3162
n=108,736 Cl 0.096 - 0.589 0.145 - 0.552 0.133 - 0.489 0.167 - 0,465
LL -114863 -112944 -112647 -110508
..........................................................................................................................................................................................
Controls Included:
Expected Pay Difference x x x x
Local Area Unemployment Rate x x x x
Decision Year FE x x
Occupation FE x x
Notes: A Iternative specific conditional logistic regression allows for altemative-specific and case-specific variables.
Cases are individuals. Alternatives include the outcome choices 0 (exitArmy) 1 (reenlist regulararmyt, 2 (reenlist
for current station stabilization), 3 (reenlist for Army training option), 4 (reenlist for OCONUS station of choice), 5(reenlist for CONUS station of choice). Alternative-specific independent variables include the excess mortality
hazard, bonus offer, and expected earnings difference. The excess mortality hazard is measured as the difference
between the inside and outside hazard where the inside hazard is the occupation-specific mortality rate for the
soldier's occupation at the time of his reenlistment decision and the outside hazard is the civilian mortality rate of
the soldier's home of record county for his age group, gender, and race in the year of his reenlistment decision. The
hazards are accumulated over a four-year term and discounted at 17%. The bonus offer is based on the
assumption of a reenlistment for a four-year term. The expected earnings difference is measured as the difference
between the soldier's expected regular military compensation and the average civilian earnings of veterans in the
soldier's age group, race, gender, and education level in the soldier's home of record state. The expected earnings
are accumulated over a four-year term and discounted at 17%. Case-specific independent variables include thelocal area unemployment rate, decision year fixed effects, and occupation fixed effects. The local area
unemployment rate (source: BS) is specific to the soldiers home of record county during the month of his
reenlistment decision. Estimated standard errors for regression coefficients are robust, clustered at the occupation
level The VSL is estimated as the ratio of the coefficient on the hazard to the coefficient on the bonus. Delta
method is used to calculate standard errors for VSL estimates and 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 16. Summary statistics for multinomial choice framework with J=23 alternatives.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (a)
Predicted StDev of Mean
Choices Term Mean Meanchoice Description .Y ) Choice Probablity Predicted Bonus Hazard
Index of Choice j Probability Offer
0 Exit Army n/a 0.571 0.571 (0.119) 0.000 2.746
1 Option 1: Reenlist Same MOS, Army Picks Location 2 0.033 0.033 (0.013) 2.833 2.515
2 Option 1: Reenlist Same MOS, Army Picks Location 3 0.017 0.017 (0.015) 4.829 3.506
3 Option 1: Reenlist Same MOS, Army Picks Location 4 0.021 0.021 (0.018) 6.044 4.353
4 Option 1: Reenlist Same MOS, Army Picks Location 5 0.012 0.012 (0.014) 7.146 5.076
5 Option 1: Reenlist Same MOS, Army Picks Location 6 0.023 0.023 (0.024) 8.047 5.695
6 Option 2: Reenlist Same MOS, Stay Current Location 2 0.007 0.007 (0.009) 1.193 2.515
7 Option 2: Reenlist Same MOS, Stay Current Location 3 0.031 0.031 (0.016) 2.082 3.506
8 Option 2: Reenlist Same MOS, Stay Current Location 4 0.035 0.035 (0.017) 2.637 4.353
9 Option 2: Reenlist Same MOS, Stay Current Location 5 0.020 0.020 (0.017) 3.170 5.076
10 Option 2: Reenlist Same MOS, Stay Current Location 6 0.039 0.039 (0.034) 3.553 5.695
11 Option 3: Reenlist New MOS, Army Picks Location 3 0.010 0.010 (0.012) 4.088 1.403
12 Option 3: Reenlist New MOS. Army Picks Location 4 0.041 0.041 (0.029) 4.922 1.741
13 Option 3: Reenlist New MOS, Army Picks Location 5 0.011 0.011 (0.014) 5.729 2.031
14 Option 3: Reenlist New MOS, Army Picks Location 6 0.014 0.014 (0.020) 6.420 2.278
15 Option 4: Reenlist Same MOS, OCONUS Location 3 0.004 0.004 (0.003) 3.010 3.506
16 Option 4: Reenlist Same MOS, OCONUS Location 4 0.034 0.034 (0.022) 3.758 4.353
17 Option 4: Reenlist Same MOS, OCONUS Location 5 0.007 0.007 (0.005) 4.449 5.076
13 Option 4: Reenlist Same MOS, OCONUS Location 6 0.008 0.008 (0.008) 4.956 5.695
19 Option 5: Reenlist Same MOS, CONUS Location 3 0.040 0.040 (0,027) 2.887 3.506
20 Option 5: Reenlist Same MOS, CONUS Location 4 0.034 0.034 (0.019) 3.502 4.353
21 Option 5: Reenlist Same MOS, CONUS Location 5 0.013 0.013 (0.011) 4.111 5.076
22 Option 5: Reenlist Same MOS, CONUS Location 6 0.016 0.016 (0.015) 4.568 5.695
Notes. Whole sample, r=561,319. Column (3) lists the observed probability of selecting choice j. Column (5) lists the predicted probability of selecting
choicej for the whole sample based on fitted values from altemative specific conditional logit estimation (model includes altemative specific independent
variables bonus offer, mortality hazard, and expected eamings difference, and the model contains case-specific local area unemployment rate, decision
year dummies, and occupation dummies). Bonus offer is in thousands of constant year 2010 dollars. Hazard for choice j=0 is the civilian mortality rate
for people aged 20-34 in the soldier's home-of-record county of the soldiers same race and gender The mortality rate is accumulated and discounted
over a four-year term. The hazard for choices j=1 through j=10 and j=15 through j=22 are based on the soldier's current occupation mortality rate at the
time of his reenlistment decision. The hazard is accumulated and discounted over the term length associated with choice j. The hazard for choices j=11
through J=14 are based on the median mortality rate among occupations for which the soldier is eligible to choose for training. This hazard is also
accumulated and discounted over the term length associated with choice j.
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Table 17. Alternative specific conditional logit estimates, multinomial choice (J=23).
Alt. Specific Conditional Logit Estimates (J=23) (1) (2)
Panel A: Coefficient & SE Estimates for Whole Sample
Excess Mortality Hazard (per 1,000) -0.0285 -0.0229
(0-0006) (0 0008)
Bonus Offer (1,000s of $2010) 0.0871 0-0904
(0.0004) (0.0004)
..m.m..........................................e......u.............m........em.s............................................................................m...........................m................................................mm.........................-............................
Panel B: Whole Sample VSL 0.3266 0.2537
n=561,319 Cl 0-313 - 0.340 0-236 - 0.271
Panel C: Men NonCombat Occs VSL 0-1980
n=228,023 Cl 0.162 - 0.234
LL -449247
Panel D: Men Combat Occs VSL 0 0493
n=122,872 Cl 0 026 - 0-072
LL -223190
....-.. m.w...............................=...e........-...........e.w.......a.me.a....e..e.......................................................me..m.....man..................................==.............................==.........==..............-......................................
Panel E: Men Infantry Occs VSL 0.0198
n= 101-688 CI -0-020 - 0.059
LL -165595
Panel F: Women All Oces VSL 0-1535
n=108,736 Cl 0.086 - 0221
LL -161173.. ... ....... .... ... .................... ............ ............. .............. .................................... . . . ...... . ...... . . . . . ....................................................... ..... 1
Controls Included:
Expected Pay Difference x x
Local Area Unemployment Rate x x
Decision Year FE x x
Occupation FE x
Notes: Alternative specific conditional logistic regression allows for alternative-specifit and case-specific
variables. Cases are individuals. Alternatives include the outcome choices 0 (exit Army), 1 through 5
(reenlist in the some MOS for a 2, 3, 4, 5, or6 year term, respectively), 6 through 10 (reenlist in the same
MOS to stay at the current duty location foro 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6year term, respectively), 11 through 14 (reenlist
to train in a new MOS for a 3, 4, 5, or 6 year term, respectively), 15 through 18 (reenlist same MOS with
choice of OCONUS location fora 3,4, 5, or 6 year term, respectivelyt and 19 through 23 (reenlist same MOS
with choice of CONUS location for a 3, 4, 5, or 6 year term, respectively). Alternative-specific independent
variables include the excess mortality hazard, bonus offer, and expected earnings difference. The excess
mortality hazard is measured as the difference between the inside and outside hazard where the inside
hazard is the occupation-specific mortality rate for the soldier's occupation at the time of his reenlistment
decision and the outside hazard is the civilian mortality rate of the soldier's home of record county for his
age group, gender, and race in the year of his reenlistment decision. The civilian mortality hazard is
accumulated over afour-year term and discounted at 17%. The bonus offer is based on the assumption of
a reenlistrentfora four-year term. The expected earnings difference is measured as the difference between
the soldier's expected regular military compensation and the average civilian earnings of veterans in the
soldiers age group, race, gender, and education level in the soldier's home of record state. The expected
earnings are accumulated over a four-year term and discounted at 17%. Case-specific independent
variables indude the local area unemployment rate, decision yearfixed effects, and occupation fixed effects.
The local area unemployment rate is specific to the soldier's home of record county during the month of his
reenlistment decision. Estimated standard errors for regression coefficients are robust, clustered at the
occupation level. The VSL is estimated as the ratio of the coefficient on the hazard to the coefficient on the
bonus. VSL 95% confidence interval estimates calculated using the delta method.
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Table 18. Summary statistics for multinomial choice framework with J=10 alternatives.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Predicted Stlev of Mean
Choices Term Mean Mean
choice Description Probablity Predicted BonusIndex (j) (Years) Choice .Hazardof Choice j Probability Offer
0 Exit Army n/a 0.571 0.571 (0.127) 0.000 2.746
1 Reenlist Same MOS 2 0.039 0.039 (0.015) 3.461 2.515
2 Reenlist Same MOS 3 0.092 0.092 (0.045) 5.874 3.506
3 Reenlist Same MOS 4 0.124 0.124 (0.044) 7.188 4.353
4 Reenlist Same MOS 5 0.052 0.052 (0.036) 8.425 5.076
5 Reenlist Same MOS 6 0.086 0.086 (0.066) 9.436 5.695
6 Reenlist New MOS 3 0.010 0.010 (0.012) 4.088 1.403
7 Reenlist New MOS 4 0.041 0.041 (0.028) 4.922 1.741
8 Reenlist New MOS 5 0.011 0.011 (0.014) 5.729 2.031
9 Reenlist New MOS 6 0.014 0.014 (0.020) 6.420 2.278
Notes: Whole sample, n=561,319. Column (3) lists the observed probability of selecting choice J- Column (5) lists the
predicted probability of selecting choicej for the whole sample based on fitted values from altemative specific conditional
logit estimation (model indudes alternative specific independent variables bonus offer, mortality hazard, and expected
earnings difference, and the model contains case-specific local area unemployment rate, decision year dummies, and
occupation dummies). Bonus offer is in thousands of constant year 2010 dollars. Hazard for choice '=0 is the civilian
mortality rate for people aged 20-34 in the soldiers home-of-record county of the soldiers same race and gender. The
mortality rate is accumulated and discounted over a four-year term The hazard for choices j=1 through j=5 are based on
the soldiers current occupation mortality rate at the time of his reenlistment decision. The hazard is accumulated and
discounted over the term length associated with choice j. The hazard for choices 3=6 through j=9 are based on the median
mortality rote among occupations for which the soldier is eligible to choosefor training. This hazard is also accumulated
and discounted over the term length associated with choice j.
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Table 19. Alternative specific conditional logit estimates, multinomial choice (J=10).
Alt. Specific Conditional Logit Estimates (J=10) 1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Coefficient & SE Estimates for Whole Sample
Excess Mortality Hazard (per 1,000) -0.0198 -0.0330 -0.0262
(0.0006) (0,0006) (0.0008)
Bonus Offer (1,000s of $2010) 0.0716 0.0767 0.0832
(0.0004) (0-0004) (00005)
......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Panel B: Whole Sample VSL 0.2770 (14299 (.3148
n=561,319 Cl 0.261 -(0293 (1414 - 0-446 0296 - 0.334
LL -781191 -762827 -754240
Panel C: Men NonCombat Occs VSL -0.0024 0.2444 0.2832
n=228,023 Cl -0.043 - 0.038 0.206 - 0.283 0-245 - 0.321
LL -340622 -331456 -329129
Panel D: Men Combat Occs VSL -0.0188 0.1165 0.0441
n=122,872 Cl -0.049 - 0.011 0-090 - 0.143 0-014 - 0.074
LL -175159 -170621 -169520
Panel E: Men Infantry Occs VSL -0.1665 0-1034 0.0652
n= 101.688 Cl -0.202 - -0.131 0-060 - 0.147 0.020 - 0.111
LL -131243 -127030 -126346
Panel F: Women All Occs VSL 0.0230 0.2519
n=108,736 CI -0-061 - 0107 0-167 - 0-337
LL -126128 -123018
Controls Included:
Expected Pay Difference x x x
Local Area Unemployment Rate x x x
Decision Year FE x x
Occupation FE x
Notes: Alternative specific conditional logistic regression allows for alternative-specific and case-specific
variables. Cases are individuals. Altematives include the outcome choices 0 (exit Army), I through 5 (reenlist
in the some MOSfora 2, 3, 4,5, or 6 year term, respectively), and 6 through 9 (reenlist to train in a new MOS
for a 3, 4, 5, or 6 year term). Alternative-specific independent variables include the excess mortality hazard,
bonus offer, and expected Eamings difference. The excess mortality hazard is measured as the difference
between the inside and outside hazard where the inside hazard is the occupation-speific mortality rate for
the soldier's occupation at the time of his reenlistment decision and the outside hazard is the civilian mortality
rate of the soldier's home of record county for his age group, gender, and race in the year of his reenlistment
decision. The hazards are accumulated over a four-year term and discounted at 17%. The bonus offer is
based on the assumption of a reenlistment for a four-year term. The expected eamings difference is
measured as the difference between the soldier's expected regular military compensation and the overage
civilian earnings of veterans in the soldiers age group, race, gender, and education level in the soldier's home
of record state. The expected earnings are accumulated over afour-year term and discounted at 17%. Case-
specific independent variables include the local area unemployment rate, decision year fixed effects, and
occupation fixed effects. The local area unemployment rate is specific to the soldier's home of record county
during the month of his reenlistment decision. Estimated standard errors for regression coefficients are
robust clustered at the occupation level The VSL is estimated as the ratio of the coefficient on the hazard to
the coefficient on the bonus VSL 95% confidence interval estimates calculated using the delta method.
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1.9 Appendix A
Forecasting the Inside Hazard Rate
The mortality rate per 1,000 soldiers for military occupation k in month t is measured as:
t 1,000
Pk,t = k fatalitiek, st 00
n=t-1 I I)srengthk,t
where fatalities is the total number of deaths in time period t among soldiers in military occupation k
and strength is the number of soldiers assigned to military occupation k at the end of t. We assume
soldier i knows the history of hazard rates Pk,t, Pk,t-1, P,t-2, ...(denoted information set Ik,t) at the time
of the reenlistment decision (time t). We assume the soldier makes a forecast fk,t of the future hazard
rate Pk,t+1- Since Pk,t+1 is a random variable, we measure the forecast error as:
ek,t+1 = Pk,t+1 - fk,t
To model the decision maker's forecast of the future hazard rate, we choose a forecast method to
minimize the expected squared forecast error, given Ik,t:
[E et+1 I k,t ] = E [(Pk,t+l - k,t2 I 2~
A basic property of probability is that the expected squared forecast error is minimized by the conditional
expectation of Pk,t+1, given Ik,t (Woolridge 2006):
E [Pk,t+1 I Ik,t= minE [e$,t+ik,t 
fk,t
A naive time series model of the mortality rate is given by:
Pk,t+1 = ak + OkPk,t + Et+1
We made two a-priori adjustments to this model to control for time periods for which there may have
been significant shifts in expected mortality rates. First, we included a dummy for the post invasion of
Iraq time period where Ot = 1 if t > March2003 and Ot = 0 otherwise. Second, we included a dummy
for the surge period in Iraq where St = 1 if t E [January2007, May2008]. Thus, the naive time series
model is:
Pk,t+1 = ak - kPk,t -i+1O±+ I PSt+I+ Et+ 1 (17)
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However, equation 17 is likely to be non-stationary with possible seasonality. Further, the residuals are
unlikely to have a mean of zero or constant variance. Given the strong likelihood that the time series
of mortality hazard rates is non-stationary during the post-9/11 era as well as the significant potential
for auto-correlation in the error terms, we explored several varieties of autoregressive integrated moving
average (ARIMA) models for the prediction equation. An autoregressive model of order s, AR(s), with
random shock Vk,t+1, has the form:
s-1
Pk,t+l = ak + E P,iPk,t-i + +fOt±1 + pSt+1 + Vk,t+1
i=O
An auto-regressive moving-average model with s-order autoregressive terms and q-order moving average
terms, ARMA(s,q), takes the form:
s-1 q-1
Pk,t+1 -- ak + E Ok,iPk,t-i + 4'Ot+I + pSt+I + Vk,t+l - E Ok,jVk,tJ
i=0 j=O
An auto-regressive integrated moving-average model with s-order AR terms and q-order MA terms with
d-times differenced data is denoted ARIMA(s,d,q). To determine the optimal prediction equation, we
used the method of Box and Jenkins (1976) to identify potential orders for ARIMA(s,d,q) models. Our
analysis of the autocorrelation and partial autorcorrelation functions using 20 lags of the hazard time-
series for each military occupational specialty indicated further exploration of models with s = 0, 1, or 2
orders of autoregressive terms, d = 0, 1, or 2 orders of differences, and q = 0, 1, or 2 orders of moving
average terms. For nearly all occupations, seasonality did not appear to be a concern. The one exception
was the mortality rate for the infantry occupational specialty (11B), which appeared to exhibit some
evidence of annual seasonality, quite possibly driven by Ramadan. See Tables A1-A4 for a display of the
autocorrelations of the mortality hazard time-series for military occupational specialty 11B (infantry).
Tables Al-A4 suggest our time series prediction model should use twice-differenced data, adjusted for
annual seasonality, for the infantry occupation. Output displays of the autocorrelations for the other 153
occupational specialties we analyzed in detail are available upon request.16 Most of the autocorrelation
tables for the non-infantry occupations suggested the use of non-seasonally adjusted, single-differenced
data.
Next, we estimated 27 ARIMA(s,d,q) one-step ahead forecast equations encompassing all possible order
combinations for s E {0, 1,2}, d G {O, 1,2}, and q E {O, 1,2} for the 100 occupational specialties with the
largest populations of soldiers. For example, the ARIMA(1,1,0) model has the form:
Pk,t+ I - Pk,t -- ak + Ok (Pk,t - Pk,t- I ) -+-Vt+1I + P St+ I + Vk,t+ 1 (18 )
16
We analyzed 171 of the most populous occupational specialties in total, but 17 did not have any deaths between 1997 and
2010. As of 2013, Army.com (http://army.com/) listed 239 enlisted, warrant officer, and officer occupational specialties.
We focused our analysis on enlisted occupations only.
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Assuming that many soldiers might not apply ARIMA type modeling to make their own forecasts of future
expected mortality hazards, we also estimated a relatively straight-forward one-step ahead mean-reverting
forecast equation for each occupational specialty of the form:
Pk,t+1 - Pk,t -- ck + kPk,t + V' O+ St + Vk,t+1 (19)
For optimal model selection, we compared Akaike's Information Criteria (AIC) and Bayesian Information
Criteria (BIC) across each of the 27 ARIMA forecast models as well as the mean-reverting model (Akaike,
1973; Sawa, 1978). The advantage of using the AIC or BIC criterion vice root mean square error (RMSE)
or sum of squared error (SSE) criterion is the adjustment made by the AIC and BIC criterion for number of
parameters in the model. Whereas RMSE and SSE can be decreased by adding covariates to the model,
AIC and BIC penalize the addition of covariates which reduce SSE by comparatively little and as a result
they reward parsimony. According to the AIC selection criteria, the mean-reverting model was the best
predictor for 98 of the 100 occupation-specific time series we analyzed. According to the BIC selection
criteria, the mean-reverting model provided the best forecast for 99 of the 100 occupation-specific time
series we analyzed. See Table A5 for a summary of the model selection results.
Our analysis indicates the mean-reverting forecast model is the optimal model to conduct one-step ahead
forecasts of the mortality hazard for nearly all of the occupational specialties in the post-9/11 era. This
model suggests that the time-series of the hazard rates for most occupational specialties follow an auto-
correlated pattern around some long-term mean. Assuming the soldier has information Ik,t, that lagged
values of the hazard rate beyond one time period are only weakly correlated with the next period's value,
and that the forecast errors Vk,t+1 are independently distributed with mean 0 and constant variance, the
mean-reverting one-step ahead forecast fk,t = Pk,t+1, as estimated by equation (19), provides a consistent
estimate of the inside hazard for re-enlisting in occupation k at time t.
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Table Al. Box-Jenkins Results for Infantry Mortality Time-Series, Non-Differenced.
Table and Graph of Mortality Hazard Time Series (Non-Differenced) Autocorrelations
Sample: 110
-1 0 1 -1 0 1
LAG AC PAC Q Prob>Q [Autocorrelation] [Partial Autocor]
1 0.9924 0.9938 168.41 0.000 ------- -------
2 0.9791 -0.6013 333.34 0.000 ------- ---- |
3 0.9606 -0.2999 493.05 0.000 ------- 
--
4 0.9374 -0.1018 646.08 0.000 -------
5 0.9102 -0.0783 791.25 0.000 -------
6 0.8796 -0.0452 927.65 0.000 I-------
7 0.8466 0.0690 1054.80 0.000 ------
8 0.8123 0.1038 1172.60 0.000 ------
9 0.7767 -0.1059 1280.90 0.000 I------
10 0.7404 0.0226 1380.00 0.000 |-
11 0.7042 0.1111 1470.20 0.000 I-
12 0.6688 0.1194 1552.10 0.000 -
13 0.6361 0.3712 1626.70 0.000 - --
14 0.6053 -0.1730 1694.60 0.000 - -
15 0.5773 -0.0782 1756.80 0.000
16 0.5523 0.0527 1814.20 0.000
17 0.5306 -0.0529 1867.40 0.000 |----
18 0.5115 -0.0449 1917.20 0.000 |----
19 0.4944 -0.0067 1964.10 0.000
20 0.4788 -0.1503 2008.30 0.000 - -
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Table A2. Box-Jenkins Results for Infantry Mortality Time-Series, Single-Differenced.
Table and Graph of Mortality Hazard Time Series (Single-Differenced) Autocorrelations
Sample: 11B
-1 0 1 -1 0 1
LAG AC PAC Q Prob>Q [Autocorrelation] [Partial Autocor]
1 0.5977 0.5986 60.73 0.000 I---- I----
2 0.5411 0.2879 110.81 0.000 I---- --
3 0.4513 0.0813 145.85 0.000
4 0.3998 0.0539 173.52 0.000 |---
5 0.3436 0.0180 194.09 0.000 -
6 0.2390 -0.0948 204.10 0.000 I-
7 0.1380 -0.1248 207.46 0.000
8 0.1561 0.0859 211.78 0.000 -
9 0.0787 -0.0442 212.89 0.000 I
10 -0.0101 -0.1301 212.91 0.000 | -I
11 -0.1039 -0.1348 214.86 0.000 | -|
12 -0.3140 -0.3808 232.81 0.000 ---I
13 -0.1989 0.1667 240.06 0.000 --
14 -0.2402 0.0702 250.70 0.000 -I
15 -0.2854 -0.0612 265.82 0.000 -- I
16 -0.2679 0.0452 279.23 0.000 -- |
17 -0.2563 0.0361 291.59 0.000 --
18 -0.2135 -0.0032 300.23 0.000 -
19 -0.1219 0.1399 303.06 0.000 -
20 -0.2201 -0.1167 312.36 0.000 -I
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Table A3. Box-Jenkins Results for Infantry Mortality Time-Series, Twice-Differenced.
Table and Graph of Mortality Hazard Time Series (Twice-Differenced) Autocorrelations
Sample: 11B
-1 0 1 -1 0 1
LAG AC PAC Q Prob>Q [Autocorrelation] [Partial Autocor]
1 -0.4311 -0.4311 31.407 0.000 --- I 
--- I
2 0.0478 -0.1735 31.795 0.000 
-
3 -0.0497 -0.1284 32.218 0.000 
-
4 0.0070 -0.0828 32.226 0.000
5 0.0556 0.0291 32.762 0.000
6 -0.0069 0.0479 32.770 0.000
7 -0.1433 -0.1594 36.372 0.000 - -
8 0.1158 -0.0224 38.738 0.000
9 0.0135 0.0564 38.770 0.000
10 0.0073 0.0463 38.780 0.000
11 0.1491 0.2539 42.780 0.000 -
12 -0.4078 -0.3088 72.902 0.000 --- --
13 0.1945 -0.1728 79.800 0.000 -
14 0.0052 -0.0312 79.805 0.000
15 -0.0708 -0.1309 80.732 0.000 
-
16 -0.0061 -0.1094 80.739 0.000
17 -0.0310 -0.0625 80.919 0.000
18 -0.0614 -0.1933 81.630 0.000 
-
19 0.2389 0.0667 92.460 0.000 -
20 -0.1818 -0.0343 98.773 0.000 -
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Table A4. Box-Jenkins Selection Order Criteria Results for Infantry Mortality Time-Series.
Selection Order Criteria (Mortality Hazard Rate Time Series)
Sample: 118 Number of obs= 148
Lag LL LR df p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC
0 -944.440 72.9378 12.8032 12.8279 12.864
1 -321.020 1246.800 9 0.000 0.018073 4.50027 4.59901 4.74329
2 -289.963 62.113 9 0.000 0.013417 4.20221 4.37500 4.62749
3 -282.984 13.958 9 0.124 0.013794 4.22952 4.47636 4.83706
4 -278.475 9.018 9 0.436 0.014668 4.29020 4.61110 5.08001
5 -269.543 17.864 9 0.037 0.014699 4.29112 4.68607 5.26319
6 -262.519 14.048 9 0.121 0.015123 4.31782 4.78682 5.47215
7 -261.267 2.503 9 0.981 0.016833 4.42253 4.96559 5.75913
8 -258.640 5.255 9 0.812 0.018404 4.50365 5.12576 6.02751
9 -248.924 19.431 9 0.022 0.018301 4.49898 5.19014 6.20010
10 -246.507 4.835 9 0.848 0.020104 4.58793 5.35314 6.47131
11 -242.858 7.298 9 0.606 0.021746 4.66024 5.49951 6.72589
12 -240.812 4.092 9 0.905 0.024066 4.75421 5.66753 7.00212
13 -221.641 38.342 9 0.000 0.021162 4.61676 5.60414 7.04694
14 -215.284 12.713 9 0.176 0.022160 4.65248 5.71391 7.26492
15 -206.718 17.132 9 0.047 0.022562 4.65835 5.79383 7.45305
16 -198.524 16.388 9 0.059 0.023130 4.66924 5.87878 7.64620
17 -185.264 26.520 9 0.002 0.022189 4.61167 5.89526 7.77090
18 -178.407 13.713 9 0.133 0.023263 4.64064 5.99828 7.98213
19 -175.212 6.392 9 0.700 0.025689 4.71908 6.15077 8.24282
20 -171.771 6.881 9 0.650 0.028350 4.79420 6.29995 8.50022
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Table A5. Optimal Forecast Model Selection Results.
Count of Occupations for Which
Model had the Minimum Value
According to:
Count of Occupations for Which
Model had the 2nd Lowest
Value According to:
Time-Series Model AIC Criterion BIC Criterion AIC Criterion BIC Criterion
Mean-Reverting 98 99 1 0
ARIMA(0,1,0) 0 0 42 61
ARIMA(1,0,0) 0 0 37 26
ARIMA(1,1,0) 0 0 13 7
ARIMA(0,1,1) 0 0 3 3
ARIMA(2,2,1) 1 0 1 2
ARIMA(1,2,0) 1 1 1 1
ARIMA(2,1,1) 0 0 1 0
ARIMA(1,1,2) 0 0 1 0
100 100 100 100
Note: We estimated 27 A RIMA models and a mean-reverting model for the monthly time-series of
hazard rates between 1997 and 2010 for each of the 100 most populous military occupational
specialties. For each occupation, we determined the optimal model according to both AIC and BIC
criterion. We list model types which were either optimal or second best; according to either the
Akaike Information Criteria (A/C) or Bayesian Infomation Criteria (BIC), for at least one time-series of
occupation-specific mortality rates.
83
1.9 Appendix A
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Estimating Expected Civilian Earnings
We took two approaches to estimating the outside earnings a soldier might expect when considering
whether to reenlist. Our preferred approach is based on the individual's demographic characteristics. This
approach assumes the soldier's next best alternative to reenlisting in the military is full-time employment
at the mean wage and salary earnings of persons with similar observable demographic characteristics in
the state listed as the soldier's home-of-record. We used March Current Population Survey (CPS) data
from 1997 to 201017 to estimate a Mincer-style earnings regression of the form:
Inyist = a + Xip @ + i + Elst
where yist is the annual wage and salary earnings for individual i from state s in year t, and where Xi is a
vector of individual characteristics including a quadratic in potential experience, gender, race, education
level, an indicator for whether individual i is single, and an indicator for status as a veteran. We used
the coefficients estimated from this equation to predict individual i's potential civilian log-earnings as:
wist = Inyist = av+i+ +s+ rt
where ki is a subvector of Xi containing a quadratic in potential experience, gender, race, education
level, and an indicator for whether individual i is single. The estimated constant term in the prediction
equation incorporates the veteran premium estimated from the Mincer-style earnings equation so that
Xv =^f+ vet.
The second approach estimates the soldier's outside potential civilian earnings using occupation and
demographic characteristics, and essentially assumes the soldier expects his occupation in the civilian
sector to be roughly equivalent to his military occupation. The earnings regression for the occupation
approach takes the following form:
Inyi jst = a +9i9 + Yf; + 0s +rti + Eist
17
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 3.0. We use the CPS March Supplements
from 1997 through 2010. Our sample includes U.S. citizens in the adult civilian population (who are not currently in
the military). We restricted the sample to those aged 15-54 who reported working full-time with positive salary and
wage related earnings last year. We adjusted earnings into constant 2010 values using the September CPI for all urban
consumers (U.S. city average, seasonally adjusted, all items) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (www.BLS.gov, accessed
9 November 2011). We weighted all regressions involving CPS data using WTSUPP (a person-level weight based on the
inverse probability of selection into the CPS March Supplement sample, which adjusts for the failure to obtain an interview,
sampling within large sample units, the known distribution of the entire population according to age, sex, and race, and
over-sampling Hispanic persons, as well as to give husbands and wives the same weight and to provide consistency with
labor force estimates from the basic survey).
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where yijs, is the annual wage and salary earnings for individual i in occupation j from state s in year
t, and where Xi is a vector of individual characteristics including a quadratic in potential experience,
gender, race, education level, and an indicator for whether individual i is single (but not an indicator
for veteran status as the sample size of veterans in each occupation is too small in the CPS data to
provide meaningful variation). We constructed occupation j for individual i by carefully cross-walking
the individual's assigned military occupation at the time of his reenlistment decision to commensurate
Standardized Occupational Classifications (SOC) using 0-NET data.18 We then matched O-NET SOCs
to the Census 2000 occupational codes, which we then further matched to the Census 1990 occupational
codes ("occ1990"). The advantage of using the 1990 version of census occupational codes is that
the CPS data for all years has been cross-walked by IPUMS into the 1990 occupational codes for
consistent comparisons by occupation over time.19 We then used the coefficients estimated from the
above regression to predict individual i's potential civilian log-earnings as:
wijst = Ilyijst = + X/ + qjY +s + t
where X is a vector including a quadratic in the average potential experience of the reenlistment eligible
sample as well as the CPS sample averages (weighted) for the proportions of the population that are
male, female, white, black, other race, marital status (i.e., single), and of various education levels (i.e.,
high school graduate, some college, college graduate, and so on).
Our approaches to estimating the expected outside option for civilian wages has several potential prob-
lems. First, these approaches likely estimate a premium for potential experience. However, non-traditional
first-termers like those who enter the military later in life, perhaps in their late 20s or early 30s, are likely
to come from the lower-end of the potential civilian earnings distribution, particularly if they joined
the military after trying their hand in the civilian labor market. As a result, our estimates of expected
civilian pay for these non-traditional first-termers are likely to be biased upward. However, anecdotal
descriptive motivations for enlistment have shifted toward patriotic, "service-to-country" orientations in
the post-9/11 period. Thus it is not clear that non-traditional first-termers are more likely to have lower
opportunity cost options, particularly since September 2001.20
18
See http://www.onetonline.org/crosswalk/.
19
The process of translating current year military occupations into current year O-NET SOCs into current year CPS occu-
pational codes into time-consistent Census 1990 occupation codes was a complicated process involving several imperfect
matches at each stage of the crosswalk. In the cases where there was not a clear, straight-forward link from MOS to
occ1990, we went line-by-line comparing occupational descriptions and typical tasks performed across the various occupa-
tional classification systems to find the best subjective match of MOS to occ1990. Most of the very challenging cross-walks
involved those occupations that perhaps are most specific to the military like infantryman and tank crewman. In many of
these cases involving military specific occupations, we ultimately selected comparison civilian occupations related to the
provision of security services.
20
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Second, and more generally, our estimates of the outside civilian wage do not explicitly account for
unobserved heterogeneity in outside earnings potential. Soldiers considering reenlistment may have private
information about their location in the distribution of potential civilian earnings. In our estimates, two
soldiers with the same observable characteristics will be assigned the same predicted outside wage.
However, the soldier who knows he can earn an outside wage that is above the mean prediction is more
likely to not re-enlist than the soldier who knows he might not be able to find civilian employment or
thinks he could only get a job with earnings below the predicted mean. The later soldier is more likely
to reenlist. As a result, the observed military-to-civilian wage differential based on predicted means may
be too small. Thus the estimated parameters for the effect of the military-to-civilian wage differential
might be biased upward. However, given the presumption of shift in trends toward "service" orientation
in the post-9/11 period, it's again not clear that our expectation should be that those with lower valued
outside options are more likely to join or reenlist in the military. Further, it's quite possible that most
soldiers considering the reenlistment decision have imperfect information about their outside options,
particularly if they joined the military right after high school, and may be more likely to rely on simple
observed averages based on crude educational attainment characteristics, which are likely to be highly
correlated with our predicted values.
A third potential shortcoming of our method for estimating the expected outside civilian earnings is that
the method does not account for selection into the CPS sample via selection into full-time employment
or top-coding of incomes. However, we assume that a soldier considering an exit from active duty
expects that he would be a full-time, employed worker in the civilian labor force. This may not be
a good assumption if the soldier believes the probability of full time civilian employment is less than
one, or if the soldier's primary outside option is to go to college or participate in a vocational training
program. In the former case, we believe inclusion of year and state fixed effects in our prediction
regression equations controls for time and geographic specific variation in employment rates. In the
latter case, we consider alternative specifications of our model in which expected outside civilian earnings
are adjusted to incorporate the probability of increasing educational attainment subsequent to service and
the likely resulting discounted premium from obtaining delayed civilian employment at a higher education
level. Finally, Murphy and Welch (1990) have shown that mincer-style quadratic in experience earnings
equations can be biased, especially for individuals who are in the early stages of their working lives. Thus,
we consider specifications of the predicted civilian earnings regressions that incorporate a cubic and a
quartic in potential experience.
See Kleykamp 2006. Also see Michael Massey's "The Volunteer Army: Who Fights and Why?" in The New York Review
of Books, April 3, 2008, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2008/apr/03: "...[E]very year the military
conducts an annual survey of new recruits which asks, among other things, their reasons for enlisting. Dr. Curtis Gilroy, the
head of personnel policy at the Pentagon, said that in the last several years one particular reason has risen in prominence:
service to country. The number citing this as their main motivation went from 27.5 percent of all responses in 2002 to
38.1 percent in 2006. (It was followed by skills acquisition, cited by 20.2 percent, then by adventure, mentioned by 16.4
percent, then by money for education, benefits, travel, and pay."
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1.11 Appendix C
Formal Definitions of Casualty
The following definitions are provided from a memorandum titled, "Department of Defense Personnel
Casualty Matters, Policies, and Procedures," Department of Defense Instruction, Number 1300.18, Jan-
uary 8, 2008 (Incorporating Change 1, August 14, 2009), Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness. This document is available at: http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/130018p.pdf.
A casualty, in the most general case, occurs when a soldier becomes unavailable to the organization.
Thus, a soldier is a casualty when he can no longer provide labor services for the unit to which he is
regularly assigned. Our measure of individual combat exposure is based on casualty counts, and by the
general definition the total casualty count includes both hostile and non-hostile casualties. Though not
stated specifically in the definitions below, casualty counts are customarily tracked for organizational
deployments. In other words, deaths from accidents, homicides, or suicides that occur at home station
while an organization is not deployed to a combat zone are not included in our measure of combat
exposure. Table C1 provides a summary of Army casualties attributed to the Global War on Terror
between 2001 and 2010. Over 82% of the casualties are classified as hostile, which is the result of action
related to a combat mission or interaction with enemy fighters. Suicide deaths among deployed soldiers
account for about 0.5% of total casualties, 4.6% of total deaths, and 21.4% of non-hostile deaths.
Table C1. Summary of Casualty Type, 2001-2010.
Army Global War on Terror Casualties, 2001-2010
Proportion
Type Count of Total
Hostile Deaths 3,332 0.Q85
Hostile Injuries 28,919 0.738
Non-Hostile Deaths 918 0.023
Non-Hostile Injuries 6,036 0154
39 205 1 000
Notes: Non-Hostile Deaths includes those from acciderts
(-1.4% of total casualties), homicrdes (<0.1%). illness
(-0.2%), and suicide (-0.5%). Source: Defense Uanpower
Data Center.
"Casualty. Any person who is lost to the organization by having been declared dead, duty sta-
tus whereabouts unknown (DUSTWUN), excused absence whereabouts unknown (EAWUN),
missing, ill, or injured." There are six casualty statuses: (1) deceased; (2) duty status
whereabouts unknown (DUSTWUN) for military, or excused absence whereabouts unknown
(EAWUN) for civilians; (3) missing; (4) very seriously ill or injured (VSI); (5) seriously ill or
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injured (SI); and (6) not seriously ill or injured (NSI). At the DoD Component's discretion, an
additional casualty status of Special Patient (SPECPAT) or Special Category (SPECAT) may
be used. This status is for those members whose illness or injury is not otherwise reportable
such as Sl or VSI but involves: personnel diagnosed with a psychotic condition requiring
hospitalization; attempted suicide and suicide gestures verified by a medical authority, or
other medical conditions that may require extensive medical treatment or hospitalization.
"Hostile Casualty. A person who is the victim of a terrorist activity or who becomes a
casualty "in action." "In action" characterizes the casualty as having been the direct result
of hostile action, sustained in combat or relating thereto, or sustained going to or returning
from a combat mission provided that the occurrence was directly related to hostile action.
Included are persons killed or wounded mistakenly or accidentally by friendly fire directed
at a hostile force or what is thought to be a hostile force. However, not to be considered
as sustained in action and not to be interpreted as hostile casualties are injuries or death
due to the elements, self-inflicted wounds, combat fatigue, and except in unusual cases,
wounds or death inflicted by a friendly force while the individual is in an AWOL, deserter, or
dropped-from-rolls status or is voluntarily absent without authority from a place of duty."
"Non-hostile Casualty. A person who becomes a casualty due to circumstances not directly
attributable to hostile action or terrorist activity. Casualties due to the elements, self-inflicted
wounds, and combat fatigue are non-hostile casualties."
"Not Seriously IlIl or Injured (NSI). The casualty status of a person whose illness or injury
requires medical attention, may or may not require hospitalization, and medical authority
classifies as less severe than SI."
"Seriously Ill or Injured (SI). The casualty status of a person whose illness or injury requires
medical attention, and medical authority declares that death is possible, but not likely within
72 hours, and/or the severity is such that it is permanent and life-altering."
"Very Seriously Ill or Injured (VSI). The casualty status of a person whose illness or injury
is such that medical authority declares it more likely than not that death will occur within
72 hours."
"Wounded in Action (WIA). A casualty category applicable to a hostile casualty, other
than the victim of a terrorist activity, who has incurred an injury due to an external agent
or cause. The term encompasses all kinds of wounds and other injuries incurred in action,
whether there is a piercing of the body, as in a penetration or perforated wound, or none,
as in the contused wound. These include fractures, burns, blast concussions, all effects of
biological and chemical warfare agents, and the effects of exposure to ionizing radiation or
any other destructive weapon or agent. The hostile casualty's status may be categorized as
NSI, SI, or VSI."
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Table D1. Selected Military Occupational Specialties (MOS), as of September 2006
Non-Combat Occupations
MOS MOS Description Women? MOS MOS Description Women?
Career Field Grout 25 (Signal)
25 info Tech Spc
25C Radio Oprtr Maintainer
25E Electromagnetic Spectrum Mngr
25F Network Switching Sys Oprtr
25L Cable Sys installer Maintainer
25M Multimedia illustrator
25N Nodai Network Sys Oprtr Maintamer
25P Microwave Sys Oprtr Maintainer
250 Multichannei Transmission Sys Spc
25R Visual info Eqpmt Oprtr Maintainer
255 Satellite Commo Sys Maintainer
257 Satellite Microwave Sys Chief
25U Signal Support Sys Spc
25V Combat Documentation Prdctn Spc
Carer Field Grnun A5 IMilitar Inrelienei
35F
35G
35L
35M
35N
35P
355
35T
inteli Analyst
imagery Analyst
Counter Inteil Agent
Human intel Colector
SIGINT Analyst
Cryptologic Linguist
Signals Collector Analyst
MI Sys Maintainer Integrator
Career Field Group 31 (Military Police
318 Military Police
31D CID Special Agent
31E Internment Resettlement Spc
Career Field Group 88 fTransportationi
88H Cargo Spc
88K Watercraft Oprtr
881 Watercraft Engr
88M Motor Transport Oprtr
88N Transpo Mgmt Coordinator
Career Field Group 92 (Logistics
51C Acquisition Contracting NCO
898 Ammunition Specialist
89D Explosive Ordnance Disposal
92A Automated Logistical Spc
92F Petroleum Supply Spc
92G Food Service Spc
92L Petroleum Lab Spc
92M Mortuary Affairs Spc
92R Parachute Rigger
925 Shower Laundry & Clothing Repair
92W Water Treatment Spc
92Y Unit Supply Spc
Career Field Group 37/38 (PsyOps / CA)
37F Psychological Operations Spc
388 Civil Affairs Spc
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Career Field Group 68 iMedicall
68A Biomedical Eqpmt Spc
68D Operating Room Spc
68E Dental Spc
68G Patient Admin Spc
68H Optical Lab Spc
68J Medical Logistics Spc
68K Medical Lab Spc
68M Nutrition Care Spc
68P Radiology Spc
68Q Pharmacy Spc
68R Vet Food inspection Spc
68S Preventive Medicine Spc
66T Anima' Care Spc
6EV Respiratory Spc
68W Health Care Spc
6aX Behavioral Health Spc
Career Fied Group 42 (Human Resourcesl
27D Paralegal Spc
36B Financial Mgmt Tech
42A HG Spc
42R Army Band
46Q Public Affairs Specialist
46R Public Affairs Broadcaster
56M Chaplain Asst
79R Recruiter
Career Field Group 74 (Chem-Bit-Nuke Defense)
74D CBRN Spc
09L interpreter Translator
Career Field Group 94 IMaintenancel
Yes 91A Ml Abiams Tank Maintainer
Yes 91B Wheeled Vehicle Repair
Yes 91C Utilities Eqpmt Repair
Yes 91D Power Generation Eqpmt Repair
Yes 91E Allied Trades Spc
91F Small Arms Artillery Repair
91G Fire Control Repair
Yes 91H Tracked Vehicle Repair
Yes 91J Q1 & Chem Eqpmt Repair
Yes 91K Armament Repair
Yes 91L Construction Eqpmt Repair
Yes 91M Bradley Fighting Vehicle Maintainer
Yes 91P Artillery Mechanic
Yes 94A Land Combat Missile Sys Repair
Yes 940 ATC Eqpmt Repair
Yes 94E Radio & COMSEC Repair
Yes 94F Computer Detection Sys Repair
Yes 94H TMDE Maintenance Support Spc
Yes 94M Radar Repair
94P MLRS Repair
94R Avionic Eqpmt Repair
Yes 945 Patriot Sys Repair
Yes 94Y Test Eqpmnt Oprtr&Maintainer
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Combat Occupations (Not Infantry or Special Forces)
MOS MOS Description Women?
Career Field Group 12 (Enrineerl
126 Combat Engr No
12C Bridge Crew Yes
12D Diver Yes
12K Plumber Yes
12M Firefighter Yes
12N Horizontal Construction Engr Yes
12P Prime Power Prdctn Spc Yes
12R interior Electrician Yes
12T Tech Engr Yes
12V Concrete & Asphalt Eqpmt Oprtr Ves
12W Carpentry & Masonry Spc Yes
C2Y Geospatial Engr Yes
Career Field Grout 19 (Armori
19D Cavalry Scout No
19K MI AR Crewman No
Career Field Group 13 (Field Artlieryl
138 Cannon Crew No
13D Automated Tactical Data Sys Spc No
13F Fire Support Spc No
13M MLRS HIMARS Crew No
13P MLRS Ops Fire Direction Spc No
13R FA Firefinder Radar Oprtr No
13T FA Surveyor Meteorological Crew No
Carter Field Grout 14 (Air Defense Ariervl
14E Patriot Fire Control Maintainer Yes
14J AD C4i TacOps Center Maintainer Yes
145 Air & Mssl Defense Crew Yes
Career Field Group 15 (Aviation)
15B Aircraft Powerplant Repair Yes
15D Aircraft Powertrain Repair Yes
15F Aircraft Electrician Yes
15G Aircraft Structural Repair Yes
15H Aircraft Pneudraulics Repair yes
15J OH 58D Avionic Repair Yes
15K Aircraft Components Repair Yes
15N Avionic Mechanic Yes
15P Aviation Ops Spc Yes
15Q Air Traffic Control Operator Yes
ISR AH 64 Attack Helicopter Repair Yes
15S OH 58D ARH Helicopter Repair Yes
15T UH 60 Helicopter Repair Yes
15U CH 47 Helicopter Repair Yes
15W UAV Operator Yes
Infantry and Special Forces Ocupations
MOS MESS Description Women?
Career Field Group 11 (Infantryl
11B infantryman No
11C indirect Fire Infantryman No
Career Field Grout 18 (Soeclal Forcesl
188 SF Weapons Sgt No
18C SF Engr Sgt No
18D SF Medical Sgt No
18E SF Commo Sgt No
18F SF Asst Ops & Intell Sgt No
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2 MORTALITY OF VETERANS
2 Mortality of Veterans
On the Hidden Costs of War in Iraq and Afghanistan: The Mortality of Recent
Veterans
by Michael Yankovich21
July 22, 2013
Abstract
This paper documents a substantial increase in the one-year post discharge mortality of recent
veterans. As a result, the mortality impacts of service in the U.S. Army during the wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq through the end of 2010 are understated by approximately 10%, which is equivalent to about
370 deaths. Approximately 91% of the change in post-service mortality after the war began appears
to be due to the effect of exposure to high rates of mortality while in-service. Changes in soldier
demographics do not explain the observed increase in veteran mortality.
21 U.S. Military Academy at West Point, michael.yankovich@usma.edu. The views expressed in this article are those of
the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or
the U.S. Government. The author would like to thank Whitney Dudley and Luke Gallagher of the Office of Economic and
Manpower Analysis for their support in providing data for this article. The author would also like to thank David Autor,
Michael Greenstone, David Lyle, and Bill Skimmyhorn for providing helpful comments.
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2.1 Introduction
This paper presents new evidence on the mortality of veterans who left active service in the U.S. Army
between 1996 and 2007. Namely, the risk of death among recent veterans has surged since the beginning
of the war in Iraq, the increase in mortality is concentrated within the first year after separation, and
the increase is most pronounced among white men who served in combat occupations. The mortality
rate of veterans in their first year after separation from active service increased over twofold in the post
invasion of Iraq period relative to the pre-war period. Given the previous lack of reliable estimates of
post-service mortality, this finding indicates that Army service fatalities between 2001 and 2010 have
been understated by about 10% which is roughly 370 deaths. Second, approximately 91% of the increase
in post-service mortality appears to be due to the effect of exposure to high rates of mortality in-service.
Decomposition analysis suggests this may have been a latent relationship existing prior to the war but
the higher rates of in-service mortality during the war mean that post-service mortality rates are higher.
Changes in soldier demographics do not explain the results.
Figure 1 documents a substantial increase in the mortality rate among veterans in the first year after
separation for cohorts leaving active duty in years 2003 through 2007. For cohorts separating between
1996 and 2007, the trend of veteran mortality at two, three, and four years after separation is consistently
near or just below 50 deaths per 100,000 per year. However, there is a noticeable and persistent trend
break in veteran mortality during the first year after separation for cohorts separating between 2003 and
2007. Increases in veteran mortality that occur subsequent to the invasion of Iraq are highly concentrated
in the first year after separation from active service. The veteran mortality rate in the first year after
separation increased from the pre-war trend of being below 100 to a steadily increasing trend in the
post-war period reaching a high for those who separated in 2007 near 175.22
Figure 2 displays the time trend of the overall mortality rate among soldiers in the active Army, among
civilians aged 20-34, and among veterans within their first year after separation from the Army. During
the pre-war period, the one-year post discharge mortality rate was slightly higher than in-service mortality
and slightly lower than the mortality of similarly aged civilians reflecting the fact that soldiers should
be healthier on average than the civilian population of similarly aged people because soldiers undergo
significant health screening prior to and at induction. Veteran mortality falls somewhere between that
of soldiers and that of civilians because there is likely to be some selection out of service on the basis
of health-related issues that may develop while on active duty. Beginning in 2003, in-service mortality
increased above the civilian mortality rate, peaked in 2007 near the height of the surge period during the
war in Iraq, and remained above the civilian mortality rate in years 2008 and 2009 as the intensity of the
war in Afghanistan began to increase. Beginning in year 2004, the one-year post separation mortality of
veterans increased above the civilian mortality rate and even surpassed the in-service mortality rate in
year 2008.
The descriptive findings presented in Figures 1 and 2 are significant because reliable estimates of the
22A mortality rate of 100 means that the probability of death is 0.1% or 1 in 1,000 whereas a mortality rate of 175
means the risk of death is about 1 in 571.
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mortality of recent veterans have not been documented to date. This lack of documentation is largely due
to the fact that there is not a comprehensive administrative database of veteran morbidity or mortality. I
estimate post-service mortality by using cell-based data constructed from an extract of an Army admin-
istrative personnel data file that has been matched by social security number with the Social Security
Administration's public-version Death Master File (DMF). The cells were constructed by separation year,
gender, race, age, years of service, and in-service occupation categories. For additional details about the
data, sources, and variable construction, please see Appendix A.
Evidence from studies of veterans from the Vietnam-era and pre-Vietnam era suggest that changes
in post-service mortality could result from military-induced smoking, increased propensity for suicide,
increased exposure to automobile accidents, and increased propensity to engage in violent or criminal
behavior, which are all activities that are positively correlated with risk of death. Moreover, these studies
find that service during a time of war is causally related to the observed increase in these behaviors.
For example, Hearst et al (1986) find that draft exposure in the Vietnam era was associated with an
increased risk of suicide and automobile accidents; Bedard and Deschenes (2004) find that veterans of
World War I and the Korean War were at substantial increased risk of mortality due to military-induced
smoking; and Rohlfs (2010) finds that Vietnam-era combat exposure has positive effects on violence and
criminality.
A growing body of contemporary evidence indicates the existence of negative effects on life and health
outcomes among veterans of the Global War on Terror. Deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan in the
2002-2005 period had modest adverse effects on the standardized test scores of children of deployed
parents (Engel et al, 2010). Deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan was associated with a substantial
increase in the risk of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) relative to non-deployed soldiers (Shen et
al, 2010). Roughly 26 percent of soldiers serving in the Global War on Terrorism suffer from depression,
substance dependency, homelessness, or suicidal ideation, and estimates of post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) range from four to 45 percent (Tanielian and Jaycox, 2008). Soldiers deployed to overseas
locations where they engage in combat or witness allied or civilian deaths have an increased risk of
suicidal ideation and PTSD relative to a counter-factual group of peers who deploy to overseas locations
without being exposed to combat or allied and civilian deaths (Cesur et al, 2013). These results suggest
that service during the most recent period of war, particularly service involving a deployment to a combat
zone, plays a causal role in explaining negative physical and mental health outcomes.
Existing studies are largely silent in terms of explaining a link between war-time service, observed increases
in mortality risks or risk-taking behavior ex-post to service, and post-service mortality. It could be the
case that war attracts people in to service who have higher levels of latent propensity to engage in risky
behavior or be susceptible to mental health issues. If this is the case, then these latent propensities
would be at the heart of explaining post-service outcomes rather than war-time service per se. Further,
if these latent propensities are related to observable demographic characteristics, then one could test to
see if shifts in the demographic characteristics of those who enter and subsequently separate from active
service are related to shifts in post-service mortality. If the composition of the enlisted force changes
such that higher mortality groups select into military service, then post service mortality could change
97
2.1 Introduction 2 MORTALITY OF VETERANS
as a result of these shifts in demographics. For example, much has been said about the Army's need to
lower its quality standards as a result of the war in order to keep its manning levels at desired quantities.
As such, we might expect to see the composition of the force change toward having more soldiers with
lower Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores and less than a high school degree. If those with
lower educational attainment and lower AFQT scores have higher mortality in the civilian sector, we
might expect them to have higher mortality as veterans after service independent of the effects of service
during a time of war.
Military service during a period of war increases one's probability of exposure to traumatic or high-
risk events thus increasing one's potential for mental or physical morbidity and by extension mortality.
Assuming the probability of death is a function of age, race, gender, health, behavior, and genetics, then
exposure to trauma or high-risk events could impact the probability of death by affecting one's health or
behavior. Ideally, we would like to measure individual exposure to traumatic events in an environment
where individuals were selected randomly for such exposure and where the exposure itself were applied
randomly so that we could test to see if in-service individual exposure is causally related to shifts in post-
service mortality. We would also like to be able to observe intermediate changes in health or behavior
subsequent to such exposure. However, this ideal experiment is not possible or practical. Instead of
individual measures of in-service exposure to trauma or high-risk events, we use aggregated measures of
exposure to in-service mortality including mortality at the military unit (company level) and mortality
at the occupation level. We assess the reduced form impact of these two in-service mortality measures,
separately, on post-service mortality using variation in these measures that occurs both within and across
occupations while controlling for demographic composition shifts that occur over time. We are also
able to develop quasi-random estimates of the effect of in-service mortality on post-service mortality
for a sub-sample of soldiers who deployed in the post-war period using an instrument for company-level
mortality exposure.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section two summarizes the results of regression analysis to test for
the effect of in-service mortality on post-service mortality. Section two also presents the results of
decomposition analysis to explain the contributions of in-service mortality and demographics to the
observed increase in post-service mortality. Section three discusses potential limitations of the analysis
as well as provides an estimate of the social cost of excess mortality among veterans. Section four
concludes.
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2.2 Veteran Mortality
2.2.1 The Effects of In-service, Company-level Mortality
I develop estimates of the effect of in-service mortality on the one-year post discharge mortality using
cell-by-year regressions with time effects and the in-service mortality main effect. The in-service mortality
rate is measured using an estimate of the military unit-level mortality rate experienced by the company-
level units to which a soldier is assigned during deployments.23 Details about the construction of this
explanatory variable are provided in Appendix A. I include key demographic control variables in the
regression estimates, and I also conduct an Oaxaca decomposition exercise to explore the extent to
which in-service mortality and demographic characteristics explain the observed difference in post-service
mortality between the pre-war period and the post-war period. As a specification check, I control for
whether the soldier was discharged with a disability or with a punitive discharge, the average number
of months the soldier was deployed during his term of service, and the distance between the soldier's
home-of-record zip code and the nearest VA center.
The sample of interest is a panel data set consisting of cells defined by military occupation, race,
and gender. There are 1,092 occupation-by-race-by-gender cells representing over 750,000 individuals
who separated from active duty between 1996 and 2007. In some estimates, I focus analysis on two
sub-samples. One sub-sample consists of 1,046 cells representing over 370,000 individuals who were
discharged from the Army between 2002 and 2007. A second sub-sample consists of 712 cells representing
approximately 198,000 individuals who deployed during their first term of service and were discharged
from the Army between 2002 and 2007. Summary statistics are listed in Table 1. All regressions are
weighted by cell population counts.
I estimate the following model of one-year post discharge mortality on the sub-sample of soldiers who
separated from active duty between 2002 and 2007:
vdrjrg, = a + .cbt exp jrgt +Xjrgt V + £,jrgt (20)
where vdrjrgt is the mortality rate of veterans in year t + 1 for veterans from military occupation j, race
r, and gender g who separated from service in year t, cbtexpjrgt is the average company-level mortality
exposure experienced by individuals in the cell defined by j, r, g, and t, and Xjrgt is a vector of demographic
characteristics including cell indicators for gender and race as well as Ejrgt which is the percent of the
cell defined by jrg consisting of veterans separating in year t with at least a high school degree and Ajrgt
which is the mean AFQT score of the cell defined by jrg consisting of veterans separating in year t. The
effect of interest is P. This regression tests for the effect of in-service mortality on veteran mortality
using variation in exposure across occupations and over time in the post-war period.
23 All soldiers are assigned to military units called companies, which have a formal alpha-numeric coding system in the
personnel administrative database. These units typically consist of about 100 soldiers. Company level units are also
sometimes referred to as detachments or squadrons. From this point forward, we will use the term company to refer to
the military unit which is the lowest level that mortality rates can be formally measured in the data.
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Results of ordinary least squares regression are listed in column (1) of Table 2 for the specification without
demographic controls and column (2) of Table 2 for the specification with demographic controls. The
estimated coefficients for all of the included variables are statistically significant suggesting a role for
both demographic characteristics as well as exposure to in-service mortality in explaining post-service
mortality. The estimates of column (2) suggest an increase in the company-level mortality rate of one
death per 100,000 soldiers is correlated with an increase in the one-year post discharge mortality rate of
0.43 deaths per 100,000 veterans. Since the average size of the enlisted force in the Army during this
time period was about 415,000 soldiers and the average number of new veterans each year was about
75,000 (see Table A3 in Appendix A), twelve more deaths among active-duty soldiers in the year of
separation was associated with one more death among veterans in their first year after separation from
the Army.
I execute a specification check by augmenting Xjrg with four additional explanatory variables that could
be related to the probability of veteran mortality. The first is the percent of veterans in the cell separated
with a disability since those who get separated with a disability might be at increased risk for post-service
morbidity and by extension mortality. The second is the percent separated with a punitive discharge since
a punitive discharge might be correlated with unobserved characteristics of individuals associated with
increased risk for post-service mortality. Third is the average number of months deployed among the
veterans in the cell since the stress of deployment could be correlated with either physical or mental health
morbidity and by extension post-service mortality. Fourth is the average distance from the veteran's home
of record to the nearest VA center as a proxy measure of post-service access to VA services since lack
of access to VA services could be linked to increased risk of post-service morbidity or mortality. Results
are listed in column (3). Including these additional explanatory variables has little impact on the point
estimate of the effect of company-level mortality on post-service mortality.
The estimates of column (4) include dummies for separation year effects in addition to the demographic
and four additional explanatory variable controls. Since the nature of the cell-based data is that of a
pooled cross-section and time-series of observations defined by occupation-race-gender cells, inclusion of
the separation year dummies allows the intercept to be different for each year. I include these year fixed
effects since mortality risks might not be the same from year-to-year as a result of the war progressing
through various stages of intensity. For example, the type and intensity of conflict in Iraq was substantially
different in 2003, the invasion year, relative to 2007, the height of the surge. Nonetheless, inclusion of
year dummies has little impact on the point estimate.
Since the data consists of cells defined by occupation, race, and gender, there are repeated observations
of the same cell type over time. If the relationship between veteran mortality (vdrjrgt) and in-service
mortality (cbtexpjrgt) is described by equation 21 which includes a fixed effect for cell jrg, then we can
consistently estimate P using the fixed-effects within estimator.
vdrjrgt = ajrg + / cbtexp jrgt + Xjrgt if+ ejrgt (21)
Fixed effects estimation removes the effect of time-invariant characteristics of the predictor variables.
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The key assumption is that those time-invariant characteristics are unique to the observation cell and
should not be correlated with other observation cell characteristics. Each cell is different and thus the
cell's error term and constant (which captures cell-specific characteristics) should not be correlated with
the others. The equation for estimating this model using the fixed effects approach is given by:
(vdrjrgt - vdrjrg) = (cbt-expjg - cbtexpjrg) + (Xrgt - xjrg 1 + (Ejrgt - tjrg)
If the unobserved effect does not change over time, then any changes in the dependent variable must be
due to influences other than the fixed characteristics (Stock and Watson, 2003). This approach estimates
the parameters of the model using variation that occurs within occupation-gender-race cells. I also include
separation year dummies to allow for intercept shifts over time to account for unexpected variation and
special events specific to particular time periods like the invasion of Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq, or
the surge in Iraq. Results of fixed effects estimation are listed in columns (5) and (6) of Table 2. The
point estimate for the effect of in-service mortality on post-service mortality in the fixed effects model
appears to be attenuated relative to the least squares regression model. An increase in the company-level
mortality rate of 1 death per 100,000 soldiers is associated with an increase in the one-year post-service
mortality rate of 0.33 deaths per 100,000 veterans.
There are several sources of potential measurement error in the company-level mortality rate. One
example is that it is possible for somebody to be assigned to one unit in the database but actually be
working with another unit in a completely different geographic location with more (or less) exposure to
mortality. However, since the data cells are defined by occupations, I expect the error in this variable
to be classical in the sense that apart from specific duty assignment associated with one's training,
errors in attribution of unit assignment while deployed are likely, on average, to be associated with
random variations in actual mortality exposure. Regardless, the existence of classical measurement error
in the measure of company-level mortality could attenuate the parameter estimates in the least squares
regression model. Also, this attenuation would be exacerbated in the fixed effects regression models.
It could also be the case that selection into the sample of discharged veterans provides a source of
omitted variable bias. However, it is not clear what the direction of such bias should be. Assuming
the omitted is positively related to the one-year post discharge mortality rate, then if the omitted is
positively related to the in-service rate the least squares estimate of the effect of company-level mortality
would be biased upward. This could be the case if the unobserved individual characteristic was related
to a person's preferences for risk-seeking behavior. If the omitted is negatively related to the in-service
mortality rate then the least squares estimate would be biased downward. This could be the case if the
unobserved individual characteristic was related to a person's work effort such that lower effort decreases
the probability of individual exposure via shirking.
To address these potential sources of bias, I develop just-identified two-stage least squares estimates in
columns (7) and (8) of Table 2. The instrument for company-level mortality experienced by a soldier is a
measure of the time in months between the soldier's completion of initial entry training and the date of
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the soldier's first deployment. These estimates are restricted to the sub-sample of soldiers who separated
in and deployed during the war-time era. Conditional on a soldier's occupation, the earlier that a soldier
deploys after completing training the more likely he is to experience mortality at his company-level unit
of assignment. For non-prior service, first-term soldiers who separate after their first term of service,
this instrument is a valid randomizer of in-service unit-level exposure to mortality since conditional on
occupational choice these soldiers have little scope over their assignment to units or their assignment to
deployment. Rather, given occupational choice, a soldier's assignment to a unit and a unit's assignment
to deployment is dictated by the needs of the Army (Engel et al, 2010).
The instrumental variable estimate of the effect of company-level mortality rate on the one-year post
discharge mortality rate is approximately 0.7. The first stage appears relatively strong with a partial R-
squared of about 8%. Assuming the validity of the exclusion restriction, this estimate is consistent with
the presumed existence of classical error in the measurement of company-level mortality. This estimate
is also consistent with the potential existence of omitted variable bias in which the omitted is negatively
related to the in-service mortality rate.
2.2.2 The Effects of In-service, Occupation-level Mortality
I estimate the effect of in-service mortality using the company-level mortality rate on the sample of soldiers
who separated during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, there is not enough meaningful variation
in company-level mortality in the pre-war period for it to be used as a reliable explanatory variable for
samples of veterans who separated prior to the war. Thus, to explore the effect of in-service mortality on
post-service mortality in both the pre and post war periods, I use a measure of in-service mortality based
on the occupation-specific mortality rate Pj (see Appendix A for details about the construction of this
variable).
It seems plausible that the company-level mortality rate, which is a close proximate measure of individual
combat exposure, could have a causal effect on the post-service mortality rate via the mechanism of
direct exposure to trauma and stress leading to increased risk of physical and mental health issues and
by extension increased risk of death. In contrast, it seems counter-intuitive that a veteran's post-service
mortality could be affected by the mortality of others in the same occupation but who may or may not be
assigned to a concomitant location. One would think that direct exposure that a veteran had experience
with would be more salient than the exposure of soldiers who were demographically similar, had the same
occupation, but did not face the same service conditions. However, the occupation-specific measure of
mortality may be a more accurate reflection of the potential risk of mortality that a soldier faces while
serving on active duty. Further, it's possible that a soldier could be affected by the mortality of people
working in the same occupation because such mortality confronts the soldier with the reality that the
risk of death associated with service in their occupation is real.
In order to compare the size of the effect of occupation-specific mortality on post-service mortality
with the size of the effect of company-level mortality, I estimated regression models with occupation-
specific mortality on the sub-sample of soldiers who separated from active duty between 2002 and 2007.
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Results are listed in Table 3. Columns (1) and (2) list the estimates of least squares regression using
equation 20 (with Pj, in place of cbtexpjrgt). When including demographic controls, the four alternative
explanatory variables, and separation year dummies, the effect of occupation-specific mortality on post-
service mortality is 0.57. That is, an increase in the occupation-specific mortality rate of 1 death per
100,000 soldiers assigned to the occupation is associated with an increase in the post-service mortality
rate of 0.57 deaths per 100,000 veterans. Column (3) lists the estimates of the fixed effects "within"
estimators specified by equation 21 (again with Pjt in place of cbtexpjrgt and Pj in place of cbtexpjrg).
Similar to the results from Table 2 when using the company-level mortality rate, the point estimate from
the fixed effects estimator is attenuated. An increase in the occupation-specific mortality rate of 1 death
per 100,000 soldiers increases the post-service mortality rate by 0.47 deaths per 100,000 veterans.
Columns (4) through (6) list results of regressions of post-service mortality on occupation-specific mortal-
ity for the whole sample including soldiers who separated between years 1996 and 2007. The least squares
estimate including demographic controls, the four alternative explanatory variables, and separation year
dummies (see column 5) as well as the fixed effects estimate (see column 6) are not meaningfully different
than the estimates reported in columns (2) and (3). Assuming occupation-specific mortality is a valid
measure of the in-service mortality rate, which may be a reasonable assumption given the high-likelihood
that correlation among conditions for people in the same demographic group and occupation are large
enough to indirectly get at individual-exposure in the same way that the company-level mortality measure
does, the estimates of columns (5) and (6) suggest the relationship between in-service and post-service
mortality has always existed. As such, the higher rates of in-service mortality during the war on terror
mean that post-service mortality rates are higher as reflected in Figures 1 and 2.
Measurement error and selection bias continue to be a concern when estimating the effect of in-service
mortality on post-service mortality when using the occupation-specific mortality rate as the measure of
in-service mortality. Measurement error is a potential concern because it's possible that the administrative
database does not accurately reflect a soldier's true occupation. This may be the case if the soldier enlisted
for one occupation but trained in another occupation without having the other occupation recorded in
his personnel records. Measurement error could also be a concern if a soldier is officially assigned to
one occupation but actually works in another. Selection into the sample of separated veterans could
be a potential problem because the military actively screens soldiers for continued service based on its
assessment of a soldier's potential to satisfactorily fulfill the terms of a service contract. As a result,
those who separate or get discharged from active service could be positively selected for increased risk of
post-discharge mortality in a way that is unobservable to the analyst. To address the issue of potential
bias from selection, we estimate and present the results of propensity-score matching models in Appendix
B. The results of this exercise are similar to the results listed in Table 3 thus are omitted from the main
body in the interest of brevity.
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2.2.3 Changes in Demographic Composition
This section reports the results of an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the explanatory factors associated
with increased veteran mortality. I define group A as the portion of the sample separating in 2007 (after
the war began) and group B as the portion of the sample separating in 1999 (before the war began). The
mean difference in veteran mortality between 1999 and 2007 is about 105 deaths per 100,000 veterans.
Those who separated in 2007 relative to those who separated in 1999 were less likely to be black, more
likely to be Hispanic, less likely to be a high school graduate, and more likely to be disabled at the time
of separation. Also, the mean difference in the occupation-specific active duty mortality rates between
those who separated in 2007 and those who separated in 1999 is about 114 deaths per 100,000 soldiers.
I estimated a linear model of the post-service mortality among veterans in the first year after separation
from active duty (vdr) for observation cells indexed by jrgt. Explanatory variables include the in-service
occupation-specific mortality rate (AD risk) P for cell jrgt in separation year t along with cell indicators
for race and gender plus cell means for AFQT percentile score and proportion who entered active duty
with at least a high school diploma. I estimated this model for the sample of soldiers separating in 1999
(group B, see column 1 of Table Cl) and the sample of soldiers separating in 2007 (group A, see column
2 of Table Cl). I also estimated this model for the entire sample of soldiers separating in years 1996
through 2007 with separation year fixed effects (see column 3 of table Cl).
Results of this decomposition exercise are listed in Table 4. When using the coefficients from column (1)
of Table C1, the explained portion of the mean difference in veteran mortality between 1999 and 2007 is
about 47%, while the active duty mortality rate in the year of separation accounts for over 100% of this
explained portion. Demographic characteristics account for minor portions of the explained portion of
the mean difference in veteran mortality. The total unexplained portion accounts for 53% of the mean
difference with both the active duty risk and the education level playing very large roles in accounting
for the overall unexplained portion of the mean difference in veteran mortality. These results suggest
that both the composition of in-service mortality as well as the effect of in-service mortality play a role
in explaining the difference in veteran mortality between the pre-war and post-war periods. However,
these results also suggest that compositional changes in demographic characteristics play a minor if not
non-existent role in explaining post-service mortality, though changes in the effect of education level do
appear to play some role.
Results of alternative specifications of the decomposition exercise are largely similar with regard to these
broad conclusions. For example, when using the coefficients from column (3) of Table B5, which are
estimated on the whole sample using a model with year fixed effects, the explained portion of the mean
difference in veteran mortality between 1999 and 2007 is 92% while changes in the composition of the
active duty risk account for 99% of the composition effects. Though the overall unexplained effect
accounts for 8% of the mean difference in veteran mortality, changes in the effect of active duty risk are
substantial in the positive direction while changes in the effect of education level are substantial in the
negative direction. In total, the results of the decomposition exercise largely rule out the possibility that
compositional changes in demographic characteristics play a significant role in explaining the surge in
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one-year post discharge mortality of recent veterans. The results also suggest that the sharp increase in
one-year post-exit mortality can be explained by both the substantial increase of the in-service mortality
rate but also partially by a small increase in the effect of in-service mortality.
Interpretation of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition results has its shortcomings (Fortin et al, 2010). Most
notably, this technique is intrinsically a partial equilibrium approach and works best when asking what the
veteran mortality gap would have been if composition had not changed but effects did or if composition
had changed but effects did not. Here we have substantial variation in endowments and coefficients,
especially those related to the active duty mortality rate, which are both changing over time. This makes
it difficult to form the correct counter-factual. Thus, the results of this decomposition exercise are merely
suggestive. Nonetheless, these results do seem to indicate that the mortality risk experienced on active
duty, both in terms of the magnitude of exposure as well as the effect of exposure, plays a meaningful
role in explaining post-service mortality. Further, changes in the effect of the education level play a much
smaller but still significant role. Neither changes in the magnitude nor effects of race, gender, and AFQT
score seem to play a significant role in explaining the difference in post-service mortality between soldiers
separating before the war began and soldiers separating after the war began.
Among all enlisted soldiers, there is a minor downward trend in the percent of the force with at least
a high school degree (see Figure A3 of Appendix A). However, this trend largely started before the war
began, coincident with the strong economy of the late 1990s. There is also a minor downward trend
in the mean AFQT score. Again however, this trend began in the pre-war period. There is a decline
in educational attainment and mean AFQT scores in 2006 and 2007, coincident with the surge in Iraq.
In the former case, declines in quality were observationally correlated with elevated economic prospects
in the civilian labor market. In the latter case, declines in quality were observationally correlated with
changes in veteran mortality. As such, it seems possible that the correlation between declines in quality
and increases in veteran mortality in the latter case was spurious.
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2.3 Discussion
2.3.1 In-service Mortality Predicts Post-service Mortality
Increased mortality among veterans in the first year after separation doesn't appear to be explained to
a large degree by changes in the demographic composition of the Army's labor force. We do see some
correlation between not being a high school graduate and higher veteran mortality, but this correlation
doesn't account for much of the mean difference according to the Oaxaca decomposition exercise. Ad-
ditionally, the apparent decline in the quality of enlisted soldiers, as measured by educational attainment
and AFQT scores, which is a trend that began prior to the war, and quality cycles are potentially related
to macro cycles and labor market conditions to a greater extent than they are to in-service mortality haz-
ards, particularly if we believe there is some sub-set of young Americans, many of whom are of observed
high quality according to the traditional pre-service screening mechanisms, who are relatively more drawn
to military service when the military is being employed during times of war.
There does appear to be a very strong relationship between the mortality rate in an occupation in
the year prior to being discharged and the post-service veteran mortality rate for soldiers who served
in that occupation in the year after being discharged. Thus, it seems there is a potentially strong
relationship between increased exposure to in-service mortality hazards and ex post to service veteran
mortality. Since we don't observe individual risk preferences, we cannot make a conclusive statement
about a causal link between exposure to hazards in-service and increased mortality after service unless
we make the assumption that all individuals who enlist for the same occupation are of similar risk
types. Nonetheless, we consistently observe a strong and statistically significant positive effect of in-
service mortality on veteran mortality across different estimating equations and specifications. Oaxaca
decompositions without including active duty mortality as an explanatory variable give high weight to the
unexplained difference in mean values of veteran mortality between 1999 and 2007, but when including
in-service mortality the Oaxaca decompositions give very high weight to the explained portion of the
mean difference in veteran mortality between 1999 and 2007. In summary, the unit-level and occupation-
specific mortality rates have a consistently positive and significant effect on veteran mortality, even in
the restrictive panel models. Further, the coefficients are similar across model types and specifications.
All of this taken together suggests a strong case for a link between exposure to mortality in service and
mortality ex post to service.
2.3.2 Limitations
The data on veteran's deaths does not contain cause of death, so it is difficult to pin down an exact
causal chain from in-service exposure to mortality risk to post discharge mortality. Presumably the causal
chain goes something like this: (1) service in a unit with a high rate of mortality makes one more likely
to be exposed to combat as well as to casualties; (2) increased exposure to mortality while on active duty
makes one more likely to suffer from physical health problems or mental health problems like suicidal
ideation and PTSD as a veteran; and (3) having untreated physical and mental health problems makes one
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more likely to die or commit suicide. Additionally, evidence on the positive effect of occupation-specific
mortality suggests that direct individual exposure is not the sole source of health problems but that the
threat of exposure as evidenced by service in occupations with high mortality also plays a role in the
increased risk of post-service mortality. The plausibility of such a causal chain is likely enhanced by the
existence of a substantial and well-documented backlog in the VA's processing of new claims for benefits
or services.2 1 Since we do not have specific information about the cause of death among veterans, it
could be the case that increased mortality of veterans could be due to other causes besides suicide or
service-related health issues. Alternative causal mechanisms could be just as valid. One could conceive
of the possibility that veterans who come through the challenge of combat might perceive themselves to
be immune to the common risks of civilian life related to substance abuse or transportation accidents. As
such, recent veterans of military occupations with relatively higher combat exposure might pursue risk-
seeking behavior in post-service civilian life and as a result be more likely to die in automobile accidents
or as the result of accidental overdoses.
Another potential limitation of this analysis is that the death counts among veterans estimated from
the SSA DMF may be inaccurate. We may be missing deaths that would be captured by state records
but not otherwise reported to the SSA. We may be missing information on American veterans living in
foreign territories. We may be missing information on veterans from U.S. territories. We may be missing
information on veterans who are foreign nationals. Even though the SSA DMF includes 93 to 96 percent
of deaths of individuals aged 65 or older among the U.S. population (Hill and Rosenwaike, 2002), the
DMF is less accurate in identifying the deaths of younger people (Schisterman and Whitcomb, 2004).
Nonetheless, the SSA DMF is an inexpensive means to maximize death ascertainment, though linkages
with the National Death Index are essential if the cause of death is needed to characterize mortality
(Hanna et al, 2009). Further, the shortcomings listed here suggest that if anything, our estimates of
veteran mortality are biased downward.
2.3.3 Cost estimate
The difficulty of estimating the cost of war is well documented (Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2012). With regard
to costs associated with excess mortality caused by war, it is difficult to define the appropriate counter-
factual group since a comparison of post-war mortality with pre-war mortality may be confounded by
selection bias. That is, in an all volunteer force, the demographics of the force are likely to change over
time as both civilian macroeconomic factors change and as the conditions of military service change.
Further, a comparison of the mortality among the military with that of the civilian population is also
inappropriate due to selection into the military applicant pool as well as selective screening for induction
by the military among applicants. With regard to the mortality of veterans who served during periods
of war, it is difficult to assess certain costs that may manifest themselves only after long periods of
24See Brandon Friedman, "The Rise (and Fall) of the VA Backlog," Time, June 3, 2013. According to the VA,
as of December 31, 2012, post-9/11/2001 claims make up 21% of the total inventory of pending claims and 22%
of backlogged claims (those pending longer than 125 days). See "Monday Morning Workload Reports available at
http://www.vba.va.gov/REPORTS/mmwr/index.asp and accessed on June 15, 2013.
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time. Further, there may be controversy over whether such costs could be directly attributed to war-time
service.
However, this paper presents novel evidence of a quantifiable link between war-time mortality among
active service members and the mortality of veterans ex-post to service during war. The regression
estimates suggest an increase in the in-service mortality rate among active duty soldiers of 1 per 100,000
leads to an increase of about 0.48 per 100,000 in the mortality rate of recent veterans. We can use this
parameter to conduct an exercise in estimating the cost of excess veteran mortality induced by the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan. First, we calculate the excess mortality of war for active duty soldiers as the
war-time average death rate minus the pre-war average death rate. Second, we multiply this result by
0.48 to get the war-induced increase in the veteran mortality rate. Third, we convert the excess veteran
mortality rate into an estimate of the number of excess veteran deaths based on the number of veterans
who separated from active service during the time of war. Fourth, we multiply this number by an estimate
of the Value of Statistical Life (VSL). Stiglitz and Bilmes (2012) suggest using a figure of $7.2 million for
the VSL to calculate the cost of excess mortality related to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Greenstone
et al (2013) estimate VSL as $0.5 among young people who volunteer for active service. Using these two
estimates of the VSL as upper and lower bound figures, we estimate the social cost of excess veteran
mortality among veterans who separated from active Army service between 2004 and 2007 to range
between $80 million and $1.1 billion. The estimated social cost of excess mortality among veterans who
separated between 2001 and 2010 ranges between $186 million and $2.7 billion. (See Appendix D for
additional details.)
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2.4 Conclusion
This paper provides the first of its kind documentation of an increase in veteran mortality subsequent to
the initiation of the war in Iraq. This new evidence suggests existing estimates of Army service-related
fatalities during the period 2001 to 2010 are understated by approximately 10% or roughly 370 deaths.
Additionally, the increase in veteran mortality is concentrated in the first year after separation from active
service among white men who serve in combat occupations. Regression analysis suggests a strong and
statistically significant positive link between in-service, company-level mortality and veteran mortality as
well as between in-service occupation-specific mortality and veteran mortality. Decomposition analysis
suggests that approximately 91% of the increase in the one-year post-service mortality rate appears to
be due to the effect of exposure to high rates of mortality while in service. This relationship likely
existed prior to the war but the higher rates of in-service mortality during the war mean that post-service
mortality rates are higher. Using standard estimates of the social willingness to pay to avoid a statistical
death, the estimated social cost of excess veteran mortality between 2001 and 2010 ranges between $186
million and $2.7 billion. These results highlight the potential benefits of mental and physical health
interventions within the first year after separation from active service in the military.
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2.5 Figures and Tables
Figure 1. Mortality Rate Trends of Army Veterans.
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Data Sources: TAPDB via OEMA and SSA DMF. Mortality hazards based on all causes of death.
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Figure 2. Mortality Rate Trends: Active Army, Civilian, and Veteran.
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hazard. Mortality hazards based on all causes of death.
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Figure 3. Variation in effect of in-service company-level mortality on veteran mortality.
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Company Level Mortality Rate (p100k)
Note: Margins plot is based on the estimates reported in column (4) of Table 2 with the addition of a squared
term for the company-level mortality rate.
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Variable
Veteran Mortality Rate p100k (Sep. Yr. +1)
Active Duty Occupation-Specific Mortality p100k (Sep. Yr.)
Disability Rating >0% at Separation (% of Cell)
Company Level Casualty Exposure Rate (p100k)
Company Level Mortality Rate (p100k)
Avg. Number of Months Deployed (First Term)
Avg. Number of Months, Training Complete to 1st Deploy
Deployed during First Term (% of Cell)
Punitively Discharged (% of Cell)
Distance: Home-of-Record ZipCode to VA Center (miles)
Gender: Female
Race: Black
Race: Hispanic
Race: Other
High School Grad or Above (% of Cell)
Average AFQT Score Percentile
Number of Cells
Separated from active duty between:
N
(1)
Mean
77.92
132.28
9.09
1,319.25
142.50
6.29
7.84
49.58
11.72
36.33
0.20
0.19
0.12
0.06
82.87
59.11
(2)
StDev
(130.76)
(151.53)
(4.28)
(1,630.87)
(188.13)
(3.58)
(3.69)
20.86
(6.51)
(7.55)
(0.40)
(0.39)
(0.32)
(0.23)
(8.12)
(10.00)
1,046
2002 and 2007
370,859
(3)
Mean
119.13
186.04
9.32
2,255.81
242.62
9.17
9.83
66.55
11.35
36.37
0.05
0.16
0.13
0.06
82.23
59.00
(4)
StDev
(154.71)
(179.30)
(3.53)
(1,730.51)
(207.58)
(1.91)
(3.19)
(0.07)
(5.10)
(6.81)
(0.22)
(0.37)
(0.33)
(0.23)
(7.44)
(8.86)
712
2002 and 2007
198,599
(5)
Mean
60.30
88.64
8.65
656.86
70.98
4.00
5.15
36.01
12.81
36.65
0.19
0.21
0.10
0.06
84.61
59.09
(6)
StDev
(106.46)
(118.42)
(4.17)
(1,318.49)
(149.78)
(3.45)
(4.25)
(21.21)
(6.64)
(7.52)
(0.40)
(0.41)
(0.29)
(0.23)
(8.56)
(9.54)
1,092
1996 and 2007
752,254
H
3f-u
2'2
U,
c0-
Q0
-nI
-i
Data Source: Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis- Cells constructed at the active duty military occupation by race by gender level Sample of cells
constructed from non-prior service soldiers who separated during or at the end of their first term of service. Cell-based sample statistics are weighted by
the size of the cell's population.
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Table 2. Estimates of the effect of company-level mortality on veteran mortality.
Company Level Mortality Rate (p100k)
Gender: female
Race: Black
Race: Hispanic
Race: Other
Educ Level HS Grad or Higher (% of cell)
Avg. AFQT Score Percentile
Separated with a Disability (% of cell)
Punitively Discharged (% of Cell)
Avg. Months Deployed, First Term
Home of record to VA center (miles)
Includes Separation Year Dummies?
Constant
IV: Finish Training to First Deployment (months)
Partial R-squared
F-Statistic (excluded instrument)
First Stage Dependent Variable: Unit Level Mortality Rate (p100k)
-21.53 -19.38
(0.167) (0.307)
0.11 0.073
3179.6 1500.01
Observations 370,359 370,859 370,859 370,859 370,859 370,859 198,599 198,599
Number of Cells 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 712 712
R-squared 0.429 0.466 0.474 0.487 0.253 0.279 0.332 0.440
Dependent variable is mortality rate among veterans within the first year of separation from active duty, measured at the military
occupation-by-race-by-gender cell level OLS regression results with robust standard errors in parentheses reported in columns (1)-(4).
Panelfixed effects regression results reported in columns (5)-(6). instrumental variable 2SLS regression results reported in columns (7)-(8)
with instrument as the time in months between completion of initial entry training and the first deployment Data Source: Office of
Economic and Manpower Analysis. Cells constructed at the active duty military occupation by race by gender level Sample of cells
constructed from non-prior service soldiers who (1) separated from active duty between 2002 and 2007, (2) separated during or at the
end of theirfirst term of service, and (3) where over 50% of the cells population deployed during the first term of service (only columns 7
and 8)_ Regressions are weighted by the size of the cell's population.
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(1)
ols
(5)
fe
0.310
(0.080)
n/a
(6)
fe
0.332
(0.094)
n/a
(7)
2sls
0.695
(0.004)
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
(2)
ols
0.431
(0.002)
-17.065
(0.327)
-27.097
(0.463)
-58.468
(0.541)
-61.046
(0.631)
-0.28
(0.024)
-0.344
(0.015)
No
153.895
-(1.907)
0.455
(0.002)
No
13.065
(0.194)
(3)
ols
0.464
(0.002)
-26.302
(0.538)
-25.338
(0.534)
-52.160
(0.660)
-57.019
(0.717)
-0.498
(0.026)
-0.824
(0.016)
1.406
(0.041)
0.341
(0.037)
-3.337
(0.074)
0.206
(0.025)
No
118.114
(2.268)
(4)
ols
0.480
(0.002)
-14.292
(0.567)
-27.913
(0.533)
-53.391
(0.663)
-58.211
(0.717)
-0.361
(0.025)
-0.614
(0.016)
0.994
(0.040)
0.547
(0.038)
-0.901
(0.039)
0.165
(0.025)
Yes
85.329
(2.293)
(8)
2sls
0.710
(0.006)
S2.324
(1.975)
-51.552
(1.401)
-74.576
(1.689)
-100.864
(1.675)
0.733
(0.066)
0.252
(0.043)
-0.595
(0.152)
3.118
(0.088)
3.060
(0.204)
0.857
(0.078)
Yes
-238.312
(10.159)
-0.409
(0.383)
-0.998
(0.515)
0.393
(0.389)
0.175
(0.249)
-0.698
(2.566)
0.010
(0.153)
Yes
123.086
(49.969)
No
32.536
(10.902)
No
-49.467
(0.910)
Table 3. Estimates of the effect of occupation-specific mortality on veteran mortality.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ols ols fe ols ols fe
Occupation-Specific Mortality (p100k) 0.619 0.569 0.468 0.576 0.551 0.462
(0.001) (0.001) (0.113) (0.001) (0.001) (0.074)
Gender: female -25.258 n/a -29.634 n/a
(0.563) (0.299)
Race: Black -15.013 n/a -8.947 n/a
(0.493) (0.306)
Race: Hispanic -42.252 n/a -38.655 n/a
(0.573) (0.374)
Race: Other -45.945 n/a -33.454 n/a
(0.634) (0.431)
Educ Level HS Grad or Higher (% of cell) -0.472 -0.52 -0.366 -0.036
(0.022) (0.365) (0.013) (0.235)
Avg. AFQT Score Percentile -0.464 -1.144 -0.680 -0.159
(0.015) (0.521) (0.010) (0.449)
Separated with a Disability (% of cell) 0.761 0.413 0.587 0.396
(0.031) (0.334) (0.020) (0.156)
Punitively Discharged (% of Cell) 0.057 -0.063 0.088 -0.053
(0.037) (0.267) (0.020) (0.130)
Avg. Months Deployed, First Term 2.340 3.359 2.059 2.032
(0.081) (2.012) (0.065) (1.468)
Home of record to VA center (miles) 0.024 -0.03 -0.070 0.133
(0.021) (0.161) (0.013) (0.115)
Includes Separation Year Dummies? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Constant -3.893 68.373 105.67 9.253 117.000 38.615
(0.145) (2.068) (48.636) (0.103) (1.390) (31.550)
Observations 370,859 370,859 370,859 752,254 752,254 752,254
R-squared 0.514 0.550 0.314 0.410 0.459 0.317
Number of Cells 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,092 1,092 1,092
Dependent variable is mortality rate among veterans within the first year of separation from active duty,
measured at the military ocwupation-by-race-by-gender cell level. OLS regression results with robust standard
errors in parentheses reported in columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5). Panel fixed effects regression results reported in
columns (3) and (6)_ Data Source: Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis- Cells constructed at the active
duty military occupation by race by gender level Sample of cells constructed from non-prior service soldiers (a)
who separated from active duty between 2002 and 2007 for columns (1) through (3) and between 1996 and
2007 for columns (4) through (6), and (b) who separated during or at the end of their first term of service
Regressions are weighted by the size of the cell's population.
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Reference Group:
Mean Difference in Vet
Mortality Rate
(1)
Using Sep. Year 1999
Coefficients Col. (1)
(2)
Using Sep. Year 2007
Coefficients Col. (2)
105.461 (0.822) 105.461 (0.822)
(3)
Using Col. (1) & (2)
Coefficients Pooled
105.461 (0.822)
(4)
Using Col. (3)
Coefficients
105.461 (0.822)
Composition Effects (mean vet mortality difference explained by differences in covariates between 1999 and 2007)
In Service Mortality 52.022
Female 0.319
Black -0.409
Hispanic -0.569
Other 0.011
Educ>=HS grad -0.413
Mean AFQT -1.422
Total: 49.439
(1.009)
(0.070)
(0.065)
(0.047)
(0.045)
(0.196)
(0.076)
(1.014)
106.670
0.378
1.840
-2.881
0.020
15.220
-0.507
120.740
(0.671)
(0.084)
(0.142)
(0.148)
(0.079)
(0.350)
(0.075)
(0.804)
107.956
0.372
-0.031
-1.962
0.015
10.314
-0.790
115.873
Unexplained (mean vet mortality difference explained by differences in partial effects
In Service Mortality 69.496
Female -1.059
Black -4.139
Hispanic -7.248
Other -1.502
Educ>=H S grad -265.954
Mean AFQT 42.624
Constant 223.804
Total: 56.022
(1.345)
(0.253)
(0.274)
(0.240)
(0.134)
(6.386)
(3.877)
(6.028)
(1.147)
14.848
-1.118
-6.389
-5.037
-1.511
-281.587
41.710
223.804
-15.279
(0.286)
(0.267)
(0.421)
(0.172)
(0.135)
(6.760)
(3.794)
(6.028)
(0.669)
13.562
-1.112
-4.517
-5.955
-1.506
-276.680
41.993
223.804
-10.412
(0.666)
(0.081)
(0.058)
(0.098)
(0.059)
(0.236)
(0.047)
(0.732)
between
(0.318)
(0.184)
(0.271)
(0.174)
(0.112)
(6.656)
(2.923)
(5.960)
(0.462)
95.936
0.334
0.643
-1.409
0.011
1.906
-0.924
96.497
1999 and 2007):
25.582
-1.074
-5.192
-6.508
-1.502
-268.273
42.126
223.804
8.963
(0.557)
(0.073)
(0.028)
(0.067)
(0.044)
(0.068)
(0.043)
(0.591)
(0.452)
(0.181)
(0.254)
(0.190)
(0.113)
(6.533)
(2.935)
(5.960)
(0.508)
(D
0
2
0
T-.
0
fI.
(D
(D
U,
(D
C-.CD
0
~1
K.
Cb
-1
1
rTi
(t)
Note: Sample consists of 1,816 cells defined by MOS x Race x Gender for soldiers separating in years 1999 and 2007.
Estimated coefficients are from the regression results reported in Table Cl of Appendix C. Source of data is OEMA.
2.6 Appendix A: Data
To date, the primary source for veteran mortality information has been limited to those veterans who
receive care in the Veterans Affairs (VA) system. The Veterans Benefits Administration's Beneficiary
Identification Records Locator Subsystem (BIRLS) database only tracks veterans "known to the VA,"
which means it only has records on veterans who have enrolled in the Veterans Health Administration,
received compensation or pension benefits, or used the VA Healthcare System. According to the VA, in
fiscal year 2008 approximately 36% of the overall estimated living population of veterans received VA
benefits and services, while 52% of the estimated living veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
received VA benefits and services.21 In fiscal year 2003, the corresponding usage rate among all estimated
living veterans was approximately 32%. Even among veterans "known to the VA" the BIRLS Death File
is substantially incomplete. A validation study attempted to estimate the accuracy of the BIRLS Death
File by matching a sample of "known" veterans to the SSA's DMF and found that use of the SSA DMF
increased the number of deaths identified by 22.4% over the use of only internal sources (i.e., the BIRLS
Death File and VHA Medical SAS Inpatient Datasets (MSID)) (Arnold et al, 2006). Thus, the VA does
not have information on a substantial proportion of veterans and as a result the VA has a limited capacity
for providing reliable estimates of veteran mortality.26
We develop estimates of the post-service mortality of recent veterans using an administrative database
from the Army that has been matched to the the public version of the DMF. The administrative per-
sonnel database (called the Total Army Personnel Database) extract contains micro-level data on the
demographic and service characteristics of enlisted soldiers who separated from active duty in the U.S.
Army between 1996 and 2007.27 The Army's Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis (OEMA)
matched the social security numbers of soldiers in this database who separated from active duty with the
DMF to identify veterans who died ex-post to service as well as their dates of death. The Army then
provided the author with veteran population and death counts, by year after discharge for the first four
years after separation, at the cell level where cells were constructed by separation year, gender, race,28
age categories (<20, 20-34, >34), years of service categories (<6, 6-10, >10), and in-service occupation
2 5 See Department of Veterans Affairs, Office of Policy and Planning, "Analysis of Unique Veterans Utilization of VA
Benefits and Services," (2009).
26 The VA's Suicide Prevention Program has initiated the State Mortality Data Project to address the issue of not being
able to identify veteran mortality or cause of death. The State Mortality Data Project is in the process of creating a
data-sharing partnership with as many states as possible to link state death records, including cause of death, with VA
and National Death Index (NDI) data to fulfill requirements of PL111.163 and determine the number of veterans who died
from suicide between 1999 and 2009. However, continued research on the reliability and validity of veteran identifiers on
state death certificates is needed according to Kemp and Bossarte, 2013. In short, there currently is limited organizational
capability to produce reliable statistics on the universe of veteran mortality and causes of mortality. In the long term, the
State Mortality Data Project may be able to address this information gap. However, in the near term, better estimates
than those available from VA sources may be needed to gain traction on issues related to Veteran mortality.27 This de-identified individual-level data was provided to the author under a restricted use agreement with the Army's
Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis (OEMA). Please contact OEMA for details on how to request access to this
data.28 Data provided by OEMA was coded so that Hispanic is considered a distinct race in accordance with the "bridged
race" classification method rather than as an overlapping ethnic category. Thus, information on race was provided to the
author in terms of four non-overlapping categories: white, black, Hispanic, and other.
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categories.
See Table Al for an example of the data structure. Key information provided with the cells includes the
population count of the number of separating soldiers represented in each cell as well as the cumulative
number of deaths that had occurred among separated soldiers represented in the cell as of the end of the
first year after separation through the end of the fourth year after separation. Table A2 lists summary
statistics, by year of separation, for this cell-based data on veteran mortality. On average, about 70,000
to 80,000 soldiers leave active duty each year. In the pre-war period, about 50-70 died in the first full
year after separation while 20-30 died in each subsequent year through the fourth year after separation.
In the post-invasion of Iraq period, about 117-161 died in the first full year after separation while 20-30
died in each subsequent year through the fourth year after separation.
In a perfect data world, the date of death from the DMF would perfectly match the separation date in the
Army's database. Though the DMF death date and the administrative death date do not perfectly match
for all records, approximately 87% of the DMF death dates occur within plus or minus three months of
the separation date. These minor differences in dates could result in the miss-classification of deaths as
having occurred ex-post to service when in actuality they occurred while on in-service. To check for the
possibility of miss-classification, the author asked OEMA to conduct an on-line search of obituaries on a
sample of matched death records. The sample was selected based on records for which the SSA DMF
death date was within six months of the separation date recorded in the Army's administrative database.
The sample consisted of 878 matched death records in separation years 2004 through 2007. Of the 878
records in the sample, online obituaries were found for 629. Information in the obituaries confirmed that
81% of the matched death records were correctly classified. Of the miss-classified death records, 92%
had dates of death within one month of the Army's separation date. As a result of the data validation
exercise, OEMA adjusted the identified miss-classified records and correctly labeled them as either having
occurred on active duty or ex-post to service. Additionally, since there is the likelihood that other records
are miss-classified among those in the sample for which we could not find on-line obituaries as well as for
matched death records from years 1996 through 2003, we did not count deaths in the first full month
after separation has having occurred ex-post to service. Thus, the summary statistics in Table A2 as
well as the calculation of all veteran mortality rates used in this paper are based on veteran death counts
exclusive of any that may have occurred within one month of the separation date recorded in the Army's
administrative database.
The author also asked OEMA to look for evidence on cause of death when reviewing obituaries for the
sample of 878 matched death records described above. In most cases, the on-line obituaries did not
contain details about cause of death among veterans. Of the matched death records that were confirmed
to have occurred ex-post to service, approximately 74% did not contain any information on cause of
death, approximately 7% stated cancer as the cause of death, and 19% cited accidents.
In addition to data on veteran mortality, the author was granted access to a restricted use, de-identified
micro-level data set consisting of the demographic and service characteristics of all enlisted soldiers who
e-ntered the Army between 1992 and 2010. This additional data was used to construct active-duty
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mortality rates by year, occupation, race, gender, and age groups. This additional data was also used
to estimate mean values for certain other demographic characteristics, including educational attainment
indicators, Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) test scores, and disability indicators of the individuals
represented in the cells of the matched-cell data set. Finally, the author estimated non-veteran civilian
mortality rates from a restricted-use micro-level Vital Statistics data set provided by the National Center
for Health Statistics (NCHS). Additional details are provided in the remainder of Appendix A.
2.6.1 Mortality among Army Veterans
Information on death counts among those who have been separated from active service in the Army
primarily comes from the Social Security Administration (SSA) DMF, public file, purchased from National
Technical Information Service, US Department of Commerce, with an as of date of May 31, 2012. The
public DMF is based on death reports received by SSA from various sources including family members,
funeral homes, hospitals, Federal agencies, postal authorities, and financial institutions. As of November
1, 2011, the public DMF data from SSA no longer contains protected state death records. 29 The DMF
contains over 85 million records of deaths that have been reported to SSA from 1936 to present. Each
DMF product includes the following information on each decedent, if the data are available to the SSA:
social security number, name, date of birth, and date of death. The DMF does have inaccuracies, and
the SSA does not have a death record for all persons; therefore, SSA does not guarantee the veracity of
the file. 3 0
1 estimate the veteran annual mortality rate, normalized to a per 100,000 basis, according to the following
formula, where vdr stands for veteran death rate, t is the number of years since separation from active
duty, popo is the number of soldiers who left active service at year 0, and diedt is the number of veterans
who died in the tth year after separation (exclusive of deaths that may have occurred within one month
of separation as described above):
vdrt diedtvdr = -Id -100,000 for {t | t = 1, 2, 3,4,5}popo - ys=- dieds
I generalize the formula for groups so that mortality rates among specific occupation (during active Army
service) or occupation-by-race-by-gender groups can be estimated. The veteran's annual mortality rate,
on a per 100,000 basis, for group g where t is the number of years since separation from active duty is
given by equation 22:
vdrgt diedgt -100,000 for {t I t = 1,2,3,4,5} (22)
popgo -- Es' diedgs
29 See "Fact Sheet: Change to the Public Death Master File" updated as of May 1, 2013 at the official website of the U.S.
Social Security Administration. See http://ssa-custhelp.ssa.gov/app/answers/detaiI/a id/149/~/social-security's-death-
master-file. Accessed on June 15, 2013.30See http://www.ntis.gov/products/ssa-rawdata.aspx, accessed on 11 May 2013.
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In the case of cells with small populations where popgt = {popgt 1500 < popgt < 1,0001 we modify the
formula for vdrgt to use a three-year moving average. In the case of cells with very small populations
where popgt = {popgt I popgt < 5001, we use the three-year moving average of the career management
field group to which the occupation belongs. A career field group, also known as a career management
field, consists of groupings of very similar occupations. See the appendix of Greenstone et al (2013) for
a list of common military occupations and the career field groups to which they belong as well as the
types of missions with which the occupation is typically involved (i.e., combat, non-combat, or infantry).
The increase in one-year post discharge mortality is most pronounced among male veterans aged 20-34,
especially those who are white and who served in the infantry or other combat occupations. See Figures
Al and A2. The time trend pattern of veteran mortality for white men largely mimics the pattern for
the total population as displayed in Figure 1. This is consistent with the fact that white men constitute
the largest demographic among enlisted volunteers for active service. When disaggregated by occupation
type, there is no perceptible difference in veteran mortality in the first year after separation among
male veterans who served in non-combat occupations before and after the war began but a substantial
increase among male veterans who served in combat occupations after 2003. For men who served in
combat occupations and who separated in year 2007, the mortality rate in year 2008 exceeded 325
meaning this particular separation group faced a one-year post discharge risk of death at least as high as
1 in 300.
2.6.2 In-Service Mortality among Active Army Soldiers
Demographic information on each soldier and the soldier's military service characteristics come from the
TAPDB as sourced by OEMA. We use separations data from the TAPDB as well as a listing of all war-
related casualties provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) to estimate time-varying
occupation-specific military mortality hazards. 31 The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) measures the
fatality rate for group g during time frame t (typically a year) as
P = fatalitiesg -. 200,000,000hoursworkedgt
where 200,000,000 is a scaling factor for 100,000 full-time equivalent workers, assuming 50 weeks of
work with a 40 hour work week. We use military administrative data32 to measure the mortality rate per
100,000 soldiers for military occupation k in month t as:
3 1De-identified TAPDB data from OEMA as well as all personnel data from DMDC were provided to the author as
part of a restricted use agreement that specifies the data can only be stored, accessed, and analyzed using government
information systems within government facilities. Though the data provided to the author was de-identified, the risk of
backward induction of personal identities precludes additional distribution of the data. For access to the raw personnel
data, one must make direct application to OEMA and/or DMDC. Data preparation and analysis programs are available
from the author upon request.
32
There are two sources of data on military deaths. The first comes from DMDC. It is a database of all combat-related
deaths which have occurred since September 2001. The second comes from OEMA and is derived from the Army's loss
files. Each time a soldier departs active service, an entry is created in the loss file which records a full set of administrative
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i) 100,000pit = fatalitiesjn - (23)
Kn=t- f strengthjt
where strength is the number of soldiers assigned to military occupation j at the end of time period t.
Our measure for the occupation-specific mortality rate is different than that used by BLS because we
do not attempt to represent the number of hours worked by soldiers. Our measured rate may overstate
the fatality hazard relative to how BLS would measure it since the typical soldier puts in more than a
40-hour work week on average, particularly when deployed. Further, our count of fatalities includes all
fatalities whereas the BLS count would only include deaths that are specifically linked in a causal way
to the occupation. We argue that a soldier is exposed to the threat of occupational hazards 24 hours a
day, seven days a week. We interpret the units of Pjt to be the number of deaths per year per 100,000
soldiers working in occupation j.
We measure the company-level mortality rate for individual soldiers, indexed by i, as:
cbtexpi = casdiedtot -12. 1,000 (24)
deployedmonthsi
where casdiedtoti is the total count of combat deaths experienced by company sized units to which
soldier i was assigned during his first term of service. Company sized units (sometimes called squadrons
or detachments) usually consist of about 100 soldiers. Soldiers assigned to the same company often have
the same or similar occupations, but not always. For example, it is common for medics and cooks to be
assigned to companies that consist mostly of infantrymen. The variable deployedmonthst is a count of
the total number of months that soldier i was deployed during his first term of service. We multiply by
12 to normalize the casualty count to a rate with an annual basis. We multiply by 1,000 to normalize
the rate to a per 100,000 soldier basis. The units of cbtexpi are deaths per 100,000 soldiers per deployed
year.
2.6.3 Civilian Mortality
We use National Center for Health Statistics micro-level mortality files and Census Bureau inter-censal
population estimates to construct civilian mortality rates. We estimate civilian mortality hazards, nor-
malized to rates per 100,000 population, using the following equation:
Pi| = Pscagr - sctagr 100,000 (25)
sctagr
characteristics about the type of discharge, including whether the soldier died or left active duty due to disability. We are
able to compare data from the combat-deaths file with the data from the loss file to validate the accuracy of the military
death counts we use to construct military occupation-specific mortality hazards over time.
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where psctagr is the civilian mortality hazard in state s and county c corresponding to individual i's home
of record, and in year t for age groyp a, gender g, and race r. Psctagr is the population in state s,
county c, and year t for age group a, gender g, and race r as tabulated from the Census Bureau's
Vintage 2009 intercensal estimates 3. fsctagr is the number of deaths resulting from non-health related
reasons in state s, county c, and year t for age group a, gender g, and race r as estimated using
Poisson regression from micro-level Vital Statistics mortality data (i.e., Mortality Files with All County
Geographic Information) provided under a restricted-use data agreement with the National Center for
Health Statistics (NCHS). 3 ' After estimating P"Jagr for each county and age-gender-race group in the
US for 1997 through 2009, we match the estimated civilian mortality rate to individuals in our sample
via a crosswalk from the individual's home-of-record zip code to state-county FIPS code. Thus, at the
time of a soldier's separation from active duty, we assume the comparison civilian mortality rate is that of
his gender, race, age group, and home-of-record county in which home-of-record was the soldier's home
just prior to his induction (i.e., the soldier's home address at the time of original enlistment). We focus
on estimating civilian mortality hazards for age groups encompassing ages 20-34, which constitutes the
possible age range during which most enlisted soldiers separate from the military. We use bridged-race
categories white, black, Hispanic, and other (where other substitutes for American Indian or Alaskan
Native and Asian or Pacific Islander). 35
The NCHS Mortality Micro-Data with all county geographical information provides mortality counts
that include the deaths of military personnel occurring within the United States. Some of these deaths
could be the result of late effects of combat injuries, some could be the result of non-combat, non-
deployed military-specific job hazards, and some could be the result of natural causes. We attempt to
separate mortality that occurs while on active duty in the Army from mortality that occurs in the civilian
population so as not to over-estimate civilian mortality rates, especially in geographic locations with
high-density military populations. We adjust NCHS death counts from a year-county-age-gender-race
cell by subtracting the commensurate number of military deaths recorded in the military administrative
data at military bases concomitant with the respective county from the NCHS data. We subtract military
deaths from the death counts in counties with Army bases or Army hospital facilities. We are able to do
this because the military's administrative data allows us to observe the soldier's duty location at the time
of death. This procedure makes two assumptions. One, most deaths of active duty soldiers while in the
U.S. that are the result of late effects of combat injuries occur in a relatively small number of locations
33
See http://www.census.gov/popest/data/intercensaI/index.html or http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/bridged _race.htm.
34
We use three year running totals to estimate the mortality hazards in counties with small populations (<100,000) and for
county age-gender-race cells with small populations (<10,000).
35
Bridged-race categories were constructed by mapping the 31 census race groups used in Census 2000 in accordance with
the 1997 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) standards for the collection of data on race and ethnicity to the four
race categories specified under the 1977 OMB standards. See Federal Register 62FR58781-58790 of October 30, 1997 and
OMB Statistical Policy Directive 15 of May 12, 1977.
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(i.e., hospitals on military bases like Walter Reed in Washington, D.C. and Brooke Army Medical Center
in San Antonio, TX). Two, mortality which occurs subsequent to military service after a soldier has
been discharged and re-enters civilian life is not the direct result of active military service. The first
assumption could be problematic if a significant number of combat-injured soldiers are sent to places
other than military hospitals for treatment and recovery. The second assumption could be problematic
if the military regularly discharges duty-related-injured soldiers who have a high likelihood of near term
death. We do not have reason to believe that either of these issues are prevalent.
2.6.4 Additional Details
We used the U.S. Census Bureau's Gazetteer Files to find the latitude and longitude of each soldier's
home-of-record zip code and the zip code of each VA facility. We then used the Haversine formula (also
known as the great-circle distance formula) to calculate the distance between the soldier's zip code and
the zip code of each VA facility and then found the VA facility with the minimum distance to the soldier's
zip code. The distance between two points on the earth's surface (d) is calculated from:36
a = sin2  + cos (01) -cos (02) -sin 2 (A )
c = 2-arctan2QIa, \/(1 -a))
d = R-c
where 0 is latitude (in radians), X is longitude (in radians), and R is the earth's radius (3,959 miles).
3 6 Sinnott, R.W. (1984), "Virtues of the Haversine," Sky and Telescope, 68:2, p. 159.
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Figure Al. Veteran's Mortality Rate Trends: Men Aged 20-34 at Separation from Active
Duty who Served in Combat Occupations.
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Figure A2. Veteran's Mortality Rate Trends: Men Aged 20-34 at Separation from Active
Duty who Served in Non-Combat Occupations.
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Table Al. Data structure.
Data Structure of Matched Cells with DMF Counts
ExitYearT Gender Race YrsOfSvc Age MOS LossesCount DeathsT+1 DeathsT+2 DeathsT+3 DeathsT+4 DeathsT+5
1996 M W <=6 20-34 11b 1000 6 8 9 10 12
1996 M B <=6 20-34 11b 100 1 2 2 4 5
1996 M H <=6 20-34 11b 80 1 1 3 5 5
1996 M 0 <=6 2-34 11b 25 1 1 1 1 1
2007 F W >10 >34 92y 1000 8 12 15 17 18
2007 F B >10 >34 92y 100 1 2 2 3 4
2007 F H >10 >34 92y 80 1 1 1 1 1
2007 F 0 >10 >34 92y 25 0 0 0 0 1
Note: Numbers are for illustrative purposes ony. YrsOfSvc categories include years of service c-6, >6 & <=10 and >10. Age categories
include <2Q 20-34, and >34. MOS stands formilitary occupation specialty. DeathsT+'i' indicates the cumulative number of deaths at the
end of 'i' years afterseparation from the Army, with separation occurring in year T
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Table A3. Army EndStrength, New Enlistments, and Separations.
Non-Prior First-Term
Enlisted Service Separation Reenlistment
Year Endstrength Enlistees Separations Rate Rate
1997 408,105 69,939 77,269 18.9% 33.1%
1998 401,979 65,171 76,535 19.0% 33.6%
1999 396,069 63,649 71,958 18.2% 34.9%
2000 402,150 72,832 71,535 17.8% 36.2%
2001 400,303 70,707 74,862 18.7% 32.2%
2002 406,183 71,301 67,719 16.7% 30.3%
2003 413,697 70,019 64,041 15.5% 31.8%
2004 413,515 70,671 81,002 19.6% 27.7%
2005 405,275 59,583 80,525 19.9% 34.3%
2006 420,165 65,911 70,537 16.8% 40.2%
2007 433,101 60,486 75,703 17.5% 42.3%
Notes: Source of data is Office of Economic and ManpowerAnalysis. Enlisted endstrength is as
of September 30 of each year Figures are for U.S. Army active force. Reenlistment rate is among
eligible first-term soldiers
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2.7 Appendix B: Matched Sample Estimates
Appendix B provides details on the estimates of the effect of in-service mortality on veteran mortality
using a matched sample of soldiers who separated before and after the war began using propensity scores.
I estimate a logit model to predict the probability of transitioning out of the military during the war on
terror. I then use the resulting estimates to develop a propensity score for the risk of separation among
a sample of those who transitioned out before and after the war began. The propensity score is used to
match people based on having the same observable characteristics. Table B1 lists the results of the logit
estimates of the probability of separation among soldiers who confronted a reenlistment decision between
2002 and 2010. Table B2 lists summary statistics for the matched sample where the matched sample
was constructed using propensity scores estimated from the logit regression reported in Table B1.
Table B2 shows that the mean difference in the one-year veteran mortality rate between those who sep-
arated in years 2002 through 2007 and those who separated in years 1996 through 2001 is approximately
57.8 deaths per 100,000 veterans. If the treatment is service on active duty during wartime, then an
estimate of the average treatment effect on the treated using nearest neighbor matching is 56.4 deaths
per 100,000 veterans with an estimated standard error of 0.67 (bootstrapped). This propensity score
estimate was calculated using all 135,059 observations in the "treated" group and 78,017 observations
from the control group.
I conducted an additional set of regression exercises using the matched sample of soldiers who separated
before and after the war. Table B3 lists the results of these regression exercises. Rather than using
demographic controls in the regressions, I use the propensity score as a control variable in the regression
of one-year post-service mortality on in-service occupation specific mortality. The regressions reported
in columns (1) through (3) of Table B3 are similar to those reported in Table 3. The difference is
that instead of estimating the regressions on cell-based data as constructed from the entire sample of
soldiers who separated between years 1996 and 2007, the regressions of Table B3 use individual level
data on the sub-sample of soldiers who separated before and after the war matched on propensity scores.
Regardless, the point estimates for the effect of in-service mortality on post-service mortality are not
meaningfully different between Table 3 and Table B3. Columns (4) and (5) report the results of a
difference-in-difference style estimator using the following regression model:
pit = a+ Pjt -1{t > 2002}+ * Pjt +3 -1{t > 2002}+Xi0'+ yt+Eit
where Pit is the veteran mortality rate for individual i (based on i's in-service occupation j, race, gender,
and year of separation t), Pjt is the occupation-specific mortality rate for i's occupation (j), and Xi is a
vector of controls including i's propensity score. The estimate of the parameter P indicates how much
the marginal response to in-service mortality increased after the war began, while the estimate of P + 77
indicates the net marginal response to in-service mortality in the post-war period. The results reported
in columns (4) and (5) indicate the effect of in-service mortality on one-year post-service mortality in the
pre-war period was 0.32 deaths per 100,000 while the net effect of in-service mortality on post-service
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mortality in the post-war period was 0.63 deaths per 100,000 (0.321+0.310). These results suggest that
not only did post-service mortality increase in the post-war period as a result of an increase in in-service
mortality, but that the marginal response to in-service mortality increased as well by nearly double.
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Table B1. Logit estimates of the probability of separation among soldiers with decision years
between 2002 and 2010.
(1) (2)
Est. Coeff. Mean
(SE) (StDev)
Dependent Variable: Separated from Active Duty 0.592
(0.491)
Female 0.14302 0.192
(0.00187) (0.394)
Race (Black) -0.11717 0.167
(0.00220) (0.373)
Race (Hispanic) -0.05988 0.119
(0.00241) (0.324)
Race (Other) -0.08522 0.057
(0.00330) (0.231)
AFQT Score Percentile (at entry) 0.00190 59.259
(0.00004) (19.037)
High School Grad or Above -0.00464 0.814
(0.00207) (0.389)
Age (at entry, 18=0) 0.00427 3.203
(0.00030) (3.513)
Married -0.11408 0.352
(0.00160) (0.478)
Bonus Offer (1,000s of $2010) -0.02605 9.164
(0.00035) (7.993)
Bonus Offer Squared 0.00044 147.867
(0.00001) (225.545)
Military-to-Civilian Relative Mortality Hazard p1k 0.00378 1.982
(0.00016) (4.745)
MilPay - ECivPay (1,000s of $2010) 0.00075 48.299
(0.00004) (29.352)
Local Area Unemployment Rate -0.01473 6.413
(0.00028) (2.731)
Promotion to E5 in First Term of Service -0.06528 0.168
(0.00211) (0.374)
Year Dummies Included Yes
N 497,671
Log-Likelihood -313,756
Data Source: Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis. Column (1) reports results
of binary logit regression on the probability of separation among the population of
non-prior service soldiers in the U.S. Army who confronted their first-term reenlistment
decision during the years of the Global War on Terror (2002-2010). The table reports
marginal effects calculated at the means of the independent variables. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Column (2) reports summary statistics for the
dependent variable (an indicator for separation from active duty) and the
independent variables with standard deviation in parentheses
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Table B2. Sample summary statistics for propensity-score matched sample of soldiers who
separated before and after the war began.
Variable
Veteran Mortality Rate, Sep. Yr. +1 (p100k)
Active Duty Occupatio n-Specific Mortality p100k (Sep. Yr.)
Propensity Score (Probability of Separation)
Disability Rating >0% at Separation
Punitively Discharged
Distance: Home-of-Record ZipCode to VA Center (miles)
Gender: Female
Race: Black
Race: Hispanic
Race: Other
High School Grad or Above
Average AFQT Score Percentile
includes Matched Soldiers who Separated in Years:
N
(1) (2)
Mean StDev
101.95 (141.80)
172.49 (155.07)
0.62 (0.14)
0.11 (0.32)
0.05 (0.22)
35.96 (42.91)
0.22 (0.42)
0.16 (0.37)
0.11 (0.32)
0.05 (0.22)
0.83 (0.37)
59.91 (18.69)
2002 - 2007
135,059
(3) (4)
Mean StDev
44.18 (68.13)
58.09 (40.54)
0.66 (0.13)
0.10 (0.30)
0.04 (0.19)
36.66 (42.65)
0.24 (0.43)
0.20 (0.40)
0.08 (0.28)
0.05 (0.22)
0.84 (0.37)
58.88 (18.14)
1996 - 2001
153,896
Data Source: Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis. Samples include soldiers who separated before and after the war
who were matched based on propensity scores calculated from a lgit regression of the probability of separating from activeduty during the Global War on Terror.
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Table B3. Estimates of the effects of occupation-specific mortality on veteran mortality from
a sample matched using propensity scores.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
os os os d-n-d d-n-d
Occupation-Specific Mortality (p100k) 0.587 0.586 0.606 0.321 0.321
(0.056) (0.056) (0.066) (0.093) (0.093)
Propensity Score (Cell Average) -4.190 -2.866 -12.610 -11.402 -10.090
(13.852) (13.593) (14.394) (13.898) (13.686)
Separated with a Disability (% of cell) -0.223 -0.560 -0.253
(1.080) (1.030) (1.060)
Separated with Punitive Discharge (% of cell) 7.603 7.319 7.476
(2.946) (2.882) (2.911)
Distance: home of record zip to VA center (miles) 0.029 0.028 0.029
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Occupation-Specific Mortality X 1(Sep. Yr. >= 2002) 0.310 0.310
(0.057) (0.057)
1(Separation Year >= 2002) -32.849 -32.829
(8.928) (8.935)
Constant 8.417 6.248 29.121 33.047 30.892
(9.471) (9.327) (13.179) (9.615) (9.597)
Includes Separation Year Dummies? No No Yes No No
Observations 288,955 288,955 288,955 288,955 288,955
R-squared 0.418 0.418 0.433 0.426 0.426
Dependent variable is mortality rate among veterans within the first year of separation from active duty. The veteran
mortality rate is measured at the military occupaton-by-race-by-gender cell level- Robust standard errors in parentheses,
clustered at the occupation-by-race-by-gender level_ Data Source: Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis. Sample
consists of individual observations of soldiers including people who transitioned out before the war (separation year < 2002)
and who transitioned out after the war (separation year>=2002) matched using a propensity score estimated from the
probability of separation.
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2.8 Appendix C: Decomposition
This appendix presents the method for estimating the decomposition results presented in table 4. Table
C1 lists the regression estimates for the coefficients used in the Oaxaca-Binder decomposition process
described below.
Table C1. Regression estimates used in Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition exercise.
Army Occupation-Specific Mortality, Sep. Yr. (p100k)
Gender: female
Race: black
Hispanic
Race: other
Educ Level HS Grad or Higher (% of cell)
Average AFQT Score Percentile
Includes Separation Year Dummies?
Constant
(1) (2) (3)
0.304 0.623 0.560
(0.005) (0.002) (0.001)
-31.357 -37.124 -32.872
(0.348) (0.914) (0.239)
5.058 -22.740 -7.950
(0.704) (1.280) (0.306)
-18.398 -79.219 -38.756
(0.893) (1.405) (0.358)
-33.864 -60.165 -33.690
(0.539) (1.852) (0.413)
0.086 -3.181 -0.398
(0.032) (0.073) (0.014)
-1.103 -0.394 -0.716
(0.026) (0.042) (0.012)
Yes
83.313 307.117 128.665
(2.816) (5.253) (1.339)
Observations 60,425 63,494 752,254
Number of Cells 896 920 1,092
R-squared 0.154 0.694 0.458
Dependent variable is mortality rate among veterans within the first year of separation from
active duty. The veteran mortality rate is measured at the military occupation-by-race-by-gender
cell level Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Data Source: Office of Economic and
Manpower Analysis Cells constructed at the active duty military occupation by race by gender
level. Sample of cells constructed from non-prior service soldiers (a) who separated from active
duty in 1999 (for column 1) and 2007 (for column 2), and between 1996 and 2007 (for column
3), and (b) who separated during or at the end of their first term of service (all columns).
Regressions are weighted by the size of the cell's population.
The model for column (1) in Table C1 is given by:
vdrjrgt = a + 5 Pj + Xjrgt y11 + e jrgt
The model for column (2) in Table C1 is given by:
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vdrjrgt = a + 3Pjt + Xjrgt 1 + E jrgt t = 2007
The model for column (3) in Table C1 is given by:
vdrjrgt = a + 3Pj +Xjrgt l + 7t + Ejrgt t c {1996, 1997,...,2007}
The model from columns (1) and (2) of Table C1 can be written generically as:
K
vdrgi = /go + F Xiktgk - Vgi
k=1
where g = {A,B} so g is now an index for group A (soldiers separating in year 2007) and group B (soldiers
separating in year 1999), i is now an index for the cell defined by MOS x Race x Gender combinations.
For example, if g =A (2007), then pgi corresponds to the mortality rate in year 2008 among veterans
from cell i (occupation j, race r, and gender g) who left service in year 2007. The K covariates include
indicators for the cell's race and gender, mean values of AFQT percentile score, and proportion with a
high school diploma or higher, a time trend, and a trend break. Assuming E [vgi I Xi] = 0 and defining
Xi = [xiI, xi2, ... xiK] the average mortality rate for veterans in their first year after leaving active duty
for group g is equal to the average characteristics for the group (Xg) multiplied by the partial effects of
those characteristics (fg), we have:
Pg =XgPg
The difference in the mean value of the veteran mortality rate between group B and A can be decomposed
in the following way:
A, = E [pB - E [pA]
PB -P A
B0 A0) + Bk Bk
k=1
K
IAk + 1 (JBk - Ak) fAk
k=1
where the first part of this expression, denoted A" , is the unexplained portion of the difference in means
(or the portion of the mean risk difference explained by differences in partial effects between the groups).
This can be interpreted as the effect of being in group B on group B observations, or the average
treatment on the treated (Fortin et al, 2011).
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A y= B AO + E kBk (Bk - Ak)
k=1
The second part of the decomposition expression, Ae, is the explained portion of the difference in mean
risk between group B and group A (or the portion of the mean risk difference explained by differences
in covariate quantities between the groups). This is called the composition effect, or the portion of the
mean difference explained by differences in covariates between the groups.
K
A'= (JBk - JAk) Ak
k=1
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2.9 Appendix D: Social Costs of Excess Mortality
This appendix provides information used in the construction of estimates of the social cost of excess
veteran mortality. Table C1 summarizes the count and classification of Army casualties during the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2001 and 2010. Table C2 provides details on estimating the social cost
of excess mortality in worksheet format.
Table D1. Casualties in the U.S. Army, 2001-2010.
Army Global War on Terror Casualties, 2001-2010
Proportion
Type Count of Total
Hostile Deaths 3,332 0.085
Hostile Injuries 28,919 0.738
Non-Hostile Deaths 918 0.023
Non-Hostile Injuries 6.036 0.154
39.205 1.000
Notes: Non-Hostile Deaths includes those from accidents
(-1.4% of total casualtiesj, homicides (<0. 1%), illness
(-0.2%), and suicide (-0.5%). Source. Defense Manpower
Data Center.
138
2 MORTALITY OF VET ERANS2.9 Appendix D: Social Costs of Excess Mortality
Cost of Excess Veteran Mortality, U.S. Army
Hostile Deaths Among Active Duty Soldiers, 2001-2010 3,332
Non-Hostile Deaths Among Active Duty Soldiers, 2001-2010 918
Estimate of Excess Non-Hostile Mortality Due to War-Induced Deployment, 2001-2010 306
Estimate of War-induced Mortality Among Active Duty Soldiers, 2001-2010 3,638
Pre-War Average Annual Mortality Rate per 100,000 Active Duty Soldiers, 1997-2000 50
War-Time Average Annual Mortality Rate per 100,000 Active Duty Soldiers, 2004-2007 158
War-induced Increase in Annual Mortality Rate per 100,000 Soldiers 108
War-Induced Increase in Annual Mortality Rate per 100,000 Veterans 52
Number of Veterans who Separated from Active Service, 2004-2007 307,767
Estimate of Excess Mortality Among Veterans Induced by War, 2004-2007 160
Estimate of Cost of Excess Mortality of Veterans ($M), 2004-2007 $1,148.7
Alternate Estimate of Cost of Excess Vet Mortality ($M), 2004-2007 $79.8
Estimate of Number of Veterans who Separated from Active Service, 2001-2010 717,322
Estimate of Excess Mortality Among Veterans Induced by War, 2001-2010 372
Estimate of Cost of Excess Mortality of Veterans ($M), 2001-2010 $2,677.4
Alternate Estimate of Cost of Excess Vet Mortality ($M), 2001-2010 $185.9
Military Service Fatalities, 2001-2010, Understated by:
(a)
(b)
(c) =1/3*(b), per Stiglitz & Bilmes (2012)
(d) =(a)+(c)
(e)
(f)
(g) = (f)-(e)
(h) =0.48*(g)
(i)
(j) = (h)/100,000*(i)
(k) = (j)*VSL; VSL=$7.2M per Stiglitz & Bilmes (2012)
(I) = (j)*VSL; VSL=$0.5M per Greenstone et al (2013)
(in)
(n) = (h)/100,000*(m)
(o) = (n)*VSL; VSL=$7.2M per Stiglitz & Bilmes (2012)
(p) = (n)*VSL; VSL=$0.5M per Greenstone et al (2013)
372 10.2%
C
(Dcn
0
0
0
(n
0
C,
06)
3,
0
(b
C,)
N.t)
References
[1] Angrist, J.D., S.H. Chen, and B.R. Frandsen (2010). "Did Vietnanm veterans get sicker in the 1990s?
The complicated effects of military service on self-reported health," Journal of Public Economics,
94:11-12, pp. 824-837.
[2] Arnold, N., M-W. Sohn, C. Maynard, and D.M. Hynes (2006). "VIReC Technical Report 2: VA-NDI
Mortality Data Merge Project," VA Information Resource Center, Edward Hines, Jr. VA Hospital,
Hines, IL. Available at http://www.virec.research.va.gov/VSF/VA-NDI-Merge.htm accessed on June
15, 2013.
[3] Bedard, K. and 0. Deschenes (2004). "The long-term impact of military service on health: evidence
from World War 11 and the Korean War," American Economic Review, 96:1, pp. 176-194.
[4] Buzzell, Emily and Samuel H. Preston (2007). "Mortality of American Troops in the Iraq War,"
Population and Development Review 33:3, pp. 555-566.
[5] Cesur, Resul, Joseph J. Sabia, and Erdal Tekin (2013). "The psychological costs of war: Military
combat and mental health," Journal of Health Economics, 32:1, pp. 51-65.
[6] Defense Manpower Data Center (2011). Selected de-identified extracts from U.S. Army Active Duty
Casualties, Personnel, and Separations Files for years 1997-2010.
[7] Department of Defense Directive 6130.3. Physical Standards for Appointment, Enlistment and In-
duction. Available at: http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/dodd/corres/html/61303.htm.
[8] Department of Defense Directive 6130.4. Criteria and Procedure Requirements for Physi-
cal Standards for Appointment, Enlistment, or Induction in the Armed Forces. Available at:
http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/dodd/corres/html/61304.htm.
[9] Engel, R.C., L.B. Gallagher, and D.S. Lyle (2010). "Military deployments and children's academic
achievement: Evidence from Department of Defense Education Activity Schools," Economics of
Education Review, 29, pp. 73-82.
[10] Fortin, Nicole, Thomas Lemieux, and Sergio Firpo (2011). "Decomposition Methods in Economics,"
The Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 4, Part A, pp. 1-102.
[11] Greenstone, M., S. Ryan, and M.F. Yankovich (2013). "The Value of a Statistical Life: Evidence
from Military Retention Incentives and Occupation-Specific Mortality," unpublished chapter of M.F.
Yankovich MIT dissertation.
[12] Hanna, D.B., M.R Pfeiffer, J.E. Sackoff, R.M. Selik, E.M. Begier, and L.V. Torian (2009). "Com-
paring the National Death Index and the Social Security Administration's Death Master File to
Ascertain Death in HIV Surveillance," Public Health Reports, 124: pp. 850-860.
140
REFERENCESREFERENCES
[13] Hearst, N., T.B. Newman, and S.B. Hulley (1986). "Delayed effects of the military draft on mortality:
a randomized natural experiment," New England Journal of Medicine, 314:10, pp. 620-624.
[14] Hill, Mark E. and Ira Rosenwaike (2002). "The Social Security Administration's Death Master File:
The Completeness of Death Reporting at Older Ages," Perspectives, Social Security Bulletin 64:1,
pp. 45-51.
[15] Jann, Ben (2008) "The Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition for Linear Regression Models," The Stata
Journal 8:4, pp. 453-479.
[16] Kemp, Janet and Robert Bossarte (2013). "Suicide Data Report, 2012," Department of Veterans
Affairs, Mental Health Services, Suicide Prevention Program.
[17] Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis, U.S. Army (2012). Total Army Personnel Database,
Enlisted Master File Extract for years 1997-2010.
[18] Rohlfs, Chris (2010). "Does Combat Exposure Make You a More Violent or Criminal Person?" The
Journal of Human Resources, 45:2, pp. 271-300.
[19] Schisterman, E.F. and B.W. Whitcomb (2004). "Use of the Social Security Administration Death
Master File for ascertainment of mortality status," Population Health Metrics, 2:2.
[20] Shen, Y.C., J. Arkes, B.W. Kwan, L.Y. Tan, and T.V. Williams (2010). "Effects of Iraq/Afghanistan
deployments on PTSD diagnoses for still active personnel in all four services," Military Medicine,
175, pp. 763-769.
[21] Stiglitz, J.E. and L.J. Bilmes (2012). "Estimating the costs of war: Methodological issues, with
applications to Iraq and Afghanistan," Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict,
Chapter 12, Ed. Michelle R. Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas, Oxford University Press.
[22] Stock, J.H. and M.W. Watson (2003). Introduction to Econometrics, Addison Wesley.
[23] Suominen, K. E. Isometsa, J. Suokas, J. Haukka, K. Achte, et al (2004). "Completed suicide after
a suicide attempt: a 37-year follow-up study," American Journal of Psychiatry, 161: pp. 562-563.
[24] Tanielian, T. and L.H. Jaycox (2008). "Invisible Wounds of War: Psychological and Cognitive
Injuries, Their Consequences, and Services to Assist Recover," Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
[25] U.S. Department of Agriculture (2013). "Rural-Urban Continuum Codes," Economic Re-
search Service. Available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/rural-urban-continuum-
codes/documentation.aspx and accessed on May 24, 2013.
[26] U.S. Department of Commerce (2012). Bureau of Economic Analysis, American Community Survey,
annual estimates of per capita personal income by county and by zip code. See American FactFinder
at http://factfinder2.census.gov/.
141
REFERENCES REFERENCES
[27] U.S. Department of Commerce (2012), "Social Security Administration Death Master File," National
Technical Information Service. As of May 31, 2012.
[28] U.S. Census Bureau (2013). U.S. Gazetteer: 2010 Census U.S. Gazetteer Files, Cen-
sus 2000 U.S. Gazetteer Files, and Census 1990 U.S. Gazetteer Files available at
http://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/gazetteer.html. Accessed May 2013.
[29] U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division (2010). "County Characteristics Resident Population Esti-
mates File: Annual County Resident Population Estimates by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin
in [STATE], April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2009" released June 2010.
[30] U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates Branch (2003). "1990-1999 Intercensal State and County
Characteristics Population Estimates File" released June 2003.
[31] U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1997-2009). Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics, Division of Vital Statistics, "Mortality Files with
All County Geographic Information."
[32] U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (2013). "Facility Listing," List by All Facilities. Available at
http://www.va.gov/directory/guide/rptfac_list.cfm. Accessed May 2013.
[33] Weiner, J., T.S. Richmind, J. Conigliaro, and D.J. Wiebe (2011). "Military veteran mortality fol-
lowing a survived suicide attempt," BMC Public Health, 23:11, p. 374.
142
REFERENCESREFERENCES
REFERENCES REFERENCES
This page intentionally left blank.
143
REFERENCES REFERENCES
REFERENCES RFRNE
This page intentionally left blank.
144
REFERENCESREFERENCES
3 CONFLICT DURATION
3 Conflict Duration
On the Persistence of Civil Wars: Third-Party Interventions, Uncertainty Over the
Prospects of Victory, and Individual Abstention
by Michael Yankovich37
November 16, 2012
Abstract
This paper reviews theoretical explanations as well as empirical evidence for the causes and
correlates of civil war duration. I give special emphasis to the observed positive correlation between
third party intervention and duration. I adapt the model of the "Swing Voter's Curse" to explain
the persistence of civil war. In this adaptation, individuals maximize expected utility by "voting" to
support the government or the rebel group, or by abstaining from making a commitment to either
side. Voting and abstention affect the ability of rebel groups to find sanctuary potentially shifting the
balance of relative capabilities and probability of decisive victory. Third party intervention distorts
signals and causes more potential voters to be uninformed and thus more likely to abstain. The
paper concludes with an analysis of implications for interventionist policies with special emphasis on
the role of the U.S. as primary interventionist in the current conflict in Afghanistan.
37U.S. Military Academy at West Point, NY. Email: michael.yankovich@usma.edu. The author thanks David Arney,
Martin Feldstein, Steve Horton, and Doug Mclnvale for helpful discussions and feedback. The views expressed in this
collection of articles are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army,
Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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"Personal choice is often all that separates America's friends from its enemies.. .so the war has
become one prolonged appeal for allegiance: The United States relies on tens of thousands
of troops and a gusher of development dollars to make its case; the Taliban offers a simpler
mix of intimidation and kinship. The safest territory in Afghanistan is the neutral middle, a
space that the expanding war has eroded. Forced to take sides, Afghans have divided into
factions, complicating any attempt to end the war."
- Joshua Partlow 3 8
3.1 Introduction
Between 1946 and 2009, there were 177 conflicts involving the use of armed force between a government
and at least one organized opposition group. 39 On average, these internal armed conflicts last over 15
years. The cost of internal conflict can be substantial. Conservative estimates place the cumulative
death toll since 1950 from civil wars at nearly 20 million (Besley and Perrson, 2009). Additionally, many
conflict countries are poor and have relatively slow economic growth. The average annual level of real
GDP per capita in conflict countries since 1950 has been $1,850, in purchasing power parity terms, while
the global average has been $8,275. The average annual GDP growth rate in conflict countries has been
2.9% compared to a global average of 4.1%.40
This year marks the 8th consecutive year that the U.S. is providing counterinsurgency support to the Gov-
ernment of Iraq and the 10th year of counterinsurgency support to the Government of Afghanistan. The
nominal cumulative budget cost of these two interventions is in excess of $1.1 trillion, and the cumulative
personnel toll exceeds 6,000 service members killed.41 Though the explicit purpose of this paper isn't
to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of U.S expenditures in support of interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan,
or any other internal conflict, I hope to highlight some key issues that potential interventionists should
consider as they develop expectations about the likelihood of achieving their objectives.
Third party states may intervene in civil wars for one of several reasons to include assisting an ally,
achieving a self-interested policy objective, managing conflict to preserve regional stability, or preventing
a humanitarian crisis. Unfortunately, neither theory nor empirical evidence provides conclusive evidence
about the impact of third party interventions in terms of either decreasing the duration of conflict or
38See "War pulls apart Afghan families," Washington Post, March 5, 2011, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/.
39Source of data is the Armed Conflict Dataset, Version 4-2010 from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) / Inter-
national Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).
40Source of data: Penn World Table Version 7.0. Real GDP per capita is measured in international currency units
adjusted for exchange rates and purchasing power parity. Growth rates of real GDP are based on a Laspeyres Index.
41See http://icasualties.org/ for up-to-date casualty counts in the two conflicts. See the Congressional Research Service
Report by Amy Belasco, "The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11,"
published September 2, 2010 and available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf, for a summary of budget
appropriations associated with the two conflicts.
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increasing the likelihood of victory for the supported side. In this paper, I examine how third party
interventions in a civil conflict on behalf of the government side can increase the duration of conflict and
have little effect on the probability of government victory.
Section two briefly introduces the ways that third party interventions can affect the duration of armed
civil conflicts. Section three summarizes empirical observations from the Armed Conflict Database,
augmented by economic data from the Penn World Table. Section four reviews some selected empirical
and theoretical evidence from the civil war literature. Section five introduces a simple adaptation of a
well-known voting model to demonstrate how individual choices of which side to support in a civil war can
affect the duration of conflict. Section six highlights potential policy implications for the contemporaneous
U.S. involvement in the conflict in Afghanistan.
3.2 Third Party Interventions and Conflict Duration
Internal armed conflicts with interventions last longer than internal armed conflicts without intervention
(see Figure 1). On average about 50% of distinct episodes of internal conflicts with interventions
survive longer than five years while only 25% of distinct episodes of internal conflicts without third party
interventions survive longer than five years. A naive interpretation of this figure suggests third party
interventions increase conflict duration implying that interventions for the sake of conflict management
are counter-productive. However, the most complicated conflicts are those that are probably more likely
to have interventions. As such, intervention and duration are jointly determined. Regardless, there are
several reasons why third party interventions could affect the dynamics of internal conflicts.
First, military involvement by the interventionist may substitute for the true military capabilities of the
supported side. If the efforts of the interventionist are not sufficient to generate decisive victory for
the supported side, then the conflict persists but with an artificially distorted balance of capabilities
between the original primary antagonists. If the non-supported side believes the interventionists lack long
term commitment, then the non-supported side may be emboldened to sustain its participation in armed
conflict in the hope of decisive victory once the interventionist departs rather than seeking a negotiated
settlement or resolution through a political process. Further, the presence of the interventionist military
prevents the primary antagonists from developing an accurate perception of each other's true capabilities.
If the presence of the interventionist creates a signal that the supported side is relatively weak, then the
opposing side might believe that its chances of long-term success are non-trivially positive. As such,
the opposing side is more likely to continue in conflict rather than seek a negotiated settlement. Thus,
intervention distorts the balance of capabilities and interferes with the information gathering process that
would otherwise take place during one-on-one interactions between the primary antagonists, and thus
potentially increases the duration of conflict by discouraging resolution through negotiation or politics.
Second, interventions may interfere with the local population's ability to form accurate expectations
about the probability of victory for either of the antagonists. This complicates personal decision-making
about which side to support. Premature commitment on the part of individuals to the eventual losing
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side holds substantial consequences for social and economic status in the post-conflict state. Thus, lack
of information about which side is likely to win deters individuals from choosing to support one side or
the other. This hold-up problem may continue until a relatively accurate picture forms of which side is
likely to emerge victorious. Individual abstention can endogenously reinforce conflict duration as neither
side is able to improve its relative capabilities so long as a significant portion of the population defers
making a commitment to one side or the other.
Third, the presence of intervening military forces may antagonize some of the ideological differences
between the government side and the rebels. If the intervention is on behalf of the government side,
particularly one that is perceived as weak or illegitimate, the rebels might be emboldened to fight harder
or sacrifice more to evict the foreign invaders and to punish the puppet regime. Further, rebels might
be relatively more successful in rallying support from the local population if they are able to successfully
cast the government side as the illegitimate patrons of the interventionist country. If an intervention
aggravates existing ideological tensions, then such interventions could increase conflict duration by super-
motivating people with strong ideological preferences to increase their level of commitment to the rebel
cause or by enabling the rebel organization to recruit more active members.
Fourth, the interventionist often brings cash in the form of logistical support contracts and development
aid. If in support of the government side, this might provide a spending multiplier boost to the economy
creating jobs and economic growth. With better economic opportunity, people might decide to support
the government rather than the rebellion. Further, such aid might help the government increase its
capacity to exert its will or squash rebellions. As such, intervention and the associated cash flows hold
potential for decreasing conflict duration. Likewise, intervention and associated cash support for the
rebel side also holds potential for decreasing conflict duration if such aid is sufficient to shift the balance
of relative capabilities decisively in favor of the rebel side. However, intervention and associated cash
aid in support of a relatively weak rebel side might increase the capacity of the rebels just enough to
enable them to sustain the conflict as well as embolden them to expand their efforts, even in the face of
challenging circumstances that might otherwise encourage them to go to the negotiating table.
Intervention with cash aid in support of the government could also serve to increase conflict duration.
Such aid increases the size of the reward for controlling the government potentially incentivizing an-
tagonists to increase their efforts to capture the prize. Additionally, the benefits of interventionist aid
spending might be disproportionately distributed to elites or taxed heavily via bribery and graft by gov-
ernment officials. If so, this might provide incentive for the population to support the rebellion. Further,
interventionist spending during the conflict might create income and growth that is far out of proportion
to what is possible in a non-conflict state. For example, the U.S. plans to spend $12.8 billion to fund the
Afghan National Security Forces in 2012 while Afghanistan's entire GDP (nominal) was just under $30
billion in 2010 with only $1 billion in government revenues.42 When aid spending during conflict is far
out of proportion relative to potential GDP in peace, some agents will be better off in the conflict state
and thus have incentive to sustain the conflict and extract as much rent as possible during the conflict
42See GovernmentExecutive.com, February 17, 2011, available at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/ and the CIA World
Factbook at https://www.cia.gov/Iibrary/pubications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.htm1.
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rather than making long-term investments in support of one of the sides or in support of building a more
stable post-conflict society.
3.3 Empirical Observations
This section presents some evidence about conflict duration, third party intervention, and the probability
of government victory using a database of post World War I armed conflicts. The Armed Conflict Dataset
from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) of the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo
(PRIO) records information on conflicts defined as "contested incompatibilities that concern government
and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government
of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year."43
3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 displays summary statistics for conflicts that were initiated or terminated between 1946 and
2009. Internal armed conflicts are those that occur between the government of a state and one or more
organized internal opposition groups. On average, internal conflicts without intervention (column 3) last
about four times as long as state-on-state conflicts (column 2) while internationalized internal conflicts
(i.e., internal conflicts with intervention on the government side, the rebel side, or both; column 4) last
about five times as long as state-on-state conflicts. Internal conflicts without intervention last an average
of 15 years with, on average, two distinct episodes per conflict. Approximately half of the overall conflict
years have at least 25 battle related deaths per year.
About 25% of internal conflicts experience an intervention for one or both sides. Internationalized
internal conflicts last an average of 21 years with 2.5 distinct episodes. Episodes of internationalized
internal conflicts are slightly more likely to end in government victory relative to internal conflicts without
intervention (27% verse 23%), and episodes of internationalized internal conflicts are slightly less likely
to end in rebel victory relative to internal conflicts without intervention (2% verse 8%). A substantial
portion of episodes of internal conflicts of both types have not reached a definitive outcome: 47% of
internal conflicts without intervention and 45% of internationalized internal conflicts are on-going, are
currently experiencing a period of low activity, or have ended without decisive victory or a negotiated
settlement (see Panel C).
Table 2 displays selected summary statistics by conflict type and region. Africa has had the most internal
conflicts (58) and the most internationalized internal conflicts (20) since the end of World War 11. African
internationalized internal conflicts last about twice as long as African internal conflicts (Panel D). Asia
has had the second most internal conflicts (Panel C). There is little difference between the average
43 Many studies use the Correlates of War database, which records information on conflicts defined as "sustained combat,
involving organized armed forces, resulting in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related fatalities within a twelve month period."
Because of its more inclusive definition of conflict, the UCDP/PRIO database has more observations and characterizes
longer duration conflicts relative to the Correlates of War database.
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duration of internal and internationalized internal conflicts in Asia. Middle Eastern internationalized
internal conflicts last over twice as long as internal conflicts in the Middle East. Among South American
internal conflicts, those without intervention tend to last longer than those with intervention (Panel
E). European conflicts since World War II have disproportionately been associated with post-Soviet era
realignments and have been relatively short-lived (Panel A).
Table 3 displays summary statistics by distinct episodes where an episode of a conflict is defined by a
continuous period during which the conflict experienced at least 25 battle related deaths per year. There
have been 448 distinct episodes of conflict since the end of World War II. On an episode basis, we again
see that episodes of internationalized internal conflicts (column 4, Panel A) last nearly twice as long on
average as episodes of internal conflicts without intervention (column 3). Additionally, the intensity of
episodes of internationalized internal conflicts (0.38) is over two and half times as high as the average
intensity of episodes of internal conflict without intervention (0.15).44 Panel C shows that episodes of
internationalized internal conflicts are more likely to end in a cease fire or peace agreement than episodes
of internal conflicts without intervention.
Table 4 provides summary statistics by episode and region. Here again we see the overall pattern of
longer duration and more intense episodes of internationalized internal conflicts (column 4) relative to
internal conflicts without intervention (column 3). This pattern is driven by observations of conflict
episodes from the Middle East (Panel B), Asia (Panel C), and Africa (Panel D).
3.3.2 Observed Patterns in the Descriptive Statistics
A few patterns emerge in the summary statistics. First, internationalized internal conflicts have longer
durations, more episodes, and more years with higher levels of battle related deaths relative to internal
conflicts without intervention. However, this evidence is not sufficient for a causal explanation of inter-
vention on duration. It could be that third party states are more likely to intervene in conflicts that are
more intense or of longer duration. A second pattern that we can observe from the summary statistics
is that the outcome of a distinct episode of a conflict is not necessarily an absorbing state. While 9%
of the episodes of internationalized internal conflicts end in rebel victory and 31% of the episodes end
in negotiated settlements (Table 3), only 2% of internationalized internal conflicts terminate in rebel
victory and 25% in negotiated settlements (Table 1). Thus, rebel victory, government victory, or a nego-
tiated settlement in a particular episode of a conflict is no guarantee that the overall conflict terminates
permanently. Rather, long duration conflicts are likely to have multiple different episodes, each of which
might have an intermediate outcome that is different from the overall outcome.
A third pattern, evident in Figure 2, is that once an internal conflict has achieved a relatively long
duration, there is little difference in the month-to-month probability of episode termination between
internationalized internal conflicts and internal conflicts without intervention. Up to about the 5th year
of a distinct conflict episode, the probability that an internal conflict without intervention terminates
44Intensity is defined as the proportion of years of the episode with at least 1,000 battle related deaths.
150
is significantly higher than the probability of termination of internal conflicts with intervention. Thus,
conflict episodes without intervention are much more likely to terminate than conflicts with intervention
prior to the 5th year of conflict. After the 5th year, there is no statistically significant difference between
the probability of termination in a given month for conflicts with and without intervention.
A fourth pattern, evident in Table 5, is that there are are substantial differences between the countries that
have internal conflict with intervention vice those that have internal conflict without intervention. Table
5 lists summary statistics of the economic characteristics of states with internal conflicts. Population and
economic data come from the Penn World Table Version 7.0. GDP figures, adjusted for purchasing power
parity, are based on constant prices using a Laspeyres style index. Relative to internal conflicts without
intervention, internationalized internal conflicts occur in countries that have smaller populations, lower
real per capita GDP, and slower rates of economic growth. Also, the countries with internationalized
internal conflicts have less investment as a percentage of GDP and more government spending as a share
of GDP. In many of the conflict countries, a value of the combined share of consumption, investment,
and government spending far in excess of one reflects the fact that the country is receiving a substantial
amount of aid and cash assistance from international donors.
A fifth pattern, evident in Panel A of Table 6, is that there is not a strong correlation between intervention
on behalf of the government side and the likelihood of government victory. Among the 58 distinct episodes
of internationalized internal conflicts between 1946 and 2009, 78% involved an intervention supporting
the government side. Among the 14 episodes that resulted in government victory, 10 (71%) had an
intervention on the side of the government while among the 44 episodes that resulted in an autcone
other than government victory, 35 (80%) had an intervention on the side of the government.
Finally, a sixth pattern, evident in Panel B of Table 6, is that differences between some of the character-
istics of the interventionist country and the supported country are associated with differences in conflict
outcomes. Gates (2002) suggests that a key factor determining rebel success is access to sanctuary,
which are physical or metaphorical places to which rebels can retreat to avoid detection as well as to
prepare for its own operations. The greater the geographic, ethnic, or ideological distance between the
government center and the rebel center, the greater the scope of the rebellion to recruit, organize, and
carry out attacks with impunity. Rebels can create ideological distance if they are successful at propagat-
ing the perception of government illegitimacy and of malign influence by the third party interventionist.
This type of perception might be more likely to exist if the local population is not able to identify with
the agents of the foreign interventionist as a result of differences in physical appearance (assumed to
be correlated with geographic distance), differences in socioeconomic status (proxied by differences in
per capita GDP), or differences in culture (proxied by linguistic distance). 45 The summary statistics
4 5Geographic distances between the third party interventionist and the supported country's government are calculated
following the great circle formula (see Mayer and Zignago, 2006). Economic distances are based on the difference between
the supported and intervening country's per capita GDP. Linguistic distances are based on the relative degree of difficulty
for the third party interventionist to learn the official language of the supported country's government (see Chiswick and
Miller, 2004). Linguistic distances are scaled from 0 to 1 with a score of 0 indicating the supported and supporter speak
the same language and with a score of 1 indicating the highest degree of learning difficulty. For example, Chinese is one
of the harder languages to learn for a native English speaker. The scaled score for linguistic distance between Chinese and
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suggest that shorter geographic and economic distances between interventionist and supported country
are associated to a greater degree with outcomes resulting in government victory.
3.3.3 Regression Analysis: Intervention, Conflict Duration, and the Probability of Government
Victory
The summary statistics seem to indicate the existence of a positive relationship between third party
intervention and conflict duration. I formally test this association by estimating a Cox proportional
hazards model (see Table 7 for results). I assume the following conditional hazard:
(tIx,1) =AO(t)-(x,#) (26)
where the baseline hazard, 4(t), is unspecified and is a function of time only. This model assumes the
hazard rates for any two episodes of conflict are proportional. The hazard function gives the instantaneous
probability at time t of the termination of an episode of conflict conditional on the conflict having survived
to time t. I specify the function 0(x,/3) in the exponential form so that (x,#) = exp (x'P), where x is a
vector of explanatory variables and P is a vector of parameters. The Cox proportional hazard model does
not require simultaneous estimation of the baseline hazard function, thus it allows for simple estimation
of the coefficients in /. Further, changes in regressors can be interpreted as having a multiplicative effect
on the original hazard. This specification also accounts for censored spells (i.e., episodes of conflict in
the data that have not yet terminated) and adjusts for tied durations.
Third party interventions in internal conflicts have a significant positive correlation with conflict duration
(Table 7, column 1). Internal conflicts with intervention decrease the log hazard ratio (relative risk)
by 0.55 compared to conflicts without intervention. Episodes of conflict with intervention have 42%
lower hazard (risk of termination) compared to episodes of internal conflict without intervention. This
relationship between third party intervention and episode duration remains statistically significant after
adding controls (see columns 2 through 5). The model of column 5 controls for conflict intensity, the
size of the population, economic variables, geographic region of the conflict, and a time effect captured
by the year of conflict initiation. At the 95% level of statistical significance, I find that the duration of
conflict episodes is positively associated (i.e., that the hazard rate of episode termination is negatively
associated) with third party intervention, intensity of the conflict, the size of the population of the conflict
country, and conflicts in the Middle East (relative to the omitted region, Europe). The fully specified
model of column 5 indicates that episodes of conflict with intervention have 51% lower hazard (risk
of termination) compared to episodes of internal conflict without intervention. Interestingly, I find no
significant relationship between measures of economic performance of the conflict country and episode
duration.
English is 0.67. Afrikaans is one of the easier languages for a native English speaker to learn. The scaled score for linguistic
distance between Afrikaans and English is 0.33. If more than one country supports the intervention with military forces,
an unweighted average of the distance measure is used. There is not a significant difference in language distances across
outcome types.
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Table 8 reports Cox proportional hazard model estimates on a sub-sample of the data which only in-
cludes observations on episodes of internal conflict with third party interventions. The purpose of these
estimates is to explore whether interventions on behalf of the government side are positively associated
with conflict duration. Though the estimated coefficients for the explanatory variable "Intervention for
Government Side" are large in magnitude, they are not statistically significantly different than 0. I also do
not see evidence of a significant statistical relationship between duration and multilateral interventions,
interventions from African nations, or interventions from the U.S. or European nations. The full model
in column 4, which also controls for conflict intensity, population size, and year of conflict initiation, con-
firms the positive association between duration of conflict episodes (i.e., negative association between
hazard of episode termination) and conflict intensity as well as population size. Interestingly, column 4
indicates a statistically significant negative relationship between episode duration and interventions on
behalf of the rebel side. That is, among internationalized internal conflicts, interventions for the rebel
side increase the log hazard ratio (or relative risk of episode termination) by 1.34 compared to those
episodes without rebel interventions. Thus, interventions for the rebel side have over 280% higher hazard
(risk of episode termination) compared to episodes without intervention for the rebel side.
Table 9 reports estimates that test for evidence of correlation between third party intervention and the
probability of victory for the government side. The estimating framework is maximum likelihood using
the probit specification:
y7 = xi -0i (27)
where y* is the latent outcome of interest (probability of government victory) and xi is a vector containing
the explanatory variable of interest, an indicator for third party interventions, and several controls. We
observe yi which is an indicator for whether the government side was classified as the victor of a conflict
episode. The probit specification assumes the residual is distributed normally with mean 0 and variance
a2 . Though the estimated coefficients on the explanatory variable of interest "Intervention" are large and
positive across model specifications, it doesn't appear that there is a statistically significant relationship
between third party intervention and the probability of victory.
Column 5 of Table 9 contains results when including a full set of controls characterizing conflict duration
and intensity as well as population size, economic characteristics, region, and year of conflict initiation.
Of note, longer duration conflict episodes are associated with lower probability of government victory.
For each additional year that a conflict episode survives, the probability of government victory declines by
11 percentage points. Also, the larger the government spending share of GDP, the lower the probability
of government victory. An increase of government spending by one percentage point as a share of GDP
decreases the probability of government victory by about two percentage points.
The results reported in Table 9 may have interesting implications with regard to the analysis of the current
conflict in Afghanistan where the purpose of U.S. intervention is to help the government side achieve
victory. The estimates indicate there is not a significant relationship between third party intervention and
government victory. Further, there is a statistically significant negative correlation between probability of
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government victory and episode duration as well as between government victory and government spending
share. This suggests that the longer the conflict endures, the lower the chances of achieving government
victory. It also suggests that a key component of our strategy in Afghanistan, providing significant levels
of cash aid (much of which is channeled through the government of Afghanistan and recorded as its
government spending), might not be helpful in terms of helping the government side increase its chances
for victory.
Table 10 reports estimates of a sub-sample of the data which only includes observations on episodes
of internal conflict with third party interventions. Analysis of this sub-sample allows us to check for a
specific relationship between intervention on the government side and probability of government victory.
As the results in all four columns of Table 10 show, there is not a statistically significant relationship
between intervention on the government side and probability of government victory. Also, there is not a
significant relationship between probability of government victory and interventions on the rebel side.
The final set of estimates examines the relationship between probability of government victory and
differences between the interventionist and the supported country. Complete data was available for only
a very small set of conflict episodes so the estimates are rather imprecise. Consistent with the summary
statistics in Panel B of Table 6, there is a negative relationship between probability of government victory
and geographic as well as economic distance. An increase of one unit in the average log distance between
the supported and intervening countries decreases the probability of government victory by 17 percentage
points. To put these measures of distance in perspective, the average log distance between supported
and intervening countries in the data set is 7.73, which corresponds to a distance of 2,275 kilometers
(roughly the distance between Boston and Tulsa, Oklahoma). A one unit increase in the log distance
from 7.73 to 8.73 corresponds to an increase in distance from 2,275 kilometers to 6,185 kilometers
(roughly the distance between Boston and Switzerland). A one unit increase in the difference of per
capita GDP between supported and interventionist is associated with a 12 percentage point decline in
the probability of government victory. An unexpected result is the positive relationship between linguistic
distance and the probability of government victory: a roughly 10% increase in the degree of difficulty of
learning the official language of the conflict country for the interventionist country is associated with a
6.9 percentage point increase in the probability of government victory. Given the small sample size, there
is little reason to give these results much credence. However, the hypothesis that differences between the
interventionist country and supported country might be systematically associated with conflict outcomes
might be worth exploring in greater detail in future studies.
In summary, there is a strong positive correlation between third party intervention and conflict duration,
but there is not a statistically significant relationship between third party intervention on behalf of
the government and probability of government victory. Further, the evidence suggests that third party
financial aid to the government side doesn't improve the government's likelihood of victory. These
findings are consistent with those of Regan (2002). His analysis suggests that third-party interventions
do not shorten but rather extend conflict duration. He also concludes that third party military and
economic intervention doesn't appear to be an effective strategy for decreasing conflict duration.
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3.4 Explanations for Conflict Duration
This section reviews some of the available empirical and theoretical evidence from the literature on
civil war. Competing hypotheses for the motivation and duration of internal conflict can broadly be
characterized in three ways. Under the rebellion-as-investment hypothesis, all payoffs to rebellion, whether
political, financial, or military, are contingent upon victory. Thus, during conflict, rebels operate at a net
loss. The higher the payoff to victory and the more forward looking are the insurgents, the longer the
expected duration of civil war. Under the rebellion-as-business hypothesis, the rebellion pays-off through
income or satisfaction during the fighting. Thus, the rebels have a net gain during the fighting despite
the costs to society. Conflict duration is increasing in the net benefit of fighting in contemporaneous
periods. Under the rebellion-as-mistake hypothesis, each side over-estimates its military prospects for
decisive victory making it difficult for the antagonists to recognize peaceful outcomes in which they might
be better off. As such, peaceful settlements that could be mutually beneficial are deemed infeasible and
the conflict continues as each side pursues what is perceived to be eventual victory.
3.4.1 Micro-Foundations of Rebellion
An early model of rebellion comes from Grossman (1991). In the model, the ruler chooses policy to
maximize "rents" from production for the rulers' clientele. Rural peasant families allocate their time
between production, soldiering, and insurrection to maximize their expected income. The probability
of successful insurrection is increasing in the fraction of time that peasants devote to insurrection and
decreasing in the effectiveness of government soldiering. The ruler would like production and taxes to
be high, but he must be concerned about peasants substituting away from production when taxes are
too high. Further, he must be concerned about peasants substituting toward insurrection when the
insurrection technology favors higher probability of success. In equilibria with low political stability (i.e.,
"good" insurrection technology), the probability of successful rebellion is high and peasants dedicate more
time to insurrection and the total value of production falls. In equilibria with high political stability, higher
levels of production induce the ruler to set a higher tax rate; thus, peasants aren't necessarily better off.
Though the probability of successful insurrection is lower, the incentives for insurrection are relatively
high in the sense that there are high taxes to avoid by devoting time to insurrection. To decrease the
probability of successful rebellion, Grossman's analysis suggests that rulers could either decrease taxes
or make government soldiering more effective by paying higher wages to soldiers and by professionalizing
the military.
Extending Grossman's analysis to rebellions involving third party interventions, we can think of military
intervention on behalf of the government as a proxy for more effective soldiering which lowers the prob-
ability of successful insurrection and creates security space to enable higher levels of private production.
Further, cash aid provided by the interventionist enables the government to pay its soldiers relatively high
wages and to invest in the professionalization of the military. If it appears that the government's military
is developing sufficient professionalism to combat rebellion on its own, then the government's military can
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become an effective substitute for foreign interventionist forces when they depart thus deterring conflict
renewal. However, if it appears that the government's military is not developing its effectiveness as a
counter-insurrection force, then it will not be able to substitute for interventionist forces when they leave
thus encouraging conflict renewal. Further, the direct military intervention as well as cash aid enables
the government to set relatively high "tax" rates and garner rents for the government's clientele. Tax
is in quotes to highlight the possibility that such taxes might not be statutory but rather de facto as
a result of corruption among government officials. The existence of these tax rents provides incentive
for peasants to devote time to insurrection activities rather than production in order to avoid paying
the taxes. Thus, the model does not provide clear predictions for the effect of intervention on conflict
duration or outcome. The model does suggest that intervention on behalf of the government side should
focus on developing the government's military as well as reforming the government's clientelism.
3.4.2 Modeling Conflict Duration
Fearon (2004) developed a game-theoretic model to explain the duration of civil wars. In the model,
expected conflict duration is a function of the probability of stalemate, which is affected by the difference
between the minimum deals that each side is willing to accept in a negotiated settlement relative to the
equilibrium payoff in a state of persistent conflict. When the probability of decisive victory for either
side is low, the probability of stalemate is high. Also, the better the rebels perform in contemporaneous
periods, the more they expect in a negotiated settlement. However, the more the government gives up
in a settlement, the greater the incentive to renege once it has regained its strength. This makes it
very hard to find a credible negotiated settlement. Fearon argues that commitment problems prevent
negotiated settlements, and that such problems are more binding "when either [the] government or rebels
are able to earn some income during a conflict despite the costs of fighting."
Many theories typically presume a balance of relative capabilities predicts longer conflict duration. How-
ever, Fearon's analysis suggests another possibility. He states, "When the day-to-day benefits of fighting
are relatively good, more stalemate-prone technologies improve the rebel group's payoff for fighting...if the
rebels can arrogate enough tax and political authority in the region during a war that they do better than
they would as non-rebels without a war, then the Fight Equilibrium can be sustained even if they expect
zero chance of prevailing militarily." Fearon's analysis suggests the need to prevent positive shocks to
insurgent capabilities and to mitigate the contemporaneous payoffs to fighting. Thus, counter-insurgency
strategy should focus on cutting-off third party intervention aid provided to rebel groups, cutting-off the
rebel's access to contraband rents, and making it harder for rebels to extract tolls and taxes from the
local population. This last suggestion implies counter-insurgency operations should focus on protecting
the population rather than targeting insurgents with kinetic activity.
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3.4.3 Political and Economic Conditions
Walter (2004) argues that renewed conflict is likely driven by underlying political and economic conditions
that sustain incentives for individual citizens to join rebel groups. Rebel groups cannot wage civil wars
"unless individual farmers, shopkeepers, and potential workers choose to enlist in rebel armies." Enlistment
is attractive under two conditions: misery, as in severe dissatisfaction with one's current situation, and
lack of voice, as in lack of nonviolent means for change or lack of access to systems of redress. Rebel
enlistment propensity is also shaped by an individual's propensity to accept risk as well as an individual's
political preferences. Walter's empirical analysis of 58 civil wars ending between 1945 and 1996 suggest
that higher quality of life and greater access to political participation have a negative effect on conflict
duration.
Walter argues that third party intervention in the form of outside economic aid and security guarantees
can have a positive effect on political openness and democratization, which should lower the likelihood of
new onset or repeat civil wars. Further, policies that encourage positive economic growth and improved
individual welfare, and thus lower incentives to enlist in rebel armies, should help mitigate the risk of
renewed conflict. The former suggestion is subject to the criticism that one or more parties to the
conflict may have substantial ideological opposition to the presence of foreign peace-keepers. The latter
suggestion is problematic because there is little agreement about which policy alternatives are effective
in promoting economic growth. Also, economic aid itself can become a source of future conflict (Nunn
and Qian, 2011).
Another mild critique of Walter's analysis is that modern rebel organizations are not solely dependent on
local labor supply. The low cost of travel and information sharing in the era of globalization gives rebel
organizations greater access to mercenary labor pools. Rebel groups can make extensive use of global
networks of ideological fighters like Islamic jihadists as well as fighters who are solely interested in pecu-
niary rewards. Also, rebel organizations can compel enlistments through the use of force or intimidation
against local citizens. Of course, there are significant downsides to both labor force strategies. In the
former case, extensive use of foreign ideologues and mercenaries may threaten the rebel group's ability
to garner sanctuary among the local population. In the latter case, extensive use of forced conscription
opens the rebel group to the threat of widespread defection, particularly if threats or intimidations are
excessively harsh.
3.4.4 Information and Conflict Duration
Collier, Hoeffler, and S6derbom (2004) conducted an empirical analysis of the duration of 55 large-scale
civil conflicts during the 1960-2000 period. 46 Pre-conflict structural conditions including low per capita
income, high inequality, and a moderate degree of ethnic fractionalization are correlated with longer
conflicts. Circumstances during conflict such as a decline in the prices of the primary commodities
that the country exports or external military interventions on the side of the rebels are associated with
46 Collier et al use a strict definition for civil war requiring at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year.
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shorter-duration civil wars. They do not find strong empirical evidence in favor of religious or geographic
explanations. They suggest that the rise of global markets in contraband goods has made conflict
increasingly viable and easier to sustain.
The analysis of Collier et al suggests several possible policy prescriptions to include ex ante promotion
of equitable economic development and during-conflict introduction of policy interventions to decrease
conflict duration. As mentioned in the previous subsection, the first policy implication is problematic
from the standpoint that there is relatively little consensus on how to promote equitable economic
development.47 The second type of policy suggested by Collier et al is to introduce policy interventions
during conflict which are likely to decrease conflict duration. These could include interdicting the sources
of rebel finances or enabling better shared situational understanding of each side's capabilities so that
belligerents can make more realistic assessments of their military prospects for victory.
However, it's not just a matter of providing sufficient information about the contemporaneous balance
of relative capabilities but also enabling a sufficient forecast of how relative capabilities are likely to
evolve over time. Regan (2002) models conflict as a bargaining situation where information is gained
through repeated interactions. As the war proceeds, each side continually receives updated signals about
the strengths and weaknesses of the other side. Third party intervention affects the transmission of
information and its content. As long as the third party is a significant participant in kinetic engagements
and negotiations, the rebel side and the government side never get a pure signal of each other's true
capabilities or intentions. On one hand, this may reinforce the perception of state weakness, perhaps
causing the rebels to over-estimate their chances of victory and increasing the duration of the conflict.
On the other hand, it takes time and resources to build state capacity, and the interventionist's role
may be necessary to give the government time and space to improve its relative capabilities and help it
develop the upper hand for an eventual one-on-one confrontation with the rebellion.
3.4.5 Rebel Recruitment, Sanctuary, and Conflict Duration
Gates (2002) developed a principal-agent model of rebel organizations in which contract enforcement is
the pillar of rebel recruitment and allegiance. In his model, a rebel group's prospects for military success
depend on its ability to recruit and motivate its soldiers to fight. Rebel group principals hire agents who
are least likely to defect. The participation constraint is satisfied when the opportunity cost of rebel
service is low or when the rebel group can offer great rewards either in the form of pecuniary rents from
looting or in the form of intangible benefits like the satisfaction of fighting for an ideological cause.
Incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied through the threat of punishment for defection and the
offer of reward for furthering the rebel group's mission.
47 Even if policy makers had more certainty over which policy interventions are more successful at generating equitable
economic development, deciphering which low income, high inequality countries are most at risk for civil conflict and thus
most likely to benefit from such interventions is not easy. Further, if such interventions are disproportionately targeted to
regions where civil conflict seems imminent, then one might be concerned that such interventions could create incentives
for poor countries to use the threat of conflict to elicit attention from the aid community.
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Gates suggests that sanctuary, distant from the government center, helps a rebel movement develop
and grow. Even with a small resource base and low force strength the rebel group can sustain conflict
indefinitely if it can augment its forces with external volunteers like global jihadists or other mercenaries, or
if it can hide in difficult to navigate terrain such as jungles or mountains, operate across loosely controlled
international borders, or gain support from the local population in concealing its activities. Further,
ideologically based groups may have an advantage in recruiting rebel soldiers and convincing the local
population to provide it sanctuary, especially if a third party interventionist supporting the government is
economically, ethnically, or ideologically "distant" from the local population. Since geographic, ethnic, and
ideological distances between the government and the rebel groups affect the recruitment and cooperation
of agents, if a rebel organization is physically isolated from government centers of strength, it's easier for
a rebel organization to satisfy participation and incentive compatibility constraints and recruit a sufficient
number of agents as well as find sanctuary. The rebel organization can compensate for lack of resources
and shorter geographic distance from the government center by focusing on group homogeneity and
recruiting among ethnic groups which are not represented in politically powerful groups that control the
government center.
While Gates' analysis focuses on the contracting problem of rebel organizations, the state must also
earn the cooperation of the local population in civil conflict. The government must recruit soldiers for
its military, prevent rebels from gaining sanctuary among local population groups, and encourage local
populations to provide information about rebel activity. The contracting problem for the government
could be even more severe than that of rebel groups, particularly if it imposes self-restraint on the type of
punishment it is willing to impose for defection. Further, the state generally must recruit a much bigger
force than that of the rebel organization.
Thus, the success of both sides depends on recruitment and control of sanctuary. The probability of
decisive victory is largely a function of which side the local population chooses to support. As such, it
might be useful to think of the outcome of internal conflict as the result of an implicit election process. In
other words, the probability of success for each side is increasing in the number of "votes" it receives from
the population. To the extent that citizens abstain from "voting," neither side can accumulate enough
support to push for decisive victory. To the extent that support for both sides is split, then again neither
side can accumulate sufficient support to push for decisive victory. Conflict termination then depends on
one of two eventualities. Either one side gains a super-majority of "votes" thus substantially increasing
its probability of success relative to the other side and enabling it to push for decisive victory, or both
sides accumulate a sufficiently similar share of "votes" thus substantially increasing the probability of
continued conflict and eventually forcing both sides to the negotiating table.
3.4.6 Empirical Evidence
In general, empirical studies find some strong correlations but no reliable causal factors in explaining
conflict duration. Identification is hampered by the high degree of heterogeneity across civil wars, the curse
of dimensionality resulting from too many right hand side variables, and the lack of good instrumental
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variables. As a result, the literature does not draw many firm conclusions with regard to policy (Hegre,
2004). Nonetheless, the available empirical evidence suggests conflict duration is strongly positively
correlated with low state capacity, low opportunity cost of rebel service, access to contraband rents,
and intervention by third parties on behalf of the government side. Theoretical explanations predict
conflict duration increases when the government side can't make credible commitments to power-sharing
deals, when antagonists have misconceptions about their adversary's capabilities, when rebel groups have
access to geographic and ideological sanctuary, and when interventions disrupt the information revelation
process that would otherwise occur between antagonists in battle or at the negotiating table.
In the next section, I sketch an adaptation of a simple model that puts the local population at the center
of decision-making in civil conflict. The model examines how the choice of supporting one side or the
other, or of abstaining from making a choice, influences conflict duration. The model also examines how
third party intervention affects the likelihood that individual decision-makers will abstain from choosing
a side to support. The model is motivated by the suggestion of Regan (2002) and Collier et al (2004)
that third party intervention affects the information updating process. The model is also motivated by
the implication of Gates (2002) that conflict outcomes are influenced by the control of sanctuary and
whether local populations choose to provide it or deny it to rebel organizations.
3.5 A Simple Model of Choosing Sides
"We are scared of both sides," a village elder, Mutayeb Khan, told the soldiers, expressing
a litany of concerns shared by many villagers in remote parts of the country. [Villagers]
worry that NATO and Afghan forces will confuse them for insurgents while they're tending
their fields or collecting wood in the hills; that the Taliban will attack them if they help, or
even talk to coalition forces; that government forces will detain their young men, perhaps
for years. "We can't go to the Taliban and complain," Mr. Khan said. "We can't go to the
government because the Taliban will find out and call us spies and kill us."
- Ray Rivera, New York Times48
Why do third party interventions increase the expected duration of conflict? Third party intervention
doesn't appear to have an affect on conflict duration via the channels of changing the military balance
of capabilities, affecting the conflict intensity, or shifting the costs and benefits of conflict termination
in favor of one side or the other. Perhaps the channel is related to information. Repeated interaction
at the negotiating table or on the field of conflict improves the information that each side has about
the other's true capabilities. Over time, repeated one-on-one interaction should lead to information
convergence where each side gains a more complete understanding of the opponent's capabilities and
can make a more accurate assessment of the probability of victory. This allows each side to make
48See "In an Afghan Village, Living in Fear of Both Sides," by Ray Rivera, New York Times, April 23, 2011, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/.
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an informed cost-benefit judgment about the merits of continued conflict vice negotiation. However,
a third party intervention on behalf of the government might reduce the amount of direct interaction
that a rebel organization has with the government, limiting the ability of the rebel group to gain a
realistic picture of the government's true capabilities and interrupting the population's ability to form
expectations about which side is likely to win. Further, the intervention also might reduce the amount
of direct interaction between the government and the population, particularly if the interventionist takes
a leading role in kinetic engagements and delivering aid or development projects. This further limits the
ability of individuals to form accurate beliefs about the government's true capabilities. When individual
members of the population can't make informed estimates of the probabilities of success among the
antagonist parties, then they may be unwilling to make a commitment to one side or the other for fear
of retribution should they pick the "wrong" side.
I illustrate this situation by adapting the model of the "Swing Voter's Curse" (Feddersen and Pesendorfer,
1996). Individuals confront a choice: support the rebellion, support the government, or abstain from
supporting either side. I think of this choice as similar to that of the choices a voter confronts in an
election between two competing political candidates. Potential voters face two decisions at election time:
the choice of whether to vote, and conditional on choosing to vote, the choice of which candidate to
support. Some individuals don't know the state of nature, that is which candidate is likely to win, and
they may not be well informed about their own preferences, that is whether the candidate they support
is likely to be good for them or not. However, they do have a prior belief about which candidate is likely
to be better, and they also have an opportunity to' update their beliefs based on signals they receive
during the campaign. The essence of the "Swing Voter's Curse" is that other individuals might have
more information about which candidate will do better in office, and as such those with less, but still
relevant, information abstain from voting because they prefer to rely on the information that others have.
The environment is such that there are two states of nature, 0 {G,R}, where the state of nature
is the ultimate victor in the conflict. The government side is represented by G and the rebel side by
R. Individuals can make a choice between these two candidates, x = {G,R}. There are three types of
individuals in society denoted by T = {G,R,i}. The first two types of individuals are committed members
of the respective competing sides. A type T = G will always choose x = G if he votes and a type T = R
will always choose x = R if he votes. The committed individuals make these choices either because of
ideological reasons or because of the income distributional advantage to being a committed supporter of
the respective group. Type T = i individuals are independents in the sense that they are not ideologically
committed to either side and their utility is partially a function of whether their choice matches the state
of nature. Preferences of individuals i are given by:
Ui(x, 0) = uyo - I (x #9 ) (28)
where 1 (x J 0) is the indicator function for the choice of the individual not being equal to the ultimate
victor of the conflict, ye is an income parameter specific to the state of nature, and ), is a parameter
that accounts for a potential wartime premium. In the baseline model presented in this paper, I assume
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= 1 and that YG = 1 =YR so that the source of heterogeneity in utility across independents is based
on whether they choose to support the candidate that ultimately wins. 49 This captures the idea that
if an individual chooses to support the government during the conflict but the rebels ultimately win,
then the new regime excludes him and other sympathizers of the former government from significant
economic activity or penalizes him in some other way such as harassment or expropriation. Essentially,
if an independent votes for the losing candidate, he suffers a substantial negative shock to utility.
If each side receives the same number of votes, conflict stalemate persists. Decisive victory requires
one side to achieve a super-majority vote share designated as C where C> 0.5. Population shares are
given by ?G, )R, and Xi. I assume that the prior probability that the winner is G is given by a < 0.5 so
that the ex ante belief of independents is that the rebels are more likely to prevail. Independents have
uncertainty about the preferences of other voters. This uncertainty is characterized as a stochastic draw
of the number of people who actually vote. That is, there is a random draw of people who are actually
confronted with the decision to pick one side or the other. I think of this as an individual being confronted
by the choice to provide sanctuary to a rebel who has moved into his area or to provide information to the
government about the new rebel's presence. Thus, the total number of voters is determined by taking
N independent random draws from the population of size R. At each draw, an actual voter is selected
with probability (1 - p). Assume p > 0. As such, the number of voters is a stochastic variable with a
binomial distribution with parameters A, N, and (1 -p).
Conditional on being selected, Bayes' rule gives us that a selected voter is independent with probability
X;/(l -p), is committed to the government with probability XG/(1 -p), and is committed to the rebellion
with probability XR/(1 -p). The numbers of voters of each type also are stochastic variables with binomial
distributions. Each individual knows his type and also receives a signal s G- {G,R, 0} so that conditional
on receiving a signal an individual knows which side is going to prevail. A signal s = # means that
an individual receives no relevant information as part of the signal. The probability of receiving an
uninformative signal is q. Assume q> 0. Thus, some of those selected to vote are committed voters,
some are independents with full information, and some are uninformed independents. Individuals do not
know how many of each type have been selected to make a choice.
Define a pure strategy as a: T x s -4 [G,R, 0] where 0 refers to abstention. For committed individuals,
the optimal strategies a(T,s) are given by a(G,-) = G and a(R,.) = R. The proportion of individuals
selected to vote who are committed are Xg and 2j. For independents who are chosen to vote and who
receive informative signals, the optimal strategies are a(i,G) = G and a(i,R) = R. The proportion of
individuals selected to vote who are independents and who get informative signals are 2,f and Af. If
(g + V7) N> CAN or if (2j + Af) > CN then there is a decisive winner and the choices of the uninformed
independents who are selected to vote are not relevant. Otherwise, the relatively uninformed may play a
pivotal role in determining the election outcome.
491n future work, I hope to extend the model by considering the implications of having 2,, > 1, which allows for the
possibility that wartime premiums could provide incentive for individuals to prefer the state of conflict to a state of peace
if access to contraband rents, aid dollars, or artificially high salaries are possible. Also, I hope to extend the model by
considering the implications of having yg 54y, to allow for the possibility that one side may be better suited for creating a
governing environment that encourages economic growth.
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Define a vector T = (rG, zRjr0) as the probabilities that a relatively uninformed independent votes for
G or R, or chooses to abstain. Since an independent does not receive direct utility from his vote, he
should only care about his choice conditional on being pivotal. In order for an uninformed independent to
potentially be pivotal, a couple of conditions need to hold. First, a sufficient number of individuals from
the population must have been selected to vote (i.e., N > CR). Second, the number of voters who have
chosen to support one of the sides is within one of the super-majority criterion value (i.e., NETE{G,R,i} X E
{CRT± 1}). Define U(x, r) as the expected utility of an uninformed independent individual to choose
x = {G,R, 0} when all other independents are using symmetric mixed strategies given by r. If U(1,zr) =
U(O,zr) then uninformed independents abstain from making a choice. The intuition here is that at the
margin the uninformed individual thinks either G or R is just as good as the other and as a result he
doesn't want his prior belief to be the deciding factor. Conditional on being pivotal, he'd rather have the
outcome determined by informed individuals who have better information than he because if he makes a
choice and is wrong he'll suffer the consequences of retribution or exclusion in the next period.
Relating this model to the case of a civil conflict with third party intervention, we can think of the
interventionist as affecting two parameters in this model: the number of individuals randomly chosen to
vote, N, and the probability that an independent voter receives an uninformative signal, q. I conjecture
that the third party intervention decreases the value of N by restricting the number of direct encounters
between the population and either the government or rebel side, especially if the interventionist takes
a leading role in conducting security operations or distributing development aid. The likelihood that
either side could achieve decisive victory falls as N decreases because in order to achieve a critical level
of support for a super-majority decisive advantage as defined by C there needs to be a sufficient number
of individuals confronted with the choice of supporting one side or the other. I also conjecture that the
third party intervention increases the value of q by restricting the number of direct encounters between
the government and rebel sides thus slowing the rate at which agents learn about the relative capabilities
and intentions of the primary antagonists. The likelihood that either side could achieve decisive victory
is decreasing in q because the higher the value of q the more uninformed individuals abstain from making
a choice and the less likely that the critical level of support for decisive advantage will be achieved.
Considering the case of third party intervention on behalf of the government side, it's possible that
the interventionist could directly affect the number of committed voters by either convincing or paying
independents to join the government thus increasing XG or by killing rebels and thus decreasing XR.
However, absent significant shifts in the proportion of committed voters, the third party intervention on
behalf of the government side is likely to decrease N and the likelihood that a sufficient mass of individuals
are forced to make a choice, increase q and the likelihood that independents will be uninformed and thus
choose to abstain, and as a result increase conflict duration.
In summary, beliefs that shape the choice of which side to support are influenced by observed outcomes
which are in turn shaped by the choices of individuals. If a sufficiently large number of voters abstain
from voting, then the state of conflict becomes self-sustaining. Abstention generates stalemate and the
perception that neither antagonist has a decisive advantage. The observed stalemate rationally confirms
the beliefs of individuals that support the abstention decisions in the first place. As a result, third party
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intervention in a civil war might generate a dynamic learning failure by interrupting the direct interaction
that the actors (government, rebels, and population) have with each other thereby leaving a sufficiently
large number of people in society relatively uninformed about which side will ultimately be best for them.
As such, individuals defer making a choice about which side to support and neither side gains sufficient
capability to achieve a decisive advantage.
3.6 Implications for U.S. Policy in Afghanistan
The purpose of this section is to assess some of the policy implications from the previous sections as
they pertain to the U.S. and its role as primary interventionist in the current conflict in Afghanistan.
Policy prescriptions most frequently suggested or implied for potential interventionists on the government
side include promoting equitable development, interdicting rebel sources of finance, using third party
guarantors as part of settlement agreements to overcome commitment problems, shifting the military
balance of power, promoting faster information convergence, reforming the government, and protecting
the population. However, one of the main impediments to the success of third party interventions on
the government side is that such interventions actually interrupt the information convergence process
and send a signal to rebel groups and the population about the relative weakness of the government.
If the interventionist does not successfully signal long-term commitment or if the government doesn't
demonstrate improved capacity over time, then a substantial portion of the population abstains from
choosing to support one side or the other. Further, the rebel organization may choose to adopt low-level
insurgency tactics in the near term and defer one-on-one confrontation with the government until after
the interventionist departs.
3.6.1 Characteristics of the Conflict in Afghanistan
The conflict in Afghanistan has had several distinct episodes over the past 30 years. Beginning with a
Soviet-backed communist revolution in the late 1970s and most recently characterized by a multi-party
insurgency against the U.N.-backed government, the conflict has involved multiple violent transitions
of power among various tribal, ethnic, and ideological groups. Various third parties have intervened
in the conflict on behalf of both the rebel and the government sides. The geography of Afghanistan is
extremely mountainous and Afghanistan shares a porous, mountainous border with a relatively ungoverned
area of Pakistan, enabling insurgent forces many options for geographic sanctuary. Ethnic divisions are
substantial. The Pashtun-dominated Taliban finds a substantial degree of sanctuary among the local
populations, particularly in the south and east of the country. Additionally, tribal leaders have frequently
switched allegiances over the past 30 years based on the evolving relative strengths of the competing
power factions. As a police chief of Waygal district said recently, "If the government has control of
the district, people will support the government...[i]f the Taliban is in control, people will support the
Taliban." 50
50Quoted in "Taliban Seizes Afghan District in Rare Show of Force" by Ernesto Londono and Javed Hambard, Washington
Post, March 29, 2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/.
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Afghanistan is amongst the poorest countries in the world and lacks any substantial measure of natural
resources. Life expectancy, literacy, and access to basic health care is amongst the lowest in the world.
Government revenues would be practically non-existent if not for foreign aid and tariffs derived from
war-related logistics and support contracts. Contraband activities, including the poppy and opium trade,
likely generate revenues on the order of 30-50% of measured GDP. 51 The conflict in Afghanistan is quite
profitable for a substantial portion of the population. The salary of being a soldier on either side of the
conflict or of being a contractor serving international NGOs and foreign military forces far outweighs the
earnings of being a farmer or self-employed urban merchant. Also, the lack of security engenders a more
favorable environment for sustaining contraband activities. From a financial perspective, many Afghans
may be better off in the current state of conflict relative to a post-conflict state when it's likely that
third party interventionists and NGOs will scale back their cash aid.
Afghanistan's central government has traditionally been weak and relatively unable to exert its will outside
of Kabul. Further, there is widespread perception among the population of corruption throughout Afghan
society but especially among government officials.52 Finally, there is ideological tension between modern
urbanists who favor integration with the international community, a more substantial role for the central
government, and adoption of democratic based governance systems vice rural traditionalists who favor
isolation, decentralized governance, and a dominant role for religion and tribal leaders.
Each of these characteristics-low opportunity cost of rebellion, poor quality of life, lack of systems
of redress, geographic and ideological sanctuary, state weakness, third party interventions, contraband
revenue, questionable government legitimacy-are positively correlated with conflict onset and duration.
In addition, there is little evidence that the antagonists view the objective of the conflict to be divisible.
As such, there seems to be little scope for a negotiated settlement. As Fick and Nagl state in their 2009
Foreign Policy article, "While there has been a. religious component in many insurgencies, the extremist
nature of the particular enemy we face seems unprecedented in recent memory." On the government's
side, the U.S.-led international interventionists have similarly been unbending in their aim to establish a
government in Afghanistan that prevents the country from ever serving as safe haven for the training of
international terrorists.
There is substantial uncertainty as to the prospects of victory for either side. The continued presence of
third party interventionists prevents discovery of the true intentions and capabilities of the government.
As a result, most Afghans don't want to choose sides. They have to live with both in the short run,
and they don't know who they'll have to live with in the long run. As tribal elders in Ghazni province
recently said, they get "slapped on one cheek by the government, and on the other cheek by the Taliban"
(Fick and Nagl, 2009). For the current U.S. counterinsurgency strategy to work, the population needs
to believe that the government can win without third party support because they know that third party
interventions are not indefinite. Each successive period with third party intervention on behalf of the
51Estimates of the value of poppy and opium production in Afghanistan are based on various estimates publicized by the
U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime between 2007 and 2010.
s
2 For a summary of the latest scandal involving exceptionally corrupt and virtually unrestricted lending from Afghanistan's
central bank to Afghan (Kabul) power elites, see "Afghan Elite Borrowed Freely from Kabul Bank" by Alissa J. Rubin in
the New York Times, March 28, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/.
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government side but without decisive government victory gives a bad signal-the continued presence of
the interventionists means that the government is still too weak to stand on its own, and the insurgents
are sufficiently strong to sustain stalemate against the interventionists. In the meantime, Afghans are left
substantially in the dark with regard to understanding which side would be likely to win in the eventual
post-interventionist phase of the conflict.
3.6.2 Implement Counterinsurgency Tactics
The analysis of Fearon (2004) suggests that a focus on protecting the population rather than targeting
insurgents with kinetic activity may be productive in terms of interdicting the rebellion's ability to extract
resources from the local population, inhibiting the ability of rebels to find sanctuary amongst the popula-
tion, and decreasing conflict duration. Contemporaneously, the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan
have engendered an evolution of military intervention strategies emphasizing Counterinsurgency (COIN)
doctrine. The general consensus among pundits is that the U.S. strategy of targeting insurgents largely
failed in the early stages of their interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan (Berman et al, 2010). On the
conflict in Afghanistan, Fick and Nagl (2009) assert, "It will not be the death or capture of every last
enemy fighter that wins this war, but creating a position of strength from which to negotiate a lasting
political solution to a cycle of conflict with no other end in sight."
According to the COIN doctrine, internal conflict between the government side and the rebel side is akin
to a competition between parties vying for the support of the population. As a result, the new focus of
U.S. efforts in Afghanistan is to protect the population with a parallel emphasis on promoting political
and economic development. The essence of a successful COIN strategy is to provide the population with
better security, protection, and services than the competing rebel side. The COIN strategy for defeating a
rebellion relies on "voters" choosing the government over the insurgents. The government/interventionist
coalition needs the people to "vote" for the government by choosing not to provide sanctuary to rebels,
by choosing to provide information about rebel activity to the government's coalition, and by choosing to
invest in activities that further the nation's long-term development of productive, non-violent economic
opportunities and political systems whereby power transitions can take place through peaceful processes.
The logic of the strategy is that the more effective the government is at providing services, the more likely
it is that the people will prefer the government to the insurgents. As a result, the people "vote" for the
government by providing tips about the location, supply stores, and activities of insurgents. Berman and
Laitin (2008) show that, among terrorist organizations active in Israel, the ability of terrorist organizations
to provide social services to their constituencies is positively correlated with the organizations' lethality.
This suggests that there is scope for the government to undermine terrorist and insurgent capabilities by
providing the same (or better) services as the insurgent or terrorist group. Berman et al (2009) conducted
an empirical test of the COIN strategy in Iraq by analyzing the relationship between reconstruction
spending and violence. Naive correlations revealed a positive correlation between violence and spending,
but largely because reconstruction spending is strategically spent in more volatile areas. After controlling
for a region's proclivity for violence, spending appears to reduce violence. However, the authors suggest
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spending works best when the projects are small and include the local population in all aspects of planning
and execution. Violence-reducing effects of spending were not observed for "large projects and programs
carried out primarily by foreign contractors."
In a separate study, Berman et al (2010) found a weakly positive correlation between violence and
employment rates. Short term job creation doesn't necessarily reduce insurgent recruiting or activity,
but rather counterinsurgency activities might inadvertently hinder longer-term trading relationships thus
destroying persistent employment possibilities for the local population. Further, if the rebellion-as-
business motive is in operation (Collier et al, 2004), then certain aspects of the COIN strategy, particularly
the concept of "money as a weapon system," might be counter-productive if local populations believe
that their best prospects for economic growth occur when aid money flows, and if they believe that aid
money flows most freely when conflict is relatively high but disappears when conflict is absent. As such,
when the COIN strategy involves the simultaneous application of security and development policy, it may
be hard for people to disentangle potential causal explanations for contemporaneous economic gains. As
such, a substantial portion of society might have higher net welfare in a state of conflict as compared to
the condition without war, which provides little incentive for people to choose sides or take action that
could accelerate conflict termination.
3.6.3 Promote Economic Development
The literature on internal conflicts frequently points to the notion that economic development can play
a key role in preventing or abating conflict. However, lack of economic growth does not seem to be
the problem in Afghanistan. Rather, on-going conflict seems to be the key driver of welfare-enhancing
economic opportunities in Afghanistan. Measured GDP is largely composed of western-subsidized gov-
ernment spending and private contracts executed with funding provided by aid organizations. Further,
substantial sources of income are generated via rebel labor markets and contraband narcotic markets,
both of which thrive in a state of conflict relative to a state of peace. Potential alternative engines of
economic growth appear to be relatively non-existent. Rural agriculture of legal crops is limited by trade
barriers as well as limited access to viable storage and transportation systems. Human capital potential
is limited by low life expectancy, poor health conditions, high levels of illiteracy, and weak education
systems. Natural resources are relatively non-existent.
Though Afghanistan has experienced relatively high sustained growth of real GDP since the fall of the
Taliban (an average of 7% per year between 2003 and 2008), the starting base was exceptionally low
and the benefits of growth have been distributed unevenly and disproportionately in favor of the Afghan
political elites. Public opinion surveys in Afghanistan consistently indicate that life is hard for the typical
Afghan, the quality of life has not improved substantially since the fall of the Taliban, and the Afghan
people continue to be dissatisfied by the poor performance of the Afghan government. The lack of
an effective government-sanctioned system of justice means that local populations, particularly in rural
areas, look to alternative service providers. In many areas, justice and social services are provided by
Taliban shadow governments. According to Walter's criteria for the attractiveness of enlistment in
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rebel organizations, both poor quality of life and lack of voice in Afghanistan, despite relatively fast
economic growth, makes it quite attractive for a significant portion of Afghan society to consider joining
or supporting the insurgency (or at least not support the government side).
3.6.4 Interdict Rebel Sanctuaries
Rebel groups in Afghanistan have the advantage of ethnic distance as the groups are primarily com-
posed of ethnic Pashtuns and foreign jihadist volunteers (motivated by ideological interests), while the
government is disproportionately represented by Tajiks, Uzbeks, and ex-patriot Pashtuns. Rebel groups
in Afghanistan also have the advantage of geographic distance as provided by sanctuary among local
populations in the Helmand River valley, the eastern mountain regions, and across the border in the
loosely governed areas of Pakistan. Additionally, many of the insurgent groups in Afghanistan have
the advantage of ideological distance with regard to their objectives of re-establishing a conservative,
decentralized theocratic government, consistent with the preferences of traditional rural and tribal power
brokers. Given the advantages that such distances provide rebel groups in terms of their recruitment
activities and ability to operate from sanctuary, the government and its third party interventionist sup-
porters must find a way to counter these advantages or diminish the distances between the government
center and the rebel group center. The analysis of Gates (2002) suggests several possible courses of
action to include depriving the insurgents of sanctuary, increasing the cost of rebel recruitment, depriving
the insurgents of financial resources, giving Pashtuns greater representation within the current govern-
ment, or negotiating a settlement that involves a more conservative, theocratic government in-line with
Taliban preferences.
Depriving the insurgents of sanctuary could be accomplished through the use of drone attacks on insur-
gent leaders in their sanctuary areas, and by providing military aid aimed at improving the Pakistan's
military to conduct counter-insurgent and counter-terrorist activities inside its border. This could also
be accomplished by the government offering greater rewards to local populations to elicit their support
and cooperation. Such rewards could take the form of economic and political development as well as
improved security and service delivery. The former suggestion is fraught with diplomatic concerns. The
latter suggestion is complicated by the reality that we haven't had much success with our cash aid and
development programs to date.
Increasing the cost of rebel recruitment could be accomplished through increasing the opportunity cost of
rebel service by encouraging economic growth or by offering higher pay to government soldiers. However,
rebel groups may have an inherent advantage in satisfying participation and incentive compatibility
constraints if they are willing to dole out harsher punishments for defection. Also, there are no clear
policy prescriptions for how to generate economic growth.
Depriving the insurgents of pecuniary resources could be accomplished through counter-contraband ac-
tivities like interdiction of the drug trade, development of alternatives to growing poppies, or securing
the highways and depriving insurgents of the opportunity to collect illegal tolls along rural highways.
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However, interdicting such activities has proven to be quite a challenge given the global demand for
heroin, the highly stable and lucrative nature of poppy production, and the difficulty in preventing cor-
rupt government security forces from collecting illegal tolls (let alone preventing insurgents from doing
so). Further, many Afghan insurgent groups garner a substantial amount of resources from global Islamic
charities as well as covert funding from external agents like Pakistan's intelligence services (ISI).
Currently, the Afghan National Security Forces are disproportionately represented by ethnic Tajiks and
Uzbeks, while the insurgent groups are primarily composed of Pashtuns. Giving Pashtuns greater rep-
resentation within the current government system might decrease the ethnic "distance" between the
insurgency and the government. However, re-balancing the ethnic composition of the security forces
might be perceived as unjust or unfair to the Northern Alliance "victors" who feel that they've earned
the right to have disproportionate representation in the government and in the security forces as a result
of their efforts to expel the Soviets in the 1980s and to defeat the Taliban in 2001. If the balance is
shifted too far in favor of Pashtuns, the Uzbeks and Tajiks could defect from the government and create
a separate insurgent movement.
Decreasing the ideological distance between the insurgents and the government could be accomplished
by negotiating a power-sharing arrangement or peace settlement such that the government becomes less
democratic and more fundamentally Islamic. However, such compromises may be antithetical to the
overarching goals of the U.S. intervention on behalf of the government. Also, the analyses of Fearon and
Walter suggest the credible commitment problems are too significant. The government would like to
commit to power sharing, but regional power elites anticipate that once the government regains strength
it would renege. Also, if the Taliban becomes part of the ruling coalition, it can't commit to not changing
the composition of the coalition in the future. As a member of the ruling coalition, the Taliban could
regain sufficient power to exclude the Northern Alliance warlords in future evolutions of the governing
coalition, and then re-implement their conservative brand of isolationist theocracy.
3.6.5 Push for a Negotiated Settlement
There is substantial risk of the Taliban being a spoiler with regard to the peacemaking process in
Afghanistan. If the Taliban has indivisible objectives in pursuit of an all-or-nothing distribution of total
power, then it would be irrational to believe that the Taliban could credibly commit to a negotiated
peace settlement. If defeated militarily in the current conflict, it seems highly likely that the Taliban
could regroup in its mountain sanctuaries in eastern Afghanistan or across the border in the relatively
ungoverned areas of western Pakistan and prepare to initiate future attacks at the next sign of government
weakness. Stedman (1997) suggests the best type of policy response for such a situation is coercion.
Further, given the Taliban's inelastic responses to diplomatic and economic pressures over the past 15
years, it seems the only hope for influence is the continued use of force. But, the use of force to defeat
the Taliban has so far been unsuccessful. Though the technology of insurgency doesn't give the Taliban
a decisive advantage, it does give them the ability to sustain de facto power in many areas of the country
as well as prevent government victory.
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An alternative to the continued use of force is the departing train strategy whereby the international
community legitimizes the parties of peace and de-legitimizes the spoiler by depriving it of resources and
by redeploying peacekeepers to protect the parties of peace. However, the departing train strategy has
essentially been in place for well over a decade now wherein the international community has legitimized
the government of Afghanistan, de-legitimized the Taliban, and proceeded apace at implementing a
constitutional process for the allocation and distribution of power in Afghanistan. The Taliban has been
excluded from the process as well as been legally banned from receiving financial or military support.
Nonetheless, the Taliban has seemingly regained its strength in the last four years and continued to
sustain its presence as a legitimate antagonist in the current conflict and as a potential spoiler in any
future negotiated settlement or post-conflict peace. The Taliban has demonstrated that it doesn't care
that the train has left the station and that, given its geographic sanctuaries across the border and
access to contraband and other illegal financial support, it can survive despite formal, legal deprivation
of resources.
Is continuation of coercive policy counterproductive in this case? The government of Afghanistan does
not have the capacity (or will) to achieve a decisive military victory against the Taliban in the near
term. Even the government's third party interventionists led by the U.S. seem unable to deal the Taliban
a decisive military defeat. Despite substantial imbalance between the military capabilities of the U.S.
and those of the Taliban, the conflict is a virtual stalemate. As time goes on and domestic political
pressures mount for the U.S. to refocus on other priorities, the credibility of the U.S.'s commitment to
seeing through a decisive and coercive outcome via Taliban defeat is increasingly in question. Perhaps
without U.S. intervention, the Taliban might be more willing to engage in one-on-one negotiations
with the government. It's possible that the continued presence of U.S. and other foreign troops in
Afghanistan imposes ideological constraints on the range of potential actions that Taliban leaders can
consider. Perhaps Taliban leaders confront significant internal threats to their standing if they consider
any course of action other than the pursuit of total power so long as the government relies on third party
foreign interventionists for its legitimacy. Granted, even if the military interventionists were to depart,
the sincerity of the Taliban in suing for a negotiated peace settlement that involves power sharing with
the current government would be highly questionable. The current government would have good reason
to fear lack of commitment by the Taliban to the terms of such a settlement.
Perhaps continued third party intervention, without long term commitment, only delays the inevitable
head-to-head showdown between the Taliban and the government of Afghanistan. Interventionists may
believe that decisive victory against the Taliban is impossible unless achieved by the government of
Afghanistan. As such, the goal of continued intervention is the creation of time and space for the
government of Afghanistan to build its capabilities for an eventual one-on-one confrontation with the
Taliban, whether it occurs after third party interventionists leave or after a peace settlement. Thus, the
question for the U.S. is how to find the proper balance between sustaining credible commitment to a
coercive policy while simultaneously setting the conditions for the government to have a reasonably high
likelihood of success in an eventual one-on-one confrontation with the Taliban.
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3.6.6 Pull Out of Afghanistan Unilaterally
If we believe the analysis of Regan (2002) and the possibility that there is some causal link in the empirical
data revealing a positive effect of intervention on conflict duration, then pulling out of Afghanistan is
likely to shorten the duration of the conflict. However, U.S. interventionist policy isn't necessarily focused
on conflict management, but rather seeks to achieve an end favorable to U.S. national security interests.
Further, a unilateral move by the U.S. to disengage from Afghanistan or to press for a negotiated
settlement with the Taliban potentially provides a substantial negative impact on U.S. reputation and
ability to make credible commitments in the future. Yet, given increasing political pressure to focus on
domestic issues, it is unlikely that the U.S. can make a long-term, open-ended commitment to intervention
on behalf of the government. The insurgents believe the U.S. will eventually leave, which makes the
rebels unwilling to negotiate in the present circumstances. Thus, the U.S. can't get the rebels to come
to the negotiating table in the near term if it stays, and a unilateral decision to end intervention means
sacrificing its purported national security objectives and possibly its reputation. Also, the longer the U.S.
continues its intervention, the greater the perception among the rebels (and perhaps the population)
that the government of Afghanistan is weak, further increasing the rebels' estimates of the likelihood
of long-term success and emboldening them to sustain their insurgency strategy while waiting for the
eventual departure of the interventionists.
During the height of the insurgency in Iraq in 2006-2007, Congress threatened to cut funding for U.S.
military operations in Iraq. The immediacy of the threat of a potential pullout of the U.S. military likely
served as a proximate cause for at least one set of constituents (the Sunni minority) to realize that it
was time for them to choose sides. Given the prospects of a potential genocide at the hands of the
Shia majority in the absence of U.S. troops or a post-conflict society dominated by an ultra-religious,
Al-Qaeda inspired militant Islamic government, the credible threat of U.S. departure provided impetus
for the Sunni minority to choose to seek a negotiated settlement with the Government of Iraq and the
American interventionists.
What would happen with an immediate pull-out of American troops from Afghanistan? Many believe the
government is not capable of standing on its own and would likely be defeated by the Taliban, who would
restore its late-1990s style theocracy. However, the departure of U.S. forces would force the population
to make a choice: support the government or support the Taliban. The question is, if the people support
the government, would that be enough to help the government increase its probability of victory. As
long as the third party interventionists are in place, the people can defer their decision and the conflict is
likely to persist for several more years, perhaps with declining prospects of eventual decisive government
victory. If the U.S. leaves, then the Afghan people will have to "vote." If the Afghan people choose to
support the government, then the government may gain sufficient capacity to either win decisively or
take a dominant position to the negotiating table. In either case, U.S. policy makers should re-evaluate
the costs and benefits of continued intervention. It is not clear that continued intervention is either likely
to shorten the duration of the conflict or engender the conditions for eventual government victory.
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Heterogeneity across civil wars is the norm. There are no policy panaceas. However, the positive corre-
lation between civil war duration and military intervention on the side of the government combined with
the lack of correlation between third party intervention and government victory is particularly troubling
for American policy in Afghanistan. A brief review of the history of conflict in Afghanistan and various
theoretical perspectives as described in the conflict literature suggest that those intervening on the side
of the government should be cautious in their expectations of success. The continued presence of the
U.S. and its coalition of interventionist partners prevents the government and rebel sides from learning
each other's true capabilities and intentions. Further, the continued intervention enables the popula-
tion to abstain from "voting" to support one side or the other. As such, neither the government, the
rebels, nor the population understand the true balance of capabilities nor are they able to form reason-
able expectations about the probability of government or rebel victory. As a result, the conflict state is
endogenously sustained as the rebels believe they will be victorious after the interventionists eventually
leave and as the people fail to commit to the government side because they are uncertain about who
will ultimately prevail. In the meantime, only the interests of those who profit from the state of conflict
are served. The substantial expenditure of human and financial resources by the U.S. may be for naught
if the continued intervention simply delays the inevitable-one-on-one conflict between the government
and the insurgents.
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3.8 Figures and Tables
Figure 1. Survivor Function Estimates of the Duration of Internal Armed Conflicts (1946-2009).
Kaplan-Meier survival estimates
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This figure plots the estimated probability of conflict continuation by duration. Source of data is the Armed
Conflict Dataset, Version 4-2010 from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) / International Peace Research
Institute, Oslo (PRIO). UCDP defines conflict as: "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state,
results in at least 25 battle-related deaths" per year among the two conflicting primary parties. "Internal" armed
conflict occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition groups without intervention
from other states. "Internationalized Internal" armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and one
or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides.
An episode is defined as continuous conflict activity. A new episode is coded whenever a conflict restarts after
one or more years of inactivity.
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Figure 2. Hazard Function Estimates of the Probability of Termination of Internal Armed Conflicts
(1946-2009).
Smoothed Hazard Estimates (with 95% CI)
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This figure plots the estimated probability of conflict termination by duration with 95% confidence intervals.
Source of data is the Armed Conflict Dataset, Version 4-2010 from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) /
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). UCDP defines conflict as: "a contested incompatibility that
concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one
is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths" per year among the two conflicting
primary parties. "Internal" armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal
opposition groups without intervention from other states. "Internationalized Internal" armed conflict occurs
between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other
states (secondary parties) on one or both sides. An episode is defined as continuous conflict activity. A new
episode is coded whenever a conflict restarts after one or more years of inactivity.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics by Conflict (1946-2009).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Internationalized
Type of Conflict Colonial State on State Internal Internal
Panel A. Overall
Average Duration (years) 5.11 4.13 15.16 20.94
(3.89) (9.09) (16.91) (18.52)
Years, >25 Battle Deaths 4.77 1.81 7.87 11.38
(3.94) (3.33) (11.50) (12.00)
Episodes per Conflict 1.00 1.40 1.91 2.50
(1.05) (1.31) (1.55)
N 21 45 133 44
Panel B: Count of 1st Episode Starts by Decade
1940s 7 7 19 4
1950s 9 5 7 8
1960s 5 12 23 8
1970s 0 8 25 6
1980s 0 7 22 2
1990s 0 4 28 14
2000s 0 2 9 2
Panel C. Proportion of Outcomes of Most Recent Episode
Cease Fire or Peace Agreement 0.48 0.51 0.23 0.25
Victory (1-sided) 0.29 0.29
Government Victory . 0.23 0.27
Rebel Victory . 0.08 0.02
Low Activity 0.00 0.20 0.26 0.18
Other 0.24 0.00 0.21 0.27
Source: Armed Conflict Dataset, Version 4-2010 from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) / International Peace Research
Institute, Oslo (PRIO). UCDP defines conflict as: "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory
where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25
battle-related deaths" per year among the two conflicting primary parties. "Colonial" is a broad term for extrasystemic
armed conflict between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory. "State-on-State" conflict is that which is
between two or more states. "Internal" armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal
opposition groups without intervention from other states. "Internationalized internal" armed conflict occurs between the
government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties)
on one or both sides. An episode is defined as continuous conflict activity. A new episode is coded whenever a conflict
restarts after one or more year(s) of inactivity. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics by Conflict and Region (1946-2009).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Internationalized
Type of Conflict Colonial State on State Internal Internal
Average Duration (years)
Years, >25 Battle Deaths
N
Average Duration (years)
Years, >25 Battle Deaths
N
Average Duration (years)
Years, >25 Battle Deaths
Panel A. Region: Europe
3.72 0.15
(0.08)
3.72
1
0.13
(0.07)
3
Panel B. Region: Middle East
5.43 3.89
(3.42)
2.01
(1.42)
2
5.99
(3.41
5.95
(3.43
6N
Average Duration (years)
Years, >25 Battle Deaths
N
Average Duration (years)
Years, >25 Battle Deaths
(5.28)
1.38
(2.66)
10
Panel C. Region: Asia
7.14
(13.31)
3.48
(4.56)
17
Panel D. Region: Africa
5.16 2.51
(4.48) (5.17)
5.15 0.82
(4.47) (0.95)
11 10
Panel E. Region: Americas
0.01 0.04
(0.02)
0.01 0.03
(0.02)
N 1 5 18 2
Source: Armed Conflict Dataset, Version 4-2010 from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) / International Peace
Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). UCDP defines conflict as: "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in
at least 25 battle-related deaths" per year among the two conflicting primary parties. "Colonial" is a broad term for
extrasystemic armed conflict between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory. "State-on-State" conflict is
that which is between two or more states. "Internal" armed conflict occurs between the govemment of a state and one
or more internal opposition groups without intervention from other states. "Internationalized internal" armed conflict
occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other
states (secondary parties) on one or both sides. An episode is defined as continuous conflict activity. A new episode is
coded whenever a conflict restarts after one or more year(s) of inactivity. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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4.04
(7.37)
2.44
(4.34)
23
15.75
(13.87)
8.65
(10.85)
11
23.84
(19.72)
13.71
(14.33)
43
10.85
(12.73)
4.62
(7.02)
38
17.34
(17.85)
7.21
(12.94)
7.03
(6.51)
1.79
(1.21)
6
33.33
(26.93)
14.59
(18.32)
8
24.50
(16.67)
14.45
(10.85)
8
20.02
(15.69)
12.42
(10.70)
20
8.03
(0.40)
4.70
(3.69)
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Table 3. Summary Statistics by Episode (1946-2009).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Internationalized
Type of Conflict Colonial State on State internal Internal
Panel A: Duration and Intensity (Proportion of Years with >1,000 Battle Deaths)
Average Duration (years) 4.77 1.30 3.82 6.51
(3.94) (2.01) (6.71) (8.50)
Intensity 0.234 0.408 0.152 0.383
(0.397) (0.475) (0.313) (0.385)
N 21 63 306 58
Panel B: Count of Episode Starts by Decade
1940s 7 15 53 4
1950s 9 6 37 10
1960s 5 17 55 12
1970s 0 12 57 9
1980s 0 7 40 2
1990s 0 4 54 17
2000s 0 2 10 4
Panel C. Proportion of Outcomes
Cease Fire or Peace Agreement 0.48 0.48 0.20 0.31
Victory (1-sided) 0.29 0.29
Government Victory 
. 0.19 0.24
Rebel Victory 0.08 0.09
Low Activity 0.00 0.24 0.42 0.22
Other 0.24 0.00 0.11 0.14
Source: Armed Conflict Dataset, Version 4-2010 from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Ilnternational Peace Research
Institute, Oslo (PRIO). UCDP defines conflict as: "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the
use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related
deaths" per year among the two conflicting primary parties. "Colonial" is a broad term for extrasystemic armed conflict between
a state and a non-state group outside its own territory. "State-on-State" conflict is that which is between two or more states.
"Internal" armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition groups without
intervention from other states. "Internationalized internal" armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and one or
more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides. An episode is
defined as continuous conflict activity. A new episode is coded whenever a conflict restarts after one or more year(s) of inactivity.
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 4. Summary Statistics by Episode and Region (1946-2009).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Internationalized
Type of Conflict Colonial State on State Internal Internal
Panel A. Region: Europe
Average Duration (years) 3.72 0.13 1.89 1.44
(0.07) (3.75) (1.24)
Intensity 0.00 0.33 0.17 0.46
(0.58) (0.34) (0.47)
N 1 3 30 7
Panel B. Region: Middle East
Average Duration (years) 2.01 0.92 3.68 8.40
(1.42) (1.99) (5.40) (15.12)
Intensity 0.00 0.20 0.21 0.20
. (0.35) (0.36) (0.35)
N 2 15 37 9
Panel C. Rezion: Asia
Average Duration (years) 5.95 2.12 5.77 8.50
(3.43) (2.37) (7.96) (7.26)
Intensity 0.33 0.36 0.19 0.54
(0.52) (0.45) (0.35) (0.45)
N 6 28 106 11
Panel D. Region: Africa
Average Duration (years) 5.15 0.68 2.46 6.83
(4.47) (0.73) (4.33) (7.27)
Intensity 0.26 0.33 0.08 0.38
(0.39) (0.49) (0.22) (0.34)
N 11 12 95 28
Panel E, Region: Americas
Average Duration (years) 0.01 0.03 3.47 2.44
(0.02) (9.25) (3.15)
Intensity 0.00 0.20 0.15 0.17
(0.45) (0.32) (0.29)
N 1 5 38 3
Source: A rmed Conflict Dataset, Version 4-2010 from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) /International Peace
Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). UCDP defines conflict as: "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in
at least 25 battle-related deaths" per year among the two conflicting primary parties. "Colonial" is a broad term for
extrasystemic armed conflict between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory. "State-on-State" conflict is
that which is between two or more states. "Internal" armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and one
or more intemal opposition groups without intervention from other states. "Internationalized internal" armed conflict
occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other
states (secondary parties) on one or both sides. An episode is defined as continuous conflict activity. A new episode is
coded whenever a conflict restarts after one or more year(s) of inactivity. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 5. Economic Characteristics
Log Population
of States with
(3)
Internal
10.180
(1.766)
Internal Conflicts.
(4)
Internationalized
Internal
9.056
(1.453)
Investment Share of GDP 0.202 0.181
(0.087) (0.091)
Government Spending Share 0.122 0.154
(0.088) (0.131)
C+I+G Share of GDP 1.035 1.075
(0.164) (0.253)
Log Per Capita GDP 7.553 7.390
(1.053) (1.133)
GDP Growth Rate 3.288 1.099
(6.554) (9.090)
Per Capita GDP Growth Rate 1.256 (0.300)
(7.866) (9.050)
N 241 50
Source: Penn World Table Version 7.0. Data not available for 65 episodes of
internal conflicts and 8 episodes of internationalized internal conflicts (mostly
pre-1960 episodes). GDP values reflect purchasing power parity, inflation,
and exchange rate adjustments to be comparable across countries and time
periods. Reported values are mean values over the length of episode except
for log per capita GDP which isfor thefirst year of an episode. Standard
deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 6. Interventions in Episodes of Internationalized Internal Conflicts.
(1) (2) (3)
Other than
All Outcomes Govt Victory Govt Victory
Panel A: Proportion of Episodes with Interventions
Intervention Supporting Government Side 0.78 0.80 0.71
(0.42) (0.41) (0.47)
Multilateral Intervention for Govt Side 0.35 0.34 0.36
(0.48) (0.48) (0.50)
Primary Interventionist from Africa 0.38 0.41 0.29
(0.49) (0.50) (0.47)
Primary Interventionist from USA or Europe 0.29 0.27 0.36
(0.46) (0.45) (0.50)
Intervention Supporting Rebel Side 0.45 0.43 0.50
(0.50) (0.50) (0.52)
Multilateral Intervention for Rebel Side 0.07 0.09 0.00
(0.26) (0.29)
Observations 58 44 14
Panel B: "Distance" Between Supported Government and Interventionist
Log Geographic Distance 7.73 7.86 7.32
(1.17) (0.98) (1.67)
Log Economic Distance 1.33 1.35 1.24
(1.65) (1.72) (1.49)
Language Distance 0.24 0.24 0.27
(0.24) (0.23) (0.27)
Observations 39 30 9
Source of data for Panel A: Armed Conflict Dataset, Version 4-2010 from Uppsala Conflict Data Program
(UCDP) / International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) for "Internationalized internal" armed conflict
(between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition groups with intervention from
other states on one or both sides. An episode is defined as continuous conflict activity. A new episode is
coded whenever a conflict restarts after one or more year(s) of inactivity. Panel B data is for interventions
on behalf of the government side only. Source of data for Panel B: Penn World Table version 7.0 for log
economic distance (which is calculated as real, PPP-adjusted log per capita GDP of the interventionist
minus the real, PPP-adjusted log per capita GDP of the supported government's country in the first year of
the conflict episode in which the intervention took place); log geographic distance is calculated as the log
of the geodesic distance (in kilometers using the great circle formula) between the third party
interventionist and the supported government's country (see Mayer and Zignago); and linguistic distances
are based on the relative degree of difficulty (relative to English) for the interventionist to learn the official
language of the supported government's country (see Chiswick and Miller). Linguistic distances are scaled
from 0 to 1 with a score of 0 indicating the supported and supporter speak the same language and a score
of 1 indicating highest degree of learning difficulty. If more than one country supports the intervention on
behalf of the government side with military forces, unweighted average geographic economic, and
language distances are used. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 7. Cox Proportional Hazard Estimates, Outcome: Time (Years) to Termination of Conflict
Episode (Internal Conflicts)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intervention (For Govt or Rebel Side) -0.545** -0.314 -0.659** -0.690** -0.710**
(0.175) (0.184) (0.190) (0.190) (0.196)
Intensity 
-0.009** -0.010** -0.012** -0.011**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log Population 
-0.262** -0.261** -0.259**
(0.042) (0.046) (0.050)
Log Per Capita GDP (PPP) 
-0.028 -0.093
(0.070) (0.114)
GDP Growth Rate 
-0.024* -0.020
(0.010) (0.011)
Investment Share 
-0.009 -0.002
(0.009) (0.010)
Government Spending Share 
-0.008 -0.008
(0.007) (0.007)
C+I+G Share 0.003 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005)
Region: Middle East 
-0.650*
(0.319)
Region: Asia 
-0.534
(0.338)
Region: Africa 
-0.524
(0.352)
Region: Americas 
-0.279
(0.315)
Year of Conflict Initiation 0.016**
(0.005)
Observations 290 290 290 290 290
Failures (Episode Terminations) 248 248 248 248 248
Log-Likelihood -1179 -1172 -1151 -1146 -1137
Time at Risk 1249 1249 1249 1249 1249
Chi-squared 10.87 25.20 67.09 75.52 93.58
Estimates are for distinct episodes of internal conflicts for which population and economic data are available from
the Penn World Table Version 7.0. Intensity measures the proportion of years in the episodefor which battle deaths
exceeded 1,000. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 8. Cox Proportional Hazard Estimates, Outcome: Time
Episode (Internationalized Internal Conflicts)
(Years) to Termination of Conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intervention for Government Side 0.663 0.583 0.615 1.006
(0.435) (0.507) (0.500) (0.563)
Multilateral Intervention on Government Side 0.248 -0.175 -0.538
(0.538) (0.617) (0.627)
Intervention from African Nation for Govt Side -0.105 -0.010 0.304
(0.342) (0.339) (0.365)
Intervention from USA or European Nation on Govt Side -0.141 -0.141 -0.249
(0.409) (0.407) (0.416)
Intervention for Rebel Side 0.900 1.342*
(0.493) (0.552)
Intensity -0.012*
(0.005)
Log Population -0.422*
(0.169)
Year of Conflict Initiation 0.037**
(0.013)
Observations 56 56 56 56
Failures (Episode Terminations) 46 46 46 46
Log-Likelihood -143.1 -142.9 -141.3 -128.4
Time at Risk 376.1 376.1 376.1 376.1
Chi-squared 2.361 2.653 5.856 31.62
Estimates are for distinct episodes of internationalized internal conflicts. Intensity measures the proportion of years
in the episode for which battle deaths exceeded 1,000. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 9. Probit Estimates of the Probability of Government Victory for Episodes of
Internal Conflict.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intervention (Govt or Rebel Side) 0.181 0.573* 0.412 0.427 0.520
(0.237) (0.271) (0.288) (0.294) (0.308)
Episode Duration -0.115** -0.104** -0.101** -0.111**
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.039)
Intensity -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log Population -0.105 -0.153* -0.137
(0.065) (0.072) (0.079)
Log Per Capita GDP (PPP) -0.005 0.034
(0.110) (0.172)
GDP Growth Rate -0.001 -0.003
(0.012) (0.012)
Investment Share -0.009 -0.010
(0.013) (0.013)
Government Spending Share -0.026* -0.024*
(0.011) (0.011)
C+I+G Share 
-0.002 -0.000
(0.006) (0.006)
Region: Middle East 
-0.062
(0.468)
Region: Asia 
-0.003
(0.489)
Region: Africa 0.135
(0.464)
Region: Americas 0.108
(0.447)
Year of Conflict Initiation 
-0.014
(0.007)
Constant -0.855** -0.595** 0.410 1.621 1.384
(0.099) (0.117) (0.629) (1.385) (1.976)
Observations 249 249 249 249 249
Log-Likelihood -126.0 -115.5 -114.2 -110.1 -107.9
Model Degrees of Freedom 1 3 4 9 14
Estimates are for distinct episodes of internal conflicts for which population and economic data are
available from the Penn World Table Version 7.0. Estimates are conditioned on episode termination.
Intensity measures the proportion of years in the episodefor which battle deaths exceeded 1,000.
Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 10. Probit Estimates of the Probability of Government Victory for Completed Episodes of
Internationalized Internal Conflict.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intervention on Government Side 0.994 0.926 0.943 2.296
(0.543) (0.566) (0.616) (1.317)
Intensity -0.055*
(0.024)
Log Population -0.294
(0.318)
Year of Conflict Initiation -0.070*
(0.030)
Intervention from USA or European Nation on Govt Side 0.196 0.194
(0.453) (0.453)
Intervention on Rebel Side 0.032
(0.449)
Constant -1.221** -1.245** -1.270* 3.837
(0.389) (0.394) (0.526) (2.853)
Observations 46 46 46 46
Log-Likelihood -24.64 -24.55 -24.55 -10.46
Model Degrees of Freedom 1 2 3 4
Estimates are for distinct episodes of internationalized internal conflicts, conditioned on episode termination.
Intensity measures the proportion of years in the episodefor which battle deaths exceeded 1,000. Standard errors
in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 11. Probit Estimates of the Probability of Government Victory,
Completed Episodes of Internationalized Internal Conflicts.
(1) (2) (3)
Log Geographic Distance -0.177
(0.194)
Linguistic Distance 0.695
(1.069)
Log Economic Distance 
-0.123
(0.164)
Constant 0.794 -0.717* -0.372
(1.491) (0.351) (0.336)
Observations 31 31 31
Log-Likelihood -18.25 -18.46 -18.39
Model Degrees of Freedom 1 1 1
Estimates arefor terminated episodes of internationalized internal conflicts for
which economic data are availablefrom the Penn World Table version 7.0. Log
economic distance is real, PPP-adjusted log per capita GDP of the interventionist
minus the real, PPP-adjusted log per capita GDP of the supported government's
country in thefirst year of the conflict episode in which the intervention took place.
Log geographic distance is calculated as the log of the geodesic distance (in
kilometers using the great circleformula) between the third party interventionist and
the supported government's country (see Mayer and Zignago). Linguistic distances
are based on the relative degree of difficulty (relative to English) for the
interventionist to learn the official language of the supported government's country
(see Chiswick and Miller). Linguistic distances are scaled from 0 to 1 with a score of 0
indicating the supported and supporter speak the same language and a score of 1
indicating highest degree of learning difficulty. If more than one country supports
the intervention on behalf of the government side with military forces, unweighted
average geographic economic, and language distances are used. Standard errors in
parentheses. **p<0.01, *p<0.05
185
3.8 Figures and Tables 3 CONFLICT DURATION
References
[1] Berman, Eli, Joseph H. Felter, and Jacob N. Shapiro (2010) "Constructive COIN:
How Development Can Fight Radicals," Foreign Affairs, June 1, 2010, available at
http://www.foreignafFairs.com/articles/66432/.
[2] _ .-.-. (2009) "Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq,"
NBER Working Paper #14606, March 2009.
[3] Berman, Eli and David D. Laitin (2008) "Religion, Terrorism, and Public Goods: Testing the Club
Model," Journal of Public Economics 92:10-11, pp. 1942-1967.
[4] Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson (2009) "The Incidence of Civil War: Theory and Evidence,"
Economic Organization and Public Policy Discussion Paper, LSE STICERD Research Paper No.
EOPP 005, available at http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/eopp/eopp05.pdf.
[5] Chiswick, Barry R. and Paul W. Miller (2004) "Linguistic Distance: A Quantitative Measure of the
Distance Between English and Other Languages," Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn, Germany,
Discussion Paper Series, IZA DP No. 1246.
[6] Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler and Mans Sbderbom (2004) "On the Duration of Civil War," Journal
of Peace Research 41:3, pp. 253-273.
[7] Feddersen, Timothy and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (1996) "The Swing Voter's Curse," American Eco-
nomic Review 86:3, pp. 408-424.
[8] _ _ _ .---(1998) "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts Under Strate-
gic Voting," American Political Science Review 92:1, pp. 23-35.
[9] Fearon, James D. (2004) "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer than Others?" Journal
of Peace Research 41:3, pp. 275-301.
[10] Fick, Nathaniel C. and John A. Nagl (2009) "Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan Edition,"
Foreign Policy, January/February 2009, available at http://www.foreign policy.com.
[11] Gates, Scott (2002) "Recruitment and Allegiance: The Micro-foundations of Rebellion," The Journal
of Conflict Resolution 46:1, pp. 111-130.
[12] Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg and HAvard Strand
(2002) "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset," Journal of Peace Research 39:5, pp. 615-637.
[13] Grossman, Herschell 1. (1991) "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," The American Eco-
nomic Review 81:4, pp. 912-921.
186
REFERENCESREFERENCES
[14] Harbom, Lotta (2010), "UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook," Version 4-2010, Uppsala
Conflict Data Program (UCDP) available at www.ucdp.uu.se and the Centre for the Study of Civil
Wars, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) available at www.prio.no/cscw.
[15] Hegre, HAvard (2004) "The Duration and Termination of Civil War," Journal of Peace Research
41:3, pp. 243-252.
[16] Heston, Alan, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 7.0, Center for Inter-
national Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, March
2011.
[17] Kreutz, Joakim (2010). "How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict
Termination Dataset," Journal of Peace Research 47:2, pp. 243-250.
[18] Mayer, Thierry and Soledad Zignago (2006) "Notes on CEPII's Distances Measures," Centre
d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (Institute for Research on the International
Economy) available at http://www.cepii.fr/distance/noticedisten.pdf.
[19] Nunn, Nathan and Nancy Qian (2011) "Aiding Conflict: The Unintended Consequences of U.S. Food
Aid on Civil War," unpublished draft presented at MIT and Harvard Development and Environment
Seminar in April 2011 (temporarily available at http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/6652).
[20] Regan, Patrick M. (2002) "Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflict," The
Journal of Conflict Resolution 46:1, pp. 55-73.
[21] Stedman, Stephen John (1997) "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," International Security 22:2,
pp. 5-53.
[22] Walter, Barbara F. (2004) "Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War," Journal
of Peace Research 41:3, pp. 371-388.
187
REFERENCESREFERENCES
